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Austerity Versus Stimulus:
An Introduction to the Special Issue
Howard Karger
James Midgley
Subas Risal
Special Editors
The Great Recession or Global Financial Crisis of 20072008 began with the collapse of several major financial institutions in both Europe and the United States. This crisis had a
major impact on the well-being of citizens around the world,
including the U.S. and Europe, where unemployment soared,
many thriving but marginal small businesses were shuttered,
and homelessness skyrocketed as highly indebted families
were unable to meet their mortgage obligations. Small investors lost heavily, and as savings and pension funds dramatically declined in value, the incomes of many older people fell.
Throughout Europe and the U.S., new housing developments
were frozen, public spending was severely cut with negative
implications for health care and education, and credit became
virtually unavailable after having been plentiful in the 1990s
and early 2000s.
In the U.S., approximately $700 billion was authorized by
the Bush administration to prevent a collapse of more financial
institutions after Lehman Brothers was allowed to default in
2008. The then newly elected Obama administration allocated
around $800 billion to its stimulus program, and in addition,
two large automotive manufacturing firms (General Motors
and Chrysler) were saved. Ford was given a line of credit
which it did not use (Nanto, 2009).
At least on the surface, it appeared that by 2010 the most
dramatic elements of the financial crisis has eased somewhat
in the U.S. For instance, the unemployment rate dropped from
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2014, Volume XLI, Number 2
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9.2% in 2009 to 7.3% in late-2013. The Dow Jones Industrial
Average went from 6,626 in March 2009 to more than 16,000
in November 2013, a high that broke the record of 13,806 set in
October 2007. Beneath the surface, however, the impact of the
recession continues to lead to even greater income inequality:
the September 2013 U.S. unemployment rate of 7.2% was 2.2
points higher than the same month in 2005; inflation-adjusted
2012 median household income (the latest figure available) fell
to $51,017 (the lowest inflation-adjusted annual income since
1995) or 8.3% below 2007. While median income fell, income
inequality worsened. The U.S. Census Bureau’s measure of
inequality, the Gini index, remained at almost 0.48 (a 1.00 is
‘perfect’ inequality) in 2012, which was unchanged from the
record high set in 2011. Inequality represents an upward trend
from 1967, when the Gini coefficient was 0.40 (Ruffing, 2013).
Moreover, the 0.46 U.S. Gini coefficient in 2003 was significantly higher than in other comparable industrial countries, including the United Kingdom (0.34); Germany (0.28); France (0.27);
Canada (0.32); and Italy (0.33) (United Nations University,
2013). The harsh economic conditions experienced by many
Americans—i.e., high unemployment, high levels of poverty,
and declining living standards—also characterize the lives of
hundreds of millions of people across the globe.
The initial response of the Eurozone to the 2007-2008 recession involved the bailout of major banks and the extension
of credit to several sovereign governments. The cost of these
bailouts amounted to hundreds of billions of Euros. To maintain the integrity of the Euro currency, numerous banks, as
well as governments of member states that were facing escalating bond rates, were rescued. Of these, the governments of
Greece and Cyprus attracted international attention because of
the severity of the conditions attached to the loans (He, Jacobs,
Kuper, & Ligthart, 2013).
In other parts of the world, such as China, the government launched a major stimulus initiative worth $586 billion
to soften the impact of declining export sales to Western
countries. The stimulus package was directed to areas such
as housing, transportation, health, education, infrastructure,
industrial subsidies, and tax cuts. The largest portion of the
stimulus
was
directed
at
public
infrastructure,
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reconstruction work in disaster areas, housing, social programs, and technology advancement. Similarly, the government of Brazil intervened to promote economic growth, and
has invested heavily in social protection, and particularly in
its famed Bolsa Familia program. The Bolsa Familia is a conditional cash transfer program that provides financial aid to poor
Brazilian families. Similar to U.S. welfare reform, eligible families must ensure their children attend school (free education is
provided if parents cannot afford it) and are vaccinated. More
recently, the newly elected government of Japan under Prime
Minister Abe’s leadership has adopted a massive stimulus
program designed to reflate the economy.
As the fiscal situation appeared to be stabilizing, if not
easing, criticisms of government responses to the crisis accelerated. In the U.S., controversy increased when the Obama
administration and the Congress enacted the Affordable Care
Act (Obamacare), which many conservatives believe will
further increase the national debt. By the 2012 election, the
debate had become highly polarized. The Tea Party movement and its allies in Congress campaigned vigorously against
the President’s policies, which they claimed were plunging
the nation into long-term economic stagnation. On the other
hand, many of the President’s supporters as well as progressive columnists and economists, such as Paul Krugman, complained that the government had not done enough to reverse
the effects of the Great Recession. The populist Occupy movement, which camped in public areas such as Zuccotti Park
near Wall Street, helped drive the debate by juxtaposing the
enormous benefits that accrue to the wealthiest one percent
compared to the stagnating and falling incomes of the vast
majority of the population. Writing in the Wall Street Journal,
entrepreneur Tom Perkins (2014) compared the discrimination
against America's 1% to the plight of Jews in Nazi Germany,
including Kristallnacht.
These different perspectives, which reflect the wider
austerity versus stimulus debate, were present during the
U.S. presidential election of 2012, and appeared to have had
some impact on its outcome. For instance, Obama’s decision to rescue the automobile industry increased his support
in swing industrial states, while Romney’s contention that
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allowing inefficient firms to go bankrupt was compatible with
the American market system, rang hollow in the light of his
earlier support of the Wall Street financial bailouts. At the same
time, many Americans remain skeptical of the idea that the
government should increase the national debt in an attempt
to stimulate economic growth. The idea that everyone should
sacrifice to balance the budget has implications not only for the
country’s continuous political struggles, but also for the very
core of social policy and social well-being.
This argument has been used with some success by the
Conservative Coalition government in Britain, which has used
the recession and the resulting deficit as a cover for retrenching
social programs. Some venerable programs, including the universal child benefit program introduced on the recommendation of the famed Beveridge Report, became means-tested, and
other social assistance programs were capped. The previous
Labour government’s innovative matched savings Child Trust
Fund was simply abolished (Allen, 2010). The rhetoric (and resonance) of shared sacrifice in the face of the recession appeared
to have muted public protest. Carefully crafted by U.S.-based
think tanks, the ideological message was simplified into a
folksy household maxim: “Like families, a government should
not overspend and must live within its means.” Lost within
this homespun wisdom was an important point: Government
spending is not like family spending, and the economy is far
more complex than an individual family budget.
In contrast to the UK, Mediterranean countries, such as
Greece and Spain, had little patience for self-sacrifice. The idea
of sacrifice has little resonance among the millions of people
who lost their livelihoods and cope as best they can with the
daily challenge of social deprivation. Here the social services
can barely cope with the devastating social consequences of
the crisis. By mid-2013 the Greek unemployment rate reached
an unprecedented 27.6% (under 25 youth unemployment was
55%), the overall poverty rate was 20%, and health conditions
were threatened as hospitals and clinics ran out of supplies.
Educated and skilled Greek workers are migrating in search of
employment, thereby diminishing the human capital needed
to rebuild the economy (Gow, 2012).
This special issue of the Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare
examines the austerity versus stimulus debate and its effects in
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an international context. Framed by the events of the recent
Great Recession, the special issue not only seeks to examine
governmental responses that reflect the austerity versus stimulus debate, but more broadly examines the way wider ideological currents and changing social and economic realities have
affected social policies around the world. The long-term trend
away from Keynesian interventionism and “welfare statism”
towards greater individual and familial responsibility, the use
of markets and the commercialization of welfare, all contributed to a fragmented and less effective system of provision
that failed to respond to the crisis as Keynesians had originally
intended. Nor did the adoption of market-based social policies
in the last few decades ensure social well-being as neoliberals
had predicted. The experiences of the countries represented in
this special issue offer interesting and cautionary lessons for
social policy in the future.
The special issue begins with an introductory article by
James Midgley, which examines the theoretical basis for the
austerity versus stimulus debate and discusses the policy
options derived from analyses of the causes of economic
cycles. Drawing on the history of economic thought, Midgley
shows that the current debate is rooted in accounts of the
workings of market economies that go back to the 18th century
and which offer very different normative interpretations of the
role of the state in economic affairs. These analyses continue to
shape policy approaches today, and although generally classed
either as neoliberal or Keynesian, the situation is much more
complicated than this simple dichotomy suggests. Offering
a nuanced account of the austerity versus stimulus debate
and its implications for both economic and social policy, the
paper discusses the way social welfare policies and programs
in different countries have failed to respond adequately to the
serious social consequences of the recent crisis. The article concludes by arguing that ideology and power play a crucial role
in determining how nations address pressing social needs in
recessionary times.
This is followed by Howard Karger’s article “Does
Europe’s Debt Crisis Spell the End of the Keynesian Welfare
State?” which examines the belief held by many European
bankers, investors and economists that the global financial
crisis and the debt problem was caused by the spending and
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borrowing required to maintain overly generous welfare programs, a bloated public sector, high pension levels and too many
generous subsidies. Based on the idea of ‘expansionary austerity,’ their solution lies in Draconian austerity measures
designed to discipline economies through severely cutting
government budgets and social programs. This article then
examines the austerity programs adopted by several indebted European nations, the rejection of Keynesian economics,
the introduction of (International Monetary Fund [IMF]-like)
Structural Adjustment Programs into the European context,
and the social and political dangers that can result from implementing austerity measures that lead to the erosion of benefits,
entitlements and social rights.
Fiona Dukelow and Mairéad Considine analyze the impact
of austerity on the Irish social protection system. The analysis examines Ireland’s wider financial and economic crisis and
its status as an “early adopter” of an austerity response which
has continued under European Union/IMF intervention. The
authors focus on how the crisis instigated a discussion around
the cost and design of the social protection system, which led
to a strategy of retrenchment and reform. Three core elements
in this narrative—generosity, sustainability and suitability are
identified.
Ijin Hong discusses recent developments in the Italian
welfare state. In particular, Hong examines how the unaddressed regional and intergenerational inequalities left the
Italian welfare unprepared for the 2008 economic crisis.
Neoliberal austerity measures adopted to address the risk
of economic default contributed to the further worsening of
living conditions for the Italians. The article attempts to understand Italy’s neoliberal shift by describing main social
policy reforms, visiting previous academic research on welfare
outcomes, and by finding a new interpretive frame for understanding the shift.
David Miller and M. C. (Terry) Hokenstad’s article on
“Deficit-Driven Austerity Policies” examines the impact of
quasi-austerity policies on local government and the provision
of social welfare and other services in the U.S. The authors
discuss austerity policies and the welfare state in relationship
to reduced revenue sharing with local communities, where the
effects are the most noticeable and detrimental.
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Lengwe-Katembula Mwansa and Gloria Jacques examine
the successful initiatives made by Botswana in terms of good
governance, and meeting the social needs of the population in
the context of the Millennium Development Goals. Most dramatically, Botswana was able to lower its poverty rate from
47% in 1990 to 20.7% in 2010. The authors also examine the
future challenges facing Botswana’s economy and the provision of social need to its citizens.
Lenore Matthew’s contribution, “The Global Financial
Crisis and Stimulus in Brazil,” examines how the onset of the
2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) slowed Brazil’s economic
growth and threatened the goal of decreasing poverty and inequality. To counter the effects of the crisis, the Brazilian government implemented a growth-with-equity stimulus plan that
targeted poor families with the goal of building human capital.
The article examines the impact of the stimulus package and
suggests that it had positive effects on the economy, but mixed
results when it came to the well-being of the poor. Matthew
contends that real improvements in the life of the poor may be
less positive than is reflected in governmental reports.
Lastly, Greg Marston’s paper examines Queensland,
Australia, where the government has instituted severe austerity measures using fear tactics and rhetoric that seems to come
straight out of the American Tea Party. Specifically, the fear
was that unless public debt was slashed and the public service
sector downsized, Queensland would become the Spain of
Australia. This comparison was built on a false sense of crisis
that helped to mask neoliberal economic reform. In addition,
the newly-elected Queensland government also passed laws
limiting civil liberties and political freedoms. This paper discusses the resistance to authoritarianism and austerity and the
impact this had on the population and social services.
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Austerity Versus Stimulus:
Theoretical Perspectives and Policy Implications
James Midgley
University of California-Berkeley
School of Social Welfare
Attempts to respond to the negative social and economic effects of
the Great Recession have been cast in terms of the austerity versus
stimulus debate. Although oversimplified, this debate reflects wider
theoretical analyses of market economies and normative prescriptions for enhancing their functioning. Referencing the historical
evolution of economic thought, these theories and their policy implications for responding to recessions are summarized and their
relevance for social welfare is examined in the light of recent events.
Key words: austerity, stimulus, social welfare, Great Recession,
economic thought

The austerity versus stimulus debate has become prominent since the onset of the Great Recession in the autumn of
2007. Advocates of austerity policies urge governments to retrench public spending, ease taxes and regulations and adopt
other measures that will restore business confidence prompting entrepreneurship, investment and economic revitalization.
On the other hand, advocates of stimulus policies urge governments to increase public spending through borrowing in order
to create employment, maintain incomes and stimulate consumption so that demand for goods and services will increase
and foster growth and prosperity.
However, it is simplistic to reduce the debate to these
polar opposites, since few governments have, in fact, taken a
clear position on either austerity or stimulus, and some have
adopted measures that give expression to both positions. In
addition, many have responded haphazardly to the recent recession, and often their responses have been shaped by electoral pressures. Economists themselves are divided on which
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2014, Volume XLI, Number 2

11

12			

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

policies are likely to be the most effective. Some have taken a
very clear position arguing vigorously for either austerity or
stimulus, while others propose a pragmatic mixture of the two.
Nevertheless, a preference for either austerity or stimulus can
be detected in the policy preferences of different governments.
These two approaches have also featured prominently in political and media discourse in recent years.
The debate reflects wider ideological differences about
how market economies function and how they should function. This invariably involves a larger debate about the role of
government in economic and social affairs, which has a long
and rich intellectual history. Although complex, there are opposing arguments on the question of state involvement which
have direct relevance for the austerity versus stimulus debate.
One position is that the economic market is self-equilibriating and that governments should refrain from intervening so
that its unencumbered internal mechanisms can function and
produce prosperity for all. The other posits that widespread
prosperity will only be achieved when efficient governments
committed to promoting the well-being of their citizens direct
the economy for social ends.
These two positions are discussed in this article with reference to the problem of ‘business cycles’ which appear to be
inherent in market economies. Since the 18th century, economists have been aware that periods of prosperity are followed
by periods of declining economic activity which may lead to
a recession, high unemployment and falling living standards.
In addition to documenting the occurrence of business cycles,
various explanations of their causes have been offered. Perhaps
most importantly, different normative accounts of how their
negative effects can be remedied have been formulated. The
current policy debate about austerity versus stimulus is based
on these conceptual endeavors.
Since the debate has direct implications for social well-being, social welfare scholars should understand its intellectual
origins and better appreciate policy proposals for addressing
the negative effects of economic volatility. The article begins
with a brief discussion of opposing conceptual representation
of market economies and explanations of the causes of economic cycles, and it then considers competing policy proposals for responding to these cycles. It concludes by reviewing
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the limited social welfare literature on the issue of austerity
versus stimulus and discusses its relevance to social welfare.

Conceptualizing the Economy and
Explaining Business Cycles
In his extensive history of economic thought, John Kenneth
Galbraith (1987) points out that systematic academic enquiry
into economic institutions can be traced back to the 18th
century when some Enlightenment thinkers began to speculate about the nature and dynamics of economic growth. Some
argued that growth occurs because enterprising individuals
create surpluses which are reinvested, stimulating more economic activity and generating employment, higher incomes
and prosperity. Reflecting earlier mercantilist ideas, others
took the view that nations become prosperous because they
have strong governments that promote investments, protect
the domestic economy and secure advantage in international
trade. Although rooted in classical political economy, these
two positions continue to shape economic analyses and policy
prescriptions today.
However, these positions represent a simplistic dichotomy
of a complex body of explanatory and normative theory on
growth and prosperity. While Adam Smith is often associated
with the view that prosperity flows from the natural workings
of the market economy and the rational pursuit of self-interest
by enterprising individuals, he also believed the governments
have a role to play by, for example, preventing the formation of
monopolies, maintaining a legal framework for trade, and promoting education. Similarly, John Maynard Keynes is usually
linked to the view that government should direct the economy,
but he also believed that long-term prosperity depends on
forging a strong partnership between the state and business.
Other economists, such as Karl Marx and Thorstein Veblen,
do not fit neatly into these two categories. Nevertheless, the
market and state interventionist positions continue to dominate economic analyses and policy prescriptions for attaining
prosperity. They are also central to contemporary explanations
of business cycles.
Also known as trade or economic cycles, perennial fluctuations in economic performance have been extensively
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documented, but their causes and the extent to which they
are amenable to policy remedies are hotly disputed. Similarly,
there is no standardized definition of these cycles or of the
difference between economic fluctuations, recessions, slumps
and full-blown depressions. In addition, different types of
downturns are often treated as if they were the same phenomenon, when it is obvious that a downturn caused by financial
speculation such as the recent Great Recession and one caused
by the oil shocks of the 1970s are very different. To complicate
matters further, some scholars believe that each recession is
unique that no generalizations about their causes are possible.
Economists attribute business cycles either to external or
exogenous factors such as war, bad harvests or climatic adversity, or to endogenous factors such as the supply of money or
the level of consumption. In addition, financial bubbles, panics
and manias have, as Charles Kindelberger (1978; Kindelberger
& Aliber, 2011) demonstrated, been a major cause of economic
instability over the centuries. He also drew attention to the fact
that many economic crises are the result of fraud and corruption. One of the first explanations of the endogenous causes of
slumps came from Thomas Malthus in a debate with his friend,
David Ricardo, over the cause of the post-Napoleonic recession of the early 19th century. He is also credited with articulating the first underconsumptionist theory of recession, claiming that the failure of capitalists to reinvest profits in industry
reduced production and employment with the result that
consumption fell, causing a slump. Ricardo disagreed, citing
the views of the French political economist Jean-Baptiste Say,
that there can be no underconsumption in a market economy
if prices adjust and create their own demand. This idea was
subsequently adopted by neoclassical scholars and remains influential today.
Say’s analysis drew on Smith’s formative notion that the
market forces of supply and demand create a natural equilibrium which, when disturbed, will automatically be rebalanced
by the internal workings of the market. Smith’s Newtonian
view of the economy as a highly integrated and harmonious
system laid the foundations not only for Ricardo and Say’s
writings, but for John Stuart Mill, the neoclassical marginalists and Alfred Marshall, whose mathematical models of the
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workings of the economy exerted enormous influence. Since
then, the neoclassical conception of a self-regulating economy
that automatically resolves economic cycles has been widely
accepted in economic and policy circles. It found expression in
Friedrich von Hayek’s highly influential work and in the writings of Milton Friedman, as well as a large number of contemporary neoclassical thinkers who are today popularly known
as neoliberals.
The argument that markets do not automatically equilibriate and that governments should adopt policies to address economic cycles and their deleterious effects can be traced to Jean
Charles Sismondi, who published one of the first systematic
studies of economic recessions in 1819. In times of economic
boom, he argued, competition and the drive for profits rapidly
increase production, which in turn results in overproduction
and declining profits followed by falling wages, unemployment and a decline in consumption. Although he conceded
that this problem might resolve itself in the long run, it causes
widespread suffering. Influenced by Robert Owen’s work,
he argued for a socialist, state-managed economy that would
foster economic stability. Marx was sympathetic to his ideas,
agreeing that economic downturns are associated with the
falling rate of profit, but he also argued that they were symptomatic of capitalism’s crisis tendencies and a precursor to its
ultimate collapse. As is well known, both he and Friedrich
Engels dismissed the argument that government should intervene, since the problem will only be resolved when the capitalist mode of production is replaced by socialism.
Marx’s work influenced Joseph Schumpeter (1939), who
was one of the most important 20th century scholars of business cycles. He disagreed with the neoclassicists and their
static conception of the economy as a stable, self-regulating
system and, adopting the historicism of Hegel, Marx and the
German Historical School of Economics, he focused on longterm economic growth and argued that bursts of innovation
brought about by creative entrepreneurs propel the economy
towards prosperity. However, he believed that this process
is accompanied by volatility and constant renewal, characterized by the “creative destruction” of inefficient enterprises. Downturns are an integral part of the process of creative
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destruction which occurs when entrepreneurial innovations
are emulated by less able imitators, resulting in the overproduction of mediocre goods and services and a general decline
in economic activity. Eventually, the downturn is corrected by
a new spurt of innovation and renewed growth. Despite their
volatility and destructive effects, recessions purge and renew
the economy and are essential for long-term prosperity.
Working with Ludwig von Mises, Hayek (1931) attributed
business cycles to monetary factors which occur when easy
credit stimulates the overproduction of consumer goods, distorting the economy and causing prices and ultimately wages
to fall. Although Keynes described Hayek’s interpretation
as a "frightful muddle," it contributed to the formulation of
monetarist explanations that subsequently became highly influential. At this time, the American economist Irving Fisher
augmented the monetarist analysis by arguing that financial
crises can be eased if reserve banks manipulate the money
supply by adjusting interest rates. His formative ideas had a
major influence on Keynes and subsequently on Friedman’s
monetarist theory which contends that economic stability is
dependent on a sound monetary system. Restricted money
supply due to high interest rates dampens growth and causes
a downturn which leads to recession. On the other hand, easy
money causes inflation and harms the economy. These views
have had a major influence on policy, but it will be shown that
both Fisher and Friedman were reluctant interventionists contending that the economy’s self-regulating mechanism should
not be disrupted through injudicious state intervention.
Keynes took a different position. Rejecting the neoclassical paradigm and Say’s work in particular, he argued that
downturns are not a temporary aberration but can result in
permanent stagnation. Challenging the belief that a depressed
economy will recover in the long run, he famously quipped
that “in the long run we are all dead.” He also took issue with
those who claimed that if wages were allowed to adjust to
demand, unemployment would disappear. Falling wages, he
countered, would not only immiserize workers but reduce aggregate demand, having wider negative effects. Having specialized in probability theory as a student, he also challenged
the neoclassical idea that future economic events could be predicted with a high degree of reliability. Uncertainty, he argued,
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plays a major role in economic downturns.
Keynes’s explanation of the causes of business cycles is
complex and some argue, ambiguous and even contradictory. Certainly, his ideas evolved in the light of changing policy
events during his lifetime, but essentially he argued that
slumps are due to a fall in aggregate demand caused by excessive savings and a lack of productive investment. When investment falls, production and employment decline, leading to
a downward spiral which, unless checked, causes a recession.
He claimed that monetary accumulation does not necessarily
result in productive employment-generating investments but
often fosters reckless speculation, which results in financial
bubbles. This idea influenced Hyman Minsky’s (1986) analysis of financial crises, which was also shaped by the ideas of
his teacher, Schumpeter. Minsky formulated a stadial model
of financial bubbles which posited that during times of rapid
growth, confidence and speculative borrowing escalates, eventually reaching the point when debts cannot be repaid, triggering a financial collapse. Known as the financial instability
hypothesis, his work has been widely commended for its prescient relevance to recent events.
Keynes was also concerned that excessive speculation
created anxiety among investors whose natural “animal
spirits” were inhibited by the risk of financial collapse. Sensing
a looming downturn, they hoard cash, further curtailing investment and demand. He also drew attention to the role of international factors, pointing out that the obsession with maintaining the gold standard at the time was highly detrimental.
In addition, he made a novel contribution to understanding
business cycles by showing that bad policy can cause and exacerbate economic downturns. His experience at Versailles
at the end of World War I and his subsequent writing on the
subject revealed the extent to which he recognized the role of
policy ineptitude in creating economic instability.
Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963) made a similar argument, claiming that the Great Depression was caused by
the Federal Reserve Bank, a government agency which had
failed to ease the money supply, turning a mild economic
downturn into a major recession. As noted earlier, monetary
factors are central to Friedman’s analysis of business cycles.
Together with Hayek, he is regarded as the doyen of modern
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neoliberalism, and both have also been at the forefront of the
attack on Keynes’s analysis and policy prescriptions. Their
writing also inspired new versions of the neoclassical approach, such as the efficient market hypothesis, real business
cycles theory and rational expectations. These contend that
markets are inherently efficient and that provided governments limit their involvement, economic downturns will only
occur occasionally. Indeed, neoliberals such as John Taylor
(2009) argue that since the 1980s, the adoption of market
reforms have been accompanied by relatively little financial
turbulence. Although the recent Great Recession has dented
neoliberal optimism about the efficiency of markets, sharp
differences about how to deal with its effects have not been
resolved. These include differences among neoliberal scholars
themselves about the nature and extent of state intervention.
As will be shown, some believe that government intervention
in the form of austerity policies is appropriate, while some
others contend that the market can resolve economic downturns without state interference.

Normative Perspectives and Policy Options
The failure to formulate a standard explanation of the
causes of business cycles has impeded the formulation of a
standard, agreed upon prescription for addressing their negative effects, and today a variety of policy options are available. Although these are often encapsulated within the austerity versus stimulus debate, it was noted earlier that this is an
oversimplification. Nor is it simply a matter of government
intervention versus non-intervention. Few neoliberal scholars today advocate a radical laissez-faire position and, as will
be shown, some statists recommend the adoption of austerity
measures. Clearly the issues are complex and require an analysis that draws on the insights of the major schools of contemporary political economy which offer different policy prescriptions for responding to recessions.
The first policy approach reflects the work of Keynes
and his followers, who advocate a proactive role for governments in economic management. Although Keynes’s ideas
are usually associated with the use of countercyclical policies,
his biographer, Robert Skidelsky (2009), points out that his
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prescriptions for achieving long-term stability are of greater significance than his proposals for responding to crises. Rejecting
the neoclassical position, as well as democratic socialism and
communism and their advocacy of nationalization and centralized economic planning, Keynes favored policies that
enhance the functioning of markets. These include monetary
policies to control inflation and foster growth, as well as fiscal
policies which involve manipulating tax rates and increasing
public spending. If used judiciously, both would promote investment, stimulate demand and create employment.
Keynes initially agreed with Fisher that business cycles can
be managed through monetary policy, but he was subsequently
persuaded that fiscal measures were also required. However,
Robert Cord (2007) observes that, contrary to popular belief, he
was cautious on the question of deficit spending and argued
that a balanced budget is necessary for long-term economic
health. While he favored deficit spending during downturns,
fiscal policy should primarily be used in times of prosperity to
promote investment and maintain employment. In this regard,
the state has a pivotal role to play in what Keynes called the
“comprehensive socialisation of investment” (Skidelsky, 2009,
p. 97). It should not only invest in infrastructure but “organize”
investment by forging a strong partnership with the business
community. Greater international cooperation to address crisis
tendencies in the global economy is also needed. Also, as mentioned earlier, Keynes was critical of what he regarded as bad
policy and published withering critiques of inept politicians
on this issue. Sound policy is dependent on a technocratic and
efficient state that proactively fine-tunes both monetary and
fiscal policy for the benefit of its citizens.
Keynes’s policy prescriptions were subsequently developed by his own students, such as Richard Kahn and Joan
Robinson, and by numerous admirers in the United States
and elsewhere, including luminaries such as Paul Samuelson,
Gunnar Myrdal, James Tobin, John Kenneth Galbraith, Paul
Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, to name but a few. Keynesianism
also influenced social policy. Social insurance and other cash
transfers, which had been introduced in many Western countries in the early decades of the 20th century, were linked
to Keynesian policies and viewed in economic rather than
welfare terms as helping to maintain demand and to function
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as “automatic stabilizers” in times of economic downturn.
Although Keynesianism is credited with promoting steady
growth and widespread prosperity in the Western countries
in the 1950s and 1960s, it appeared to be less effective in addressing the phenomenon of “stagflation” which emerged in
the 1970s. Extraordinarily high levels of inflation but persistent
unemployment were impervious to Keynesian remedies, and
coupled with the effects of the oil shocks, paved the way for
the popularization of neoliberal policies. It was only with the
onset of the Great Recession that Keynesian prescriptions have
again attracted attention.
Many progressive commentators (Blinder, 2013; Grunwald,
2012; Krugman, 2009, 2012; Kuttner, 2013; Stiglitz, 2010, 2012)
propose the use of stimulus measures based on Keynesian
ideas which they contend will revive the economy. Although
applauding the Obama administration’s recovery package (authorized in terms of the American Recovery and Investment
Act of 2009), they argue that it did not go far enough and is in
part responsible for the country’s slow recovery. The second
policy approach is based on the neoclassical approach which
is comprised of different strands including monetarism, rational expectations and the efficient market hypothesis. These
all posit that the unencumbered market economy will of its
own accord generate growth and prosperity. Impenetrable
mathematical models formulated by contemporary neoliberal
scholars have demonstrated that markets cannot be manipulated by investors, corporations, politicians or bureaucrats, but
that the rational behaviors of millions of individual economic
actors are in the aggregate the basis for market efficiency. Since
it has been “scientifically” proven that unencumbered markets
cannot fail, attempts to regulate them are not only unnecessary
but counterproductive. Similarly, rational expectations theory
contends that people anticipate government policy decisions,
rendering them ineffective. These ideas have been widely
adopted since the Reagan years and also justified financial deregulation in the 1990s.
Nevertheless, it has been shown already that few neoliberal economists believe that governments have no role to play.
Instead, as Hayek argued, government should create favorable
conditions for entrepreneurs and investors to pursue profits,
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and this requires low taxes, deregulation, denationalization
and other policies that promote innovation and competition.
In a recent account, Taylor (2012) restates these ideas, outlining the key principles on which sound economic policy should
be based. These include the centrality of markets and the rule
of law, a limited role for government, incentives and a predictable market-friendly policy framework. Keynesianism, he
claims, does not provide a predictable framework, because its
continual economic fine tuning is subject to error and creates
uncertainty. Like Friedman and Schwartz, Taylor (2009) attributes recessions to economic mismanagement. The Great
Recession, he claims, was the result of deficit spending by
the Bush administration, unrealistically low interest rates and
haphazard action in response to the bank failures of 2008. Also,
like Friedman, he believes that the money supply should not
be frequently manipulated but governed by a fixed target,
such as Friedman’s constant monetary growth rule or his own
Taylor rule, which automatically adjusts money supply in the
light of changing events. This creates a stable and predictable
environment for investors and entrepreneurs and maintains
sound economic “fundamentals.”
By ensuring the fundamentals, governments prevent recessions from occurring, and in the unlikely event of a downturn,
most neoliberal scholars believe that governments should
embrace austerity policies. As will be shown, only a few economists, such as Schumpeter, believe that recessions should be
allowed to run their “natural” course. By implementing austerity policies, the state signals investors and entrepreneurs
that it is serious about promoting recovery, that it will live
within its means, and above all, that taxes will not be raised
to meet deficits. In this climate, entrepreneurs will confidently
invest in the resurgent economy. Reserve banks augment this
approach by easing the money supply and providing ready
credit for investment. As confidence is boosted, new investments create businesses and jobs and foster what is sometimes referred to “as expansionary austerity.” Contrary to the
Keynesian view that austerity is deflationary, neoliberal scholars believe that austerity actually promotes growth. Studies by
Alberto Alesina and his colleagues (Alesina & Ardagna, 1998;
Alesina & Perotti, 1995) contend that many countries which
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have adopted austerity policies have been restored to normal
economic functioning. Deficit spending not only exacerbates
the problem but, as Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff
(2010) claim, it impedes growth. Although Mark Blyth’s (2013)
detailed analysis of the evidence strongly disputes these findings, they have been widely used to support of the neoliberal
agenda.
Schumpeter is associated with the neoclassical position,
but as was noted earlier, he disagreed with its static view of
the economy and argued instead that the long-term health
of the economy depends on a dynamic process of growth
characterized by creative destruction, renewal and regeneration. Although recessions have unfortunate social effects,
they are necessary for development. In this regard, his ideas
echo the Social Darwinist belief that evolutionary change
through natural selection improves society and that protecting “the weak” through social welfare programs is harmful.
Accordingly, governments should not intervene to mitigate
or correct recessions, nor should they seek to prevent them.
Although Schumpeter’s ideas resonate with some politicians
and members of the business community, his proposals are not
widely accepted today. As presidential candidate Mitt Romney
realized during the 2012 election, recommending the liquidation of bankrupt automotive firms is not electorally popular.
On the other hand, David Stockman’s (2013) recent restatement of the Schumpeterian approach attracted widespread
media attention.
The third policy approach is associated with the imposition
of austerity policies by the European Central Bank at the behest
of the German government which has funded rescue packages
for several of the Union’s member states. Known as ordoliberalism, it requires a strong state which forges durable corporate
arrangements with the business community and trades unions
within a policy framework that shapes market behavior. As
its name implies, ordoliberalism seeks to maintain an orderly
economic system which minimizes conflict between labor,
business and the state. It also promotes economic growth, and
particularly industrialization, in collaboration with all partners. Social policies that support economic development and
promote solidarity are integral to the ordoliberal model. The
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state invests heavily in infrastructure, supports educational
and training programs that prepare workers for industrial employment and maintains fiscal discipline. Budget deficits are
not only viewed as harmful because they impede growth but
because they undermine the whole system.
Although ordoliberalism is market-based, its advocates
reject the neoliberal view that the decisions of myriads of individual economic actors are the source of prosperity and believe
instead that the market should operate within a system of rules
that facilitates competition. Of particular importance are rules
that prevent large corporations from creating monopolies and
dominating the economy. Ordoliberalism is in many respects
similar to Keynesianism and also to the corporatist approaches
adopted in European countries such as Austria and Sweden
(Williamson, 2010). However, unlike Keynesianism, it rejects
deficit spending as well as continual economic fine-tuning,
relying instead on a comprehensive, rule-based or “constitutional" economic system which is maintained by laws, central
banks, technocrats and a large number of boards, advisory
committees and other entities that negotiate and secure consensus from different partners in the corporate system.
The ordoliberal approach was formulated in the 1930s by
Walter Eucken and his colleagues at the University of Freiburg.
It is rooted in the 19th century industrialization policies of the
Prussian government, which invested heavily in education
and infrastructure and secured the support of nascent industrialists for its effort to enhance its global status. These events
were bolstered at the time by writings of Friedrich List who
claimed that the British commitment to laissez-faire was little
more than a ploy to maintain its own imperial position. Since
then, German governments have disavowed market liberalism and relied instead on a strong state to direct economic development. Although sullied by Nazi totalitarianism, this approach was revived with the support of the Marshall Plan after
World War II and, in the guise of the Social Market Economy,
it shaped the country’s impressive economic and social development. Despite facing serious economic challenges following reunification, the government’s continued commitment
to economic corporatism has ensured widespread prosperity.
However, with the adoption of labor flexibility and economic
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liberalization policies in recent years, there is concern about
whether the ordoliberal model can be sustained.
Variations of the ordoliberal model which to different
degrees combine corporatism, Keynesianism and French dirigisme are found in other countries, and perhaps most notably
in the developmental states of East Asia which emerged as
major industrial nations after World War II (Leftwich, 2000;
Woo-Cumings, 1999). However, as the East Asian financial
crisis of the late 1990s reveals, state-directed development is
not immune to recession and even stagnation. Nevertheless,
austerity has not featured prominently in their responses to
economic downturns. In fact, they and other rapidly growing
economies in the developing world have quite successfully
adopted stimulus policies. For example, the government of
China implemented a massive stimulus package in the wake of
the Great Recession and has been able to maintain steady, albeit
somewhat slower growth in recent years. A vigorous reflationary policy was also introduced in Japan following the recent
election of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his government.
The final policy approach, which is not grounded in a coherent theory of political economy, advocates a cautious response based on experiment and incremental decision-making.
As an opinion piece in Business Week (Engardio, 2008, p. 22) in
the early months of the Great Recession summarized: “Forget
Adam Smith—whatever works!” Arguing pragmatically for a
mix of austerity and stimulus, this approach proceeds incrementally to test various options. However, it is subject to electoral pressures so that a fluid and even haphazard response
often emerges. Decisions to implement austerity or stimulus
proposals frequently falter, resulting in incoherent policy decisions. For example, Philippe Pochet and Cristophe Degryse
(2010) report that the European Union’s comprehensive economic recovery plan of 2008 unraveled as the crisis worsened,
electoral opposition in Germany to rescue packages increased
and struggles between the Union’s leadership intensified. The
result, as Blyth (2013) notes, is a chaotic situation which has in
fact exacerbated the problem.
Similarly, the Obama administration retreated from its original stimulus approach in the face of sustained political opposition and, in the light of the current stalemate in the Congress,
the situation has become muddled. However, the Federal
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Reserve resolutely adheres to its monetary policy. In Britain,
the Conservative Coalition’s original commitment to austerity
was also eased after it suffered several byelection defeats, even
though the government insists that it will balance the budget.
On the other hand, countries such as Greece and Cyprus
have been subjected to the callous dictates of austerity with
devastating consequences for their citizens. Faced with these
confused policy responses, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) recently urged its member states to proceed cautiously
and experiment with a mix of austerity and stimulus policies.
The intervention of the IMF serves as a reminder that global
economic forces have further complicated matters and affected
policy responses directed at resolving domestic problems.

Social Policy Responses
Policy recommendations for mitigating the effects of recessions are usually couched in economic terms, but as recent
events reveal, recessions have serious social consequences. In
the United States and other Western countries, unemployment
soared and the incidence of poverty and deprivation increased
in the wake of the financial crisis. Millions of families lost
their homes through mortgage foreclosures and many elderly
people struggled to make ends meet as their pension fund accumulations dwindled. Rising public sector deficits resulted in
severe retrenchments in education, health and social services
with detrimental implications for social well-being. Even in
developing countries that were not directly affected, falling
commodity prices and demand for their export goods reduced
the incomes of millions of workers. The human costs of these
events are huge and require a coordinated and systematic
social policy response.
Prior to the great depression of the 1930s, responses to
economic downturns were nonexistent or haphazard, and it
was only with the Roosevelt administration’s New Deal that
a systematic approach which integrated social and economic
interventions was implemented. There were similar developments in Europe. Although the New Deal and the adoption of
the Beveridge proposals in Britain are often seen as “welfarist”
innovations, both were an integral part of wider economic
policies designed to promote recovery and promote long-term
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prosperity. The German social market economy mentioned
earlier is another example of how social and economic policies
were closely linked at the time. By integrating economic and
social policies, social programs not only served as automatic
stabilizers during recessionary periods but contributed positively to economic prosperity.
Since then, the close association between economic and
social policy has been severed. Changing economic and social
conditions, as well as rising affluence and individualism, accompanied by electoral resistance to public spending have
contributed to the relegation of social welfare as of secondary
importance to economic policy. As Midgley (2008) suggests,
these changes have also been fostered by the popularization
of the neoliberal argument that social spending is inimical to
economic growth. Paradoxically, social policy scholars such
as Richard Titmuss (1974) and T. H. Marshall (1950) contributed to the separation of welfare and the economy by arguing
that social policies should be motivated by altruism and social
rights rather than economic criteria. These developments had
a major impact, contributing to the segregation of economic
and social policy, as well as the fraying of the so-called safety
net. Today, welfare programs no longer function effectively as
automatic stabilizers, nor do they promote wider economic
goals.
For example, increasingly stringent enrollment and other
requirements have reduced the coverage of unemployment insurance as well as benefit levels in the United States. Similarly,
the abolition of the country’s social assistance program for
families with children in 1996 and its replacement with a new
welfare-to-work program (known as Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families, or TANF) has seriously undermined the
welfare system’s role as an automatic stabilizer. In a recent
study of TANF coverage, Keith Bentele and Lisa Nicoli (2012)
report that take-up has fallen to historically low levels, even
though need has increased dramatically. Sasha Abramsky
(2012) notes that budgetary supplements to the program,
which were introduced as a part of the Obama stimulus
package, were inadequate, and some states even declined to
accept these funds. In Arkansas, Alabama and Mississippi, less
then 15 percent of families in poverty received TANF benefits
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during the recession. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP), previously known as food stamps, has more
extensive coverage, but benefits levels are also low. To make
matters worse, Congress proposed major reductions to the
program in 2013. Natasha Pilkauskas and her colleagues point
out that although the food stamp program alleviated hardship
during the Great Recession, its ability to function effectively
in the future may be undermined by budgetary reductions
(Pilkauskas, Currie, & Garfinkel, 2012).
Although these social programs have been severely retrenched and face further cuts, they continue to play a critical role in preventing destitution among very poor people
in the United States. As Luke Shaefer & Kathryn Edin (2013)
contend, the incidence of absolute poverty would be even
worse without them. Jared Bernstein (2013) agrees, pointing
out that programs such as food stamps, tax credits and healthcare assistance, which were boosted by the Obama administration’s stimulus initiative, kept as many as fifty million people
above the federal government’s poverty line—this figure includes approximately nine million children. In view of recent
Congressional battles over public spending, he is not optimistic about the future of these programs.
Naren Prasad and Megan Gerecke’s (2010) comprehensive
overview of policy responses to the Great Recession shows
that the governments of many Western countries failed to use
social welfare programs to respond to the crisis. In many cases,
these programs are underdeveloped or had been weakened
over the years. Although some European countries had programs that had a positive countercyclical effect, they were in
a minority. Bernard Casey (2012) notes that even in Europe,
the response was highly uneven. In some cases, governments
retrenched social spending, while in others they responded
haphazardly to political pressure and increased spending. For
example, in Sweden, automatic reductions to the state pension
program, which are required when revenues decline, were
suspended in response to these pressures (Scherman, 2012). In
Britain, the Conservative Coalition cynically used the financial crisis to introduce a number of “welfare reforms,” claiming that the budget deficit requires sacrifices from everyone,
including those receiving benefits. Social assistance payments

28			

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

were capped, the country’s historic universal child benefit
program was means-tested, and its child savings account
abolished.
In many developing countries, social protection programs were also retrenched in response to the recession. Anna
McCord (2010) reports that the governments of many developing countries were more concerned with reflation rather
than meeting increased social need. Part of the problem is that
relatively few of these countries have well-developed social
insurance or social assistance programs. George Mpedi (2009)
contends that the situation in Africa is particularly dire. On
the other hand, Prasad and Gerecke (2010) point out that recessions have in the past prompted social welfare expansion.
In addition to the examples of the United States and Britain
given earlier, they note that developing countries such as
Mexico and Korea introduced new programs in response to
financial crises. The expansion of social protection in Korea
in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis has been particularly well documented (Hwang, 2006; Kwon, 2001). The Great
Recession, Prasad and Gerecke suggest, may also foster a recommitment to social welfare.
Karl Polanyi (1944) famously made a similar observation
in his account of how the welfare state emerged as a reaction
to the excesses of rampant 19th century capitalism. However,
there are few indications that an effective countervailing force
has emerged. The Occupy Movement, which expresses the
anger of millions of ordinary Americans about the financial
crisis and the privileges enjoyed by the top one percent of
income earners, passed without significant reforms. Although
new regulations have been imposed on the financial industry,
Robert Kuttner (2013) and others doubt whether they will be
effective. Certainly, financial elites continue to wield enormous
power, and the extreme inequalities which scholars such as
Raghuram Rajan (2010) and Robert Reich (2010) believe actually caused the recession have not been addressed. Although
Krugman (2012), Stiglitz (2012), Kuttner (2013) and others
argue that the current deficit can be addressed by raising
taxes on those with high incomes, there is little if any political
support for these proposals. In addition, recent Congressional
hearings on tax avoidance by large multinational firms are
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unlikely to produce any significant changes. On the other hand,
attacks on social programs such as food stamps, Medicare and
Social Security continue unabated. Clearly, sharp differentials
in power, income and wealth continue to shape policy responses to the Great Recession.
A much more vigorous social policy response is needed if
the serious social consequences of financial crises are to be addressed and if long-term prosperity is to be assured. A solid intellectual basis for social welfare that has electoral appeal and
can be championed by progressive politicians is sorely needed.
In the 1930s, Keynesianism offered an intellectual framework
of this kind which, coupled with Beveridge’s work and that
of European Social Democrats, legitimated social spending.
Since the 1980s, neoliberal economics has offered an equally
effective intellectual counterargument. There is an urgent need
for a reinvigorated theory that provides a viable rationale for
social welfare. This will require that the current obsession with
static welfare state typologies, as well as rhetorical indulgences
based on postmodernist and abstract critical theories, be transcended with workable, pragmatic proposals (Stoesz, 2005).
The growing interest in social policy circles in the interface
between economic and social policy, and in social investments
that can revitalize social policy’s contribution to economic development, may form the basis for proposals of this kind.
It could be that an opportunity has been missed to formulate new and politically viable approaches in response to the
social crisis resulting from the Great Recession. However, it
has brought the issues into sharp focus. Certainly, many more
people today are supportive of the need for concerted action.
Indeed, many have been affected by the crisis. A renewed commitment to address the challenge by formulating innovative
and appropriate social policy responses and advocating for
their adoption is now required.

References
Abramsky, S. (2012). Creating a Countercyclical Welfare System.
American Prospect. July/August, 62-64.
Alesina, A. & Ardagna, S. (1998). Tales of Fiscal Adjustment. Economic
Policy. 13 (27) 487-545.

30			

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

Alesina, A. & Perotti, R. (1995). Fiscal Expansions and Adjustments
in OECD Economies. Economic Policy. 10 (21) 205-284.
Bentele, K. G. & Nicole, L. T. (2012). Ending Access as We Know It:
State Welfare Benefit Coverage in the TANF Era. Social Service
Review, 86 (2), 223-268.
Bernstein, J. (2013). Children of the Great Collapse. American Prospect.
May/June, 57-61.
Blinder, A. (2013). After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the
Response and the Work Ahead. New York: Penguin.
Blyth, M. (2013). Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Casey, B. H. (2012). The Implications of the Economic Crisis for
Pensions and Pension Policy in Europe. Global Social Policy, 12
(3), 246-265.
Cord, R. (2007). Keynes. London: Haus Publishing
Engardio, P. (2008, Oct. 15). Forget Adam Smith, whatever works.
Bloomberg's Business Week Magazine, 22.
Friedman, M & Schwartz, A. (1963). A Monetary History of the United
States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Galbraith, J. K. (1987). Economics in Perspective: A Critical History.
Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Grunwald, M. (2012). The New New Deal: The Hidden Story of Change in
the Obama Era. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Hayek, F. von (1931). Prices and Production. London: Macmillan.
Hwang, G. (2006). Pathways to State Welfare in Korea: Interests, Ideas
and Institutions. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Kindelberger, C. P. (1978). Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of
Financial Crises. New York: Basic Books.
Kindelberger, C. P. & Aliber, R. Z. (2011). Manias, Panics and Crashes:
A History of Financial Crises. (6th edition). New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Krugman, P. (2009). The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of
2008. New York: Penguin.
Krugman, P. (2012). End this Depression Now! New York: Norton.
Kuttner, R. (2013). Debtor’s Prison: The Politics of Austerity versus
Possibility. New York: Knopf.
Kwon, H. J. (2001). Globalization, Unemployment and Policy
Responses in Korea: Repositioning the State. Global Social Policy.
1 (2), 213-234,
Leftwich, A. (2000). States of Development: On the Primacy of Politics in
Development. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and Other Essays. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
McCord, A. (2010). The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Social
Protection in Developing Countries. International Social Security
Review. 63 (2), 1-46.
Midgley, J. (2008). Social Security and the Economy: Key Perspectives.
In J. Midgley and K. L. Tang (Eds), Social Security, the Economy
and Development. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 51-84.

Theoretical Perspectives & Policy Implications

31

Minsky, H. P. (1986). Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Mpedi, L. G. (2009). Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on Social
Security Systems in Africa. Journal of Social Development in Africa,
24 (2), 123-138.
Pilkauskas, N. V., Currie, J. M. & Garfinkel, I. (2012). The Great
Recession, Public Transfers, and Material Hardship. Social Service
Review. 86 (3), 401-427.
Pochet, P. & Degryse, C. (2010). Social Policies of the European Union.
Global Social Policy, 10 (2), 248-257.
Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation. New York: Farrar and
Rinehart.
Prasad, N. & Gerecke, M (2010). Social Security Spending in Times of
Crisis. Global Social Policy, 10 (2), 218-247.
Rajan, R. (2010). Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the
World Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Reich, R. B. (2010). Aftershock: The Next Economy and America’s Future.
New York: Knopf.
Reinhart, C. M. & Rogoff, K. S. (2009). This Time its Different: Eight
Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Scherman, K. (2012). The Swedish Public Pension under Financial
Stress. Global Social Policy, 12 (3), 336-338.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1939). Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and
Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process. New York: McGraw
Hill.
Shaefer, H. L. & Edin, K. (2013). Rising Extreme Poverty in the
United States and the Response Federal Means-Tested Transfer
Programs. Social Service Review. 87 (2), 292-318.
Skidelsky, R. (2009). Keynes: The Return of the Master. London: Penguin.
Stockman, D. (2013). The Great Deformation: The Corruption of
Capitalism in America. New York: Public Affairs.
Stoesz, D. (2005). Quixote’s Ghost: The Right, the Liberati and the Future
of Social Policy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2010). Free Fall: America, Free Markets and the Sinking of
the World Economy. New York: Norton.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2012). The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society
Endangers Our Future. New York: Norton.
Taylor, J. B. (2009). Getting off Track: How Government Actions and
Interventions Caused, Prolonged and Worsened the Financial Crisis.
Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
Taylor, J. B. (2012). First Principles: Five Keys to Restoring America’s
Prosperity. New York: Norton.
Titmuss R. M. (1974) Social Policy: An Introduction. London: Allen and
Unwin.
Williamson, P. J. (2010). Varieties of Corporatism: A Conceptual
Discussion. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Woo-Cumings, M. (Ed.) (1999). The Developmental State. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.

The Bitter Pill: Austerity, Debt, and the Attack
on Europe's Welfare States
Howard Karger
University of Queensland, Australia
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There is a general belief among may European policymakers that
the current debt problem in some Eurozone countries is caused
by the unsustainable levels of governmental spending required
to maintain overly generous welfare state programs, a bloated
public sector, overly generous pension levels, state subsidies,
and low user fees for services. Their proposed solution lies in
implementing stringent austerity measures designed to discipline debt-ridden governments by cutting public budgets, reducing the number of public sector workers, curbing social benefits,
and sharply narrowing the scope of the welfare state. Based on
a belief in ‘expansionary austerity,’ this approach repudiates a
key Keynesian principle for dealing with a recession—namely,
the use of government spending to pursue full employment.
This paper will examine the austerity measures forced upon
several heavily indebted European nations by the ‘Troika’—
the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB)
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Also examined
will be the introduction of components of the IMF and World
Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) into the Eurozone context, and the resulting social and political instability.
Key words: austerity, European Commission, European Central
Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Structural Adjustment Programs, welfare state, Keynes

A tense consensus existed in Western nations around the
view that Keynesian economics (and the modern welfare
state it spawned) has provided the social and political stability necessary for economic growth. Even in the U.S., where
Keynesianism is relentlessly attacked by conservative economists, policymakers and think tanks, the critique fell by the
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wayside as the Congress turned to Keynesian demand-side
measures to shore up an economy crippled by the global financial crisis (GFC) (Blinder & Zandi, 2010).
Desperate times required measures which would have
been unthinkable only five years earlier. The 2009 Keynesianinspired and stimulus-based $840 billion American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) created jobs, provided economic relief for those hard-hit by the recession, funded infrastructure (e.g., education, health, energy) growth and maintenance, expanded unemployment benefits, and used federal tax
incentives to stimulate consumption. Unlike the Europeans,
U.S. conservatives stopped short of demanding the large-scale
layoff of public sector workers, and Congress avoided devastating cuts in welfare programs.
This approach stood in sharp contrast to the European
choice of austerity over stimulus. Ironically, the European
bankers and policymakers—not the Americans—led the
charge to reduce the size and scope of the public sector, dismantle key welfare functions, and diminish the public’s expectations around state provision of services. Although U.S. conservatives loaded the anti-Keynesian ammunition, European
policymakers fired the gun.

Expansionary Austerity
Harvard professors Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna
maintain that since 1980 large and decisive spending cuts have
been followed by economic growth (Coy, 2010). Specifically,
they argue that “spending cuts adopted to reduce deficits
have been associated with economic expansions rather than
recessions” (cited in Berman, 2011, p. 12). They note that austerity measures stimulate growth by placating bond markets
(lowering interest rates and encouraging investment), and
by reassuring citizens that harsher fiscal adjustments will
not be needed later, thereby stimulating consumer spending.
Austerians like Alesina and Ardagna argue that spending cuts
are a better way to shrink deficits (and stimulate growth) than
tax increases (Coy, 2010). Alesina and Ardagna’s (2009) theories were debunked by The Economist, the IMF and the Center
for Budget and Policy Priorities, who found that austerity measures resulted in increased growth in only nine of the 107 cases
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cited (Avent, 2010; Berman, 2011). An IMF report further debunked Alesina and Ardagna’s theories by finding that when
measured correctly, austerity was contractionary rather than
expansionary (Guajardo, Leigh, & Pescatori, 2011).
In their 2010 influential paper, ‘Growth in a Time of Debt,’
Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff
maintained that government stimulus programs only exacerbate debt problems and should be quickly replaced by austerity measures (2011). The crux of their argument was that when
a nation’s debt reaches 90 percent of its GDP, it leads to unmanageable interest costs and becomes a drag on an economy.
When Thomas Herndon, a graduate student at the University
of Massachusetts, found errors in Reinhart and Rogoff’s Excel
spreadsheet data, the authors maintained that despite the error,
high debt levels lead to slow economic growth. Economist
Miles Kimball crunched Reinhart and Rogoff’s data and found
no evidence for their conclusions. Economist Arindrajit Dube
found evidence that Reinhart and Rogoff had reversed the relationship—slow growth causes higher debt, not the other way
around (Gongloff, 2013).
Austerian-based academic papers were greeted uncritically because they provided the ammunition conservative
policymakers needed—namely, cutting spending and welfare
state functions in a depressed economy will spur on economic
growth. This orientation disintegrated under serious academic scrutiny and the real-world experiences of countries that
adopted austerity measures. Ari Berman (2011) attributes the
austerian influence to an influential and aggressive ‘austerity
class’—a center-right coalition of politicians, policy analysts
and technocrats—who have appointed themselves the ‘impartial’ custodians of economic policy. Their goal is to protect the
investments of banks over the well-being of citizens, and their
claims are legitimized by think tanks who warn that high debt
will lead to a national bankruptcy.

The Attack on the European Welfare States
The Eurozone debt crisis led economically strong nations,
like Germany, to implement fiscal oversight and control of their
less well-off southern European neighbors. This oversight pressured smaller and weaker economies into implementing tough
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austerity measures and some of the deepest public sector cuts
in a generation. The oversight also highlighted the hypocrisy
of the stronger economies. For instance, when the euro was
introduced in the 1990s, Germany insisted on a guarantee that
Eurozone countries would adopt sound fiscal principles, including restricting their total borrowing to less than 3 percent
of GDP with debts of less than 60 percent. The second criteria
was dropped, since Germany’s debt to GDP ratio was above 60
percent (Knight, 2011).
There is little doubt that many European nations are in
the midst of a debt crisis and a recession. Some are even in
a depression (Krugman, 2013). Despite this, the Eurozone
is debating whether a recession or governmental debt is the
biggest problem. The moribund economies of Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Spain, Portugal and others have resulted in diminished
market confidence, as evidenced by the high (and often unsustainable) interest rates they are forced to offer on their bonds
(BBC News, 2011a). The hope of stronger EU nations is that
economically fragile economies will step back from the abyss
without defaulting on their debt. To accomplish this goal, the
27 EU member states set a target to cut deficits to no more than
3 percent of GDP by 2014-2015 (BBC News, 2011a). Meeting
that goal would require Eurozone nations to enact strident
austerity measures.
Cyprus
Cyprus was an example for other indebted nations who
might not take austerity seriously enough. The EU and IMF
loan bailout deal for Cyprus included deep spending cuts,
overhauling outdated state companies, and the effective confiscation of billions of euros deposited in Cypriot banks. In exchange for a $13.2 billion emergency aid package, Cyprus was
forced to agree to EU demands that it basically confiscate up
to 60 percent of a depositor’s holdings above $132,460 held in
two of the country’s largest banks (Bank of Cyprus and Laiki
Bank). In turn, Laiki Bank was dissolved and merged into the
Bank of Cyprus (which also absorbed Laiki’s crippling billion
dollar debt). The 2013 austerity measures resulted in a 16.3
percent unemployment rate (more than 30 percent for those
under 25). The bailout package essentially converted a banking
crisis into a recession, as the IMF predicted a 9 percent drop
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in Cyprus’s 2013 GDP (some economic modelling suggests 24
percent) (Higgins, 2013).
Greece
Greece typifies the economic basket case of some southern European nations. Despite huge bailouts from the EU and
the IMF, some economists fear that it will be impossible to cut
Greece’s 2013 $410 billion debt (160 percent of GDP) without
defaulting. Moreover, despite severe austerity measures (or
perhaps because of them), Greece’s debt grew by 24 percent
between 2012 and 2013. This was the largest rise in the EU,
which saw the debt of 24 out of 27 member states increased
over the 12-month period (Ekathimerini.com, 2013). Since
2010, Greece has been frozen out of the international financial
markets because of its debt and weak economy, and has been
kept afloat and inside the Eurozone solely through a $318.2
billion EU and IMF bailout (Papachristou & Maltezou, 2013).
Despite Greece’s weak economy, the EU and IMF pressured it into adopting severe austerity measures as a precondition for a bailout (BBC News, 2011a). The first round of austerity measures led to a wave of protests (some violent) and
crippling strikes. In an attempt to cut $65 billion by 2015, unpopular austerity measures included a new property tax, the
suspension of 30,000 civil servants on partial pay, deep cuts in
public employment, and the sale of state assets. Another $41
billion in budget savings was expected to be realized through
personal and business tax increases and spending cuts. Some
of the new taxes affected people earning as little as $12,000 a
year.
Opponents claimed that the harsh conditions set out by
lenders condemned Greece to years of painful spending cuts
and job losses, a prophecy borne out by the 2013 high 27.6
percent unemployment rate (60 percent for those 25 and under)
(BBC News, 2011a; Higgins, 2013; Reuters, 2013a; Segall, 2011).
To add salt to the wound, the promised Eurozone aid to Greece
of $315 billion was parceled out in tranches to make sure
the country adhered to the conditions laid out by the Troika
(Kitsantonis, 2013).
Greece’s austerity-driven contraction wreaked havoc on
the overall economy. The IMF—which helped coerce Greece
into austerity—grossly underestimated the pain. In its 2013
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report, the IMF acknowledged that Greece’s economic contraction between 2009 and 2012 was around 17 percent, instead of
its forecast of 5.5 percent.
Greece adopted yet another round of austerity measures in
2013 which called for thousands of civil service workers to face
layoffs and wage cuts. The plan specifically called for putting
25,000 civil servants (e.g., teachers, municipal police officers,
school janitors and others) into a “mobility plan” that docked
their wages ahead of involuntary transfers or outright dismissals. These austerity measures were intended to satisfy EU
finance ministers and pave the way for the release of $9 billion
in rescue loans. The response was predictable—thousands of
Greeks demonstrated against the plan (Kitsantonis, 2013).
Italy
Italy had a public debt of more than $2.6 trillion and a debtto-GDP ratio of 130 percent in 2013. This was coupled with a
decline of 1.5 percent in the GDP, further pushing Italy into a
recession that began in 2011 (Totaro, 2013).
Before leaving office, the former Berlusconi government
adopted an austerity package worth about $91 billion that included raising healthcare fees, cuts to regional subsidies, cuts
in family tax benefits, and cuts in the pensions of high earners.
A second round of austerity measures worth $40 billion was
developed by former Prime Minister Mario Monti in 2011.
Monti’s measures included: raising sales taxes; increasing the
wealth tax on property and assets, including second homes,
yachts, private jets and luxury cars; and curbing tax evasion
(equal to about 17 percent of Italy’s GDP). (Tax evasion is also
a big problem in Greece.) These measures also called for public
sector salary cuts and limiting new hires (i.e., only one employee replaces every five that leave). The 2011 reforms raised
the pension age to 62 for women (rising to 66 in 2018) and 66
for men. Pension payments lost their value when they were
de-linked from inflation for all but the lowest payments (BBC
News, 2011a; BBC News, 2011b). Lastly, the VAT was increased
to 23 percent. There are two major components to addressing
debt: cutting spending and raising taxes. When broken down,
roughly $17 billion of the $40 billion in cuts fell on pensions
and local authorities, while $23 billion was recouped through
tax increases (Nardelli, 2011).
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One of the areas hit hardest by austerity measures is health
care. Italians saw out-of-pocket healthcare costs grow by 160
percent from 2005 to 2011, with further increases of copayments expected in the foreseeable future. The increased copay
may help explain a 9 percent reduction in pharmaceutical expenditures in 2012 (Benassi, 2013).
While Monti’s austerity policies helped bring the budget
deficit closer to EU guidelines, it also led to a recession that
pushed the jobless rate to 12.5 percent (youth unemployment
hit 38 percent), a 20-year high (Totaro, 2013). In 2013, disgruntled Italian voters overwhelmingly rejected the austerity measures of the Monti government and the EU. Monti’s electoral
slate received only 10 percent of the vote; roughly 55 percent
of the electorate voted for political parties that rejected the EU
reforms (Schwarz, 2013).
Portugal
Portugal is one of the more economically problematic
Eurozone nations. Its 2013 debt was $271 billion, or 124 percent
of its GDP, a number which is expected to rise (Bugge, 2011;
countryeconomy.com, 2013). As a result, Portugal had to pay
about 5.4 percent interest rate on its bonds in late 2013, one
of the highest rates in Europe. Portugal became the third
Eurozone country to receive an EU and IMF bailout of $103
billion in 2011 (Barley, 2011).
In exchange for the bailout, Portugal adopted severe austerity measures that included: increasing the work week of
public employees to 42 hours (one of the longest in the EU)
without extra pay; sharp cuts in public sector wages, including
a 5 percent cut for top public sector wage earners; the suspension of holiday and year-end bonuses for civil servants and
pensioners; tax hikes for high earners; a VAT rise; and cuts in
health, welfare and education spending. Portugal also slashed
its military budget (BBC News, 2011a; PressTV, 2011a). Taken together, these austerity measures helped drive Portugal deeper
into a recession, as its economy contracted by 2.3 percent in
2013 (a third consecutive year of recession). Unemployment hit
a record high of 18 percent (Thompson, 2013; PressTV, 2011b).
Public reaction to the austerity measures, combined with the
moribund economy, and the high unemployment rate, forced a
governmental crisis and the resignation of the finance minister
in 2013 (Hesse & Zuber, 2013).
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Spain
Spain is an important Eurozone nation. Its economy is
five times larger than Greece’s and accounts for 12 percent of
the Eurozone’s combined GDP. Spain’s population is roughly
twice the size of bailed-out Portugal, Ireland and Greece combined. Hence, Spain’s economic success or failure will have a
major impact on the future of the Eurozone (Tremlett, 2012).
Similar to other Eurozone nations, Spain’s GDP contracted by 1.5 percent in 2013. Its budget deficit was 6.5 percent
of GDP compared to EU’s target of 3 percent (CNBC, 2013).
Unlike other troubled Eurozone nations, its 2013 public debt
ratio to GDP was 85 percent, lower than the UK and France,
and close to Germany’s 82 percent. At the same time, Spain’s
2013 unemployment rate was 23.6 percent with an under-25
rate of 55 percent (The Guardian, 2013).
Policymakers have generally relied on the high spending
levels of southern European countries to explain the crisis. For
example, Greece did not tax (or adequately enforce existing
taxation) sufficiently. It overspent and then it lied about its
debt level. Portugal overspent and borrowed too much. Italy
was wracked by a series of corrupt and fiscally incompetent
governments (Knight, 2011). Spain exploded the myth that the
Eurozone’s debt problems resulted from too much borrowing
and profligate public spending. Unlike its Southern European
neighbors, Spain had a balanced budget until the GFC in 2008.
As its economy grew, its public debt to GDP ratio continued
to fall (until 2007) unlike other Eurozone countries, including
Germany. In large measure, Spain was a victim of the GFC and
the collapse of the housing market which was driving its economic growth (Knight, 2011).
Spain adopted austerity measures similar to other financially strapped Eurozone nations, including large spending
cuts, a freeze on public sector salaries and hiring, a 5 percent
cut in government worker pay, an increase in the retirement age
to 67, a 28 percent increase in the tobacco tax, and higher taxes
for the rich. In 2012 the conservative government of Mariano
Rajoy acceded to the pressure by Berlin and Brussels and introduced another round of austerity measures that raised taxes,
and cut spending on healthcare, education, and social services.
Similar to Greece, Spain has experienced widespread anti-austerity protests with makeshift tent cities organized by young

The Attack on Europe's Welfare States

41

people fearing a grim future of unemployment (BBC News,
2011a; Independent, 2011).
Iceland
Iceland had a different response to the GFC than many
other indebted European nations. Before the GFC, Iceland was
one of the richest nations in the world. Credit was abundant as
Icelanders borrowed to buy consumer goods, summer houses
and expensive vacations. Despite the warning signs, the government and Central Bank failed to regulate the financial elite
that were driving the nation into near bankruptcy.
In 2008, former Prime Minister Geir Haarde announced
that Icelandic banks were insolvent and the country was in
crisis. By then, Iceland’s debts were $110 billion, or ten times
the government’s budget. Panic broke out as shops sold out
and people stockpiled food. It was the start of a cycle that saw
individuals and companies going bust. Haarde was forced to
resign only days after his address (Kvam, 2011b).
In response to the crisis, the government nationalized the
three largest Icelandic banks that had engaged in irresponsible
financial speculation. Creditors were forced to absorb most
bank-related losses. The government also imposed capital
controls to protect the country’s currency and tightened financial regulation (Sherter, 2011). In 2008 Iceland received a $4.6
billion loan by the IMF (Kvam, 2011a).
Iceland protected welfare benefits before it began cutting
budgets. Government officials used the Keynesian principle
that the best way out of a recession is by boosting (not cutting)
government spending and putting money in the pockets
of people most likely to spend it (Sherter, 2011). To stimulate demand, the government increased the state minimum
pension by 20 percent in 2009 and taxes were reduced for the
lowest pensioners. This strategy also included levying higher
taxes on the rich while protecting the economic interests of the
poor.
The Icelandic government implemented a debt relief
program for businesses and households based on the belief
that no one should have debt exceeding 110 percent of the
value of their property (Kvam, 2011a). With the cooperation
of banks and pension funds, the government helped highly
indebted individuals and businesses reduce their debts. This
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helped many individuals and businesses (who had sustainable loans before 2008) avoid the financial deterioration that
occurred in some Eurozone countries. The debt relief program
also allowed businesses to freeze their debts and continue operating, although they could not incur further debts that might
be needed for investment, growth and job creation.
Under pressure from the IMF to seek a balanced budget,
a “stability pact” was reached in 2009 between government,
trade unions and employer organizations that included sharp
public sector spending cuts and tax hikes. Despite the stabilizing economic reforms, the Social Democrats lost popular
support by a series of policy mistakes, tax hikes, a leniency
toward foreign creditors, soaring prices, capital controls that
limited investments, and the government’s inability to deal
with soaring household debt. In 2013 Icelandic, voters dumped
the Social Democrats and returned a center-right government
that promised protection of social security, and better welfare
and job creation. This landslide election victory was also seen
as a rejection of IMF-enforced austerity, the bailout terms and
EU membership (Reuters, 2013b)

Austerity and the Repudiation of Keynesian Economics
In 2013, President Obama urged Greece to balance austerity with growth as it seeks to recover from the financial crisis:
“We know from history that those countries that are growing,
those countries where employment is high and people are
increasing their productivity … have an easier time reducing their debt burden than those countries where people are
feeling hopeless” (Lederman & Olster, 2013). A similar plea
was made by former U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner
in 2011, who urged European governments to not withdraw
stimulus spending that supports growth. The Europeans took
a hard line in their response: “We don’t see any room for manoeuver in the euro area which could allow us to launch new
fiscal stimulus packages” (cited in Neuger & Christie, 2011).
Europe’s austerity measures are bound together by a rejection of the basic Keynesian principles that have guided
economic policy since the end of World War II. Whereas
Keynesian economics requires governments to spend more
in recessionary times, the Troika is forcing weaker Eurozone
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countries to make deep cuts in public expenditures. As noted
earlier, these austerity measures are rooted in the belief that
the cause of Europe’s financial crisis lay in decades of reckless
over-spending and over-borrowing to pay for overly generous
welfare programs, pension systems and bloated public sectors.
Rhetoric aside, before the GFC, Spain and Ireland ran budget
surpluses and had low debt levels. While Spain’s debt was 31
percent of its GDP, Ireland’s was only 12 percent. Both were
below Germany’s debt level. Instead of profligate spending,
these economies fell victim to a banking crisis and credit boom
driven by cheap interest rates and irresponsible lending practices, which morphed into financial panic and a severe recession. The cause was not overspending per se, but credit and
asset bubbles that proliferated in the wake of weak fiscal regulation in the U.S. and Europe (Schwenninger, 2011).
Nobel laureate Paul Krugman (2012) points out that economic experts have been consistently wrong about the shortrun effects of budget deficits. For one, Eurozone deficits have
not sent interest rates or inflation soaring. The Eurozone inflation rate fell to a meager 1.2 percent in mid-2013 and the
central bank’s benchmark interest rate was less than 1 percent
(Stoukas, 2013). While Krugman (2012) acknowledges the importance of debt, he believes that public spending to lower unemployment is more important.
The harsh austerity measures imposed on vulnerable
Eurozone countries illustrate how disconnected economic
technocrats and policymakers are from the suffering of ordinary Europeans. Apart from marked differences in the severity of austerity measures—anywhere from light to devastating
cuts—there are also striking similarities. Across the board, one
hard-hit group are public sector workers, who in some cases,
are being used as scapegoats for economic woes. Under some
austerity measures, civil servants are facing pay cuts from 5 25 percent; are having bonuses and holiday pay cut; are having
their retirement age raised; are being put on unpaid involuntary furlough; and are having their work weeks extended, often
without extra pay. Public sector freezes and massive layoffs
are a common strategy for Eurozone governments desperate to
shave budgets to meet EU targets. Among other things, these
freezes and layoffs result in additional—and often impossible
—workloads for the remaining public workers.
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Another hard-hit group are low- and moderate-income
families who are experiencing cuts in welfare benefits, family
support allowances, disability pensions, and governmental
subsidies, including pharmaceutical and transportation subsidies. This group is also facing higher user fees for public services, especially in healthcare.
European governments are pressured to make it appear
that the pain and hardship of austerity measures are being
spread evenly among the classes. As such, there is a presumed
balance between spending cuts and higher taxes, although
austerity measures seem to lean more towards spending cuts.
While taxes are raised (and benefits cut) on small and medium
incomes, there are also tax increases for corporations and the
rich. (Ireland is an exception since the government has refused
to raise the 12.5 percent corporate tax rate, the lowest in the
EU.) Overall, the pretense of equitably socializing the pain
of austerity is disingenuous, since tax increases and benefit
cuts have a differential impact on various economic classes.
For instance, a significant rise in the VAT (a common austerity
measure to raise revenue) will have greater impact on a family
earning $12,000 a year than one earning $500,000. The loss of a
public sector job is not an equivalent hardship to a 50 percent
luxury tax on a yacht or jet. Even a significant rise in the personal income tax of very high wage earners has far less impact
on them than a small tax increase does on a low or moderate
income family. While higher corporate taxes may appear equitable, the costs are often passed on in higher prices or cuts in
the labor force.
There is a clear message in Eurozone austerity measures:
Repayment to creditors is more important than pushing an
economy into recession and high unemployment. Severe austerity measures will invariably lead to lower levels of consumption, higher unemployment, and greater social instability as young workers lose hope of ever finding work. Paul
Krugman (2011) points out that:
… the nations now in crisis don’t have bigger welfare
states than the nations doing well—if anything, the
correlation runs the other way. Sweden, with its
famously high benefits, is a star performer, one of the
few countries whose GDP is now higher than it was
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before the crisis. Meanwhile, before the crisis, “social
expenditure”—spending on welfare-state programs—
was lower, as a percentage of national income, in all of
the nations now in trouble than in Germany, let alone
Sweden. Oh, and Canada, which has universal health
care and much more generous aid to the poor than
the United States, has weathered the crisis better than
we have. The euro crisis, then, says nothing about the
sustainability of the welfare state.... (p. 14)

Applying Structural Adjustment Principles
to the Eurozone
The austerity-driven economic policies of the Troika share
the same lineage as the shock policies the IMF forced upon
developing countries as a prerequisite for loans and assistance.
SAPs were mandated by the IMF and the World Bank as a condition for developing countries to secure new loans or to lower
interest rates on existing ones. The goal was to ensure repayment of debt by reducing a country’s fiscal imbalances through
spending cuts in health, education and social services; imposing higher user fees on state services; privatizing and selling
off state assets; deregulation; eliminating trade barriers; and
by monetary reform. Borrowers who failed to meet these conditions could be subjected to various fiscal penalties. Critics
argued that financial threats to poor countries constituted
blackmail, since they had no recourse but to comply. Critics
of SAPs also claimed they compromise a nation’s sovereignty, since an outside organization is dictating economic policy
based on decisions made thousands of miles away (Karger,
Iyani, & Shannon, 2007). Although SAPs were originally designed to address the economic conditions of developing countries, a SAP-based approach has been applied to heavily indebted Eurozone nations. As such, the critiques of SAPs above
all too frequently apply to some southern Eurozone nations as
well.
The IMF uses conditionality (i.e., conditions attached to a
loan or aid) in developing countries to make sure loans are
paid back (Dreher, 2004). With Eurozone borrowers, the conditionalities are based on austerity measures that lower the
deficit regardless of the consequences to employment or the
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health and welfare of the population. In that sense, these conditions are harsher than those imposed on developing countries, since the IMF and World Bank require these countries to
submit a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) developed
within a broad-based participatory process (Palast, 2003; World
Bank, 2002). A PRSP is not something required of Eurozone
borrowers.
There is a lack of evidence around the effectiveness of
SAP-like approaches (Public Broadcasting System, n.d.).
Sherle Schwenninger (2011) notes that in Greece the EU austerity program has set in motion “a vicious cycle of recession
and debt, whereby austerity leads to recession, which in turn
produces even larger deficits and debt, which in turn prompts
calls for more austerity… .” (need pp #)
Paul Krugman (2011) argues that:
austerity has been a failure everywhere it has been
tried: No country with significant debts has managed
to slash its way back into the good graces of the
financial markets. For example, Ireland is the good boy
of Europe, having responded to its debt problems with
savage austerity that has driven its unemployment rate
to 14 percent. Yet the interest rate on Irish bonds is still
above 8 percent—worse than Italy. (p. 14)

The Dangerous Road
Forcing a severe SAP-like approach into the European
context can have dangerous consequences. For instance, the
slowdown in growth can exacerbate the current anti-immigrant backlash in Europe as jobs become scarcer and immigrants are seen as lower-paid competition. The dearth of jobs
and benefits can also lead to an exaggerated form of nationalism ripe for extreme right-wing or fascist political movements.
Sigmar Gabriel, Chairman of the German Social Democratic
Party, warns that the austerity measures being imposed on
Europe indicate how little we learned from the rise of the Nazi
Party. Gabriel points out that the Chancellor of the Weimar
Republic, Heinrich Brüning, cut successive budgets during the
Great Depression. The end result was six million unemployed
Germans who were fodder for a rising Nazi party (McGreevey,
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2011). A similar warning was issued by Nikos Hatzopoulos,
president of a Greek trade union:
the wave of spending cuts that drives the social insurance
system to the brink of collapse and Greek society to
extreme poverty, is not the way. The collapse of the
welfare system could trigger extreme unprecedented
social tension within Greece in a first phase and a
domino effect across Europe. (CNC World, 2011)
Gabriel and Hatzopoulos’ warnings help explain the
growth of far right-wing, anti-immigrant and pro-fascist parties
across Europe. These groups include Austria’s Freedom Party
(formerly led by Nazi sympathizer Jörg Haider); Belgium’s
Flemish Block, Danish People’s Party, France’s National Front,
Germany’s Republican Party, German People’s Union and
National Democratic Party (largely neo-Nazi youth protest
movements), Greece’s Hellenic Front, and Italy’s Northern
League and National Alliance (pro-fascist). Other right-wing
groups include Netherlands Pim Fortuyn’s List (LPF), and
Liveable Netherlands, Norway’s Progress Party, Portugal’s
Popular Party, Swiss People’s Party, and the British National
Party (The Guardian, 2011).
Although France’s far-right National Front, now led by
Marine Le Pen (daughter of the founder Jean-Marie Le Pen),
has moderated its positions somewhat, it still espouses a halt to
immigration, reclaiming French sovereignty from the European
Union, restoring the death penalty, and implementing “national preference” to reserve jobs, financial aid and public housing
for French citizens over foreigners (Crumley, 2011). In a surprise vote, Le Pen placed third in the 2012 French presidential
election with almost 18 percent of the vote.
Hungary is an epicenter of the neofascist movement in
Europe. A 2012 survey by the Anti-Defamation League found
that more than 60 percent of Hungarian respondents said that
Jews “talk too much about the Holocaust” and 73 percent said
Jews have too much power in the business world. Compared to
2009, the survey also found that “levels of anti-Semitism have
increased most dramatically in Hungary, as well as in the UK
and Spain” (Jovanovski, 2013).
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Hungary’s Jobbik Party was founded in 2003 by a group
of Protestant and Catholic university students. It came to international attention when it received almost 15 percent of the
votes in the European Parliament elections. In 2010 it became
Hungary’s third largest political party, capturing almost 17
percent of the vote. Jobbik is a virulently anti-Semitic and antiRoma (Gypsy) party that proposes to abolish abortion, re-establish the death penalty, and create a special police unit to deal
with “gypsy delinquency.” Jobbik also operates a paramilitary
arm called the Hungarian Guard (Hockenos, 2010; Ostrovsky,
2013; Stancil, 2009). Marton Gyöngyösi, a Jobbik MP, typified
the anti-Semitism when he called for the creation of a “registry” of Jewish MPs and government officials in Hungary.
Perhaps not coincidentally, Hungary’s public debt is the
highest in central and eastern Europe, and its 2012 unemployment rate was almost 11 percent (nearly 30 percent for those
under 25). It has been under the EU’s deficit management
procedure since 2006, the longest of any country (Globalpost,
2013).
German economic analyst Michael Mross observes that
“Austerity means cuts. That means that you have cut the
income of the poorest, that the social welfare will be cut down”
(RT.com, 2011). In a modern industrial society, the welfare state
acts as a buffer against absolute deprivation; promotes greater
social mobility through affordable education, thereby making
class lines more porous; redistributes resources; encourages
consumption by providing social welfare benefits; and enhances economic productivity by providing affordable health
care.

Conclusion
Europe’s harsh austerity measures are counterproductive since they are leading to a cycle of recession, high unemployment, greater social instability, and accelerated income
inequality. In the end, it is becoming increasingly harder for
Eurozone nations to repay their debts in the context of their
contracting or moribund economies. After years of harsh austerity measures, countries like Greece, Italy, Spain, Ireland and
Italy have yet to return to economic health. If the developing
world’s experience with SAPs is any indication, the prognosis
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for achieving a strong economy through “expansionary austerity” is extremely poor. More likely, continuing severe austerity measures will only lead to more hardship. As the political demonstrations illustrate, Europe’s population—especially
the young—are increasingly less able to see a light at the end
of the economic tunnel.
The stagnant or deteriorating economies of indebted
Eurozone nations has caused the EU to rethink its austerity approach and begin to focus on stimulus and growth. European
Commission officials are calling on member states to focus
on increasing competitiveness by growth-boosting economic
reforms. It is also asking member states to focus on lowering
youth unemployment from their current disastrously high
levels. At the same time, they are urging austerity measures
to continue (Petroff, 2013). In the end, novel solutions—based
on growth and stimulus—are needed for countries to rebound
from their financial calamity without eviscerating their health,
welfare, and education of its citizens.
Note: For consistency, all currency has been converted to U.S. dollars.
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Between Retrenchment and Recalibration:
The Impact of Austerity on the
Irish Social Protection System
Fiona Dukelow
Mairéad Considine
University College Cork, Ireland
This article analyzes the impact of austerity on the Irish social
protection system. The analysis is situated in Ireland’s wider financial and economic crisis and its status as an ‘early adopter’
of an austerity response which has continued under European
Union/International Monetary Fund intervention. We focus on
how the crisis instigated a political narrative about the cost and
design of the social protection system, leading to a programme of
retrenchment and reform which has blended a politics of blame
avoidance with credit claiming. Three core elements in this narrative—generosity, sustainability and suitability— are identified, and against this background, a pattern of multi-dimensional change in social protection across the life course dealing with
working age, pensions, and child income supports is analyzed.
Key words: Ireland, social protection policy, austerity, retrenchment, welfare

In the decade of unprecedented growth preceding Ireland’s
current crisis, debates about its economic and social policy
path were frequently framed in terms of ‘Boston versus Berlin.’
This dichotomy was articulated by a former prominent politician who proffered the view that “[w]e in Ireland have tended
to steer a course between the two but I think it is fair to say that
we have sailed closer to the American shore than the European
one” (Harney, 2000). Such ideas inevitably simplify complex
political and socio-economic realities, however the economic
policy trajectory closely followed the liberal market model, and
in the era of financialized capitalism Ireland became ‘a world
leader in the financialization of the economy’ (Ó Riain, 2012,
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p. 498). Yet in social policy terms, while typically linked with
the liberal welfare regime, the range of influences on Ireland’s
welfare development has meant that its position as a liberal
welfare state is open to some ambiguity. It has been observed
that it ‘defies classification’ and is better described as a ‘hybrid
regime,’ with links in particular to the welfare tradition of the
conservative/corporatist regime (Cousins, 1997; NESC, 2005).
Moreover, many (e.g., Daly & Yeates, 2003; Murphy, 2012)
noted that Irish social policy developments since the 1990s
steered a different path to those of the UK, the more prototypical liberal welfare regime in Europe.
Ireland’s economic crisis emerged as one of the most severe
cases following the global financial crisis and the subsequent
Eurozone crisis. It was primarily driven by an internally generated collapse of what Hay and Wincott (2012) term the "Anglo
liberal growth model" manifest in the bursting of its property
and credit bubbles, which had ruinous consequences for the
Irish financial system and which were ultimately absorbed by
the state. Ireland’s rapid turn to austerity, in which it was a
forerunner of a wider European turn to austerity, has leant it
exemplary status in debates about austerity versus stimulus.
On the Keynesian side, it confirms the ‘fantasy of austerity’ by
its continued poor economic performance (Krugman, 2012a,
2012b). For neoliberals, minor signs of economic improvement
are taken to indicate expansionary fiscal contraction, a theory
that suggests public spending cuts encourage private expenditure and capital investment (Adam Smith Institute, 2011).
Within the EU, the Irish case has been elevated as evidence
"that the programmes can work" (Barroso, cited in Mackintosh,
2013) and that EU/IMF loan conditions based on ‘fiscal consolidation’ have been the correct response to the Eurozone crisis.
In economic terms, Ireland’s crisis response marks the continued influence of its existing neoliberal paradigm (Allen, 2012;
Hay & Smith, 2013). In this regard, the Irish case tracks the ‘arc
of neoliberalism’ (Centeno & Cohen, 2012) that remains dominant, the European expression of which Fitoussi and Saraceno
(2012) identify as the ‘Berlin-Washington’ consensus. As such,
it appears the so-called ‘Boston versus Berlin’ dichotomy has
presently collapsed into no alternative but the former.
Our focus is to analyze what this ‘no alternative to austerity’ approach has meant for Irish social protection policy,
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identifying it as a key site of Ireland’s austerity politics. The
article, based on qualitative analysis of crisis-centered political debate and policy change, proceeds as follows. We set a
context by outlining the nature of political debate about the
crisis, attaching particular significance to how it implicated
the cost and design of social protection in both the causes of
and solutions to the crisis. We identify three core intertwined
elements in this narrative—the generosity, sustainability and
suitability of the social protection system. Against this backdrop, changes to social protection policy are analyzed across
three areas: working age, pensions and child income supports. Drawing on welfare retrenchment and welfare state
change literature and related distinctions between cost-cutting
and structural reform, we examine the types and degrees of
change being implemented, finding that the dominant pattern
of retrenchment is interacting with other crisis-led structural
changes, and the majority of the structural changes are leading
to further curtailment of the social protection system.

Austerity Politics and the Social Protection System
In contrast to early responses to the crisis inspired by
Keynesianism (Hemerijck, 2012; Pontusson & Raess, 2012) and
forms of fiscal stimulus in evidence across the Eurozone until
early 2010, Ireland’s austerity program was already well advanced. Any scope for maneuvering in Ireland was expended on its response to its banking crisis. In autumn 2008, the
government guaranteed almost all the liabilities of Ireland’s
domestic banks, exposing the state to private debts worth approximately 275% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This contrasted with more limited guarantees subsequently implemented elsewhere, and when combined with related bank rescue
measures, Ireland’s policy response ranked as "the costliest
banking crisis in advanced economies since at least the Great
Depression" (Laeven & Valencia, 2012, p. 20). Ireland’s economic contraction, which saw GDP decline by 12.4% between
2007 and 2010, together with its reaction to the banking crisis,
led to severe fiscal problems. The general government deficit
grew from a surplus of 0.1% of GDP in 2007 to 13.4% of GDP
in 2011, and general government gross debt rose from 25.1%
to 106.4% of GDP over the same period (Eurostat, 2013). A
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concern around the banking crisis was the speed and scale of
the turn to austerity. Between 2008 and 2010, fiscal adjustments
of almost 9% of GDP were implemented. By the time of the
loan agreement with the EU/IMF in late 2010, when Ireland’s
banking costs were overwhelming the state, the conditions attached represented a continuation of many steps already taken
with regard to fiscal policy and welfare retrenchment, and a
further adjustment of 9% of GDP was agreed upon for 20112013. Over both phases expenditure cuts have comprised approximately two thirds of the adjustments.
Whereas internationally the Irish case became something
of a brickbat in the debate between austerity and stimulus, nationally this debate was strongly one-sided. The main political
parties all accepted the need for austerity and the wider debt
and deficit parameters of the EU Stability and Growth Pact. In
making the case for investment and alternatives to austerity,
the weak power resources of actors on the left, a long standing
hallmark of Irish politics, meant it failed to make much impact
on the hegemony of ‘there is no alternative.’ Pierson’s (1994)
still influential theory of welfare retrenchment suggests that
it is an unpopular and risky move for governments to pursue
and that tactics of blame avoidance are typically utilized in
the process. However, our focus examines how welfare expenditure was framed in the crisis, not necessarily always in
an unequivocally blame-avoidant manner, but in ways which
blended with credit-claiming for being fiscally responsible. As
Bonoli (2012) notes, this is one of a limited number of ways in
which welfare retrenchment can become the object of a creditclaiming strategy. Ireland’s weak left, together with the populist tradition in Irish politics dominated by two main parties,
Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael (both of which have operated under
opaque ideological divisions), may provide conditions compatible with a credit-claiming logic in conditions of crisis. In
particular, lack of robust ideological debate in political discourse affords latitude in the simultaneous adoption of ‘justification strategies’ (Green-Pedersen, 2002) that may seek to
avoid blame or claim credit, depending on the policy context.
While Ireland’s crisis has multiple dimensions, a core
element of political debate and interpretation has been framing
the crisis as a debt crisis. This had the effect of opening up government expenditure and the policy choices made prior to the
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crisis as objects of critique. In the words of former Taoiseach
(Head of Government) Brian Cowen:
As a society, we became over-optimistic about our
recent, seemingly spectacular, economic success, and
badly overshot the mark. People became impatient
with restraint. …The general attitude was that we could
afford to ramp up spending, while simultaneously
being a low tax country, as if there were few hard
choices to be made. (2010)
Strategies of welfare retrenchment became inextricably linked with prudent economic management, both by the
Fianna Fáil/Green Party government in power when the crisis
emerged, and by its replacement in 2011 by a Fine Gael/Labour
Party coalition.
In contrast with Pierson’s (2001) depiction of welfare states
entering an era of permanent austerity, the Irish welfare state
is often cast as a case of delayed development and appeared to
encounter a delayed golden age prior to the crisis. Economic
growth of the late 1990s and early 2000s provided unprecedented resources at governments’ disposal, thus enabling
increased welfare expenditure. At the same time, taxes and
social insurance contributions were reduced without fiscal repercussions. Social protection expenditure as a proportion of
GDP remained relatively stable (6.7% of GDP in 2001 and 7.7%
of GDP in 2007) and on the low side of European expenditure
patterns. Moreover, an analysis of social expenditure from 1981
to 2007 (McCashin, 2012) demonstrates how it was subject to
a range of trends. It was clearly expansionary in the case of
Child Benefits and retrenched in the case of Sickness Benefits,
while extension of coverage was the overriding driver of increased expenditure in other programs, such as pensions and
unemployment.
In keeping with the framing of the crisis as a crisis of public
expenditure, ‘generosity’ became a new term in the semantic
field of social protection. Political debate about the generosity
of the system emerged as a justification for its retrenchment,
especially in the early stages of the crisis. The idea was amplified with discussion of what became framed as the problem
of the generosity of social protection. Government references
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to generosity ranged between drawing attention to the generosity of the system as pre-emptive defense of critique against
cuts being implemented, to a ‘vice into virtue’ strategy (Levy,
1999) claiming that cuts would actually preserve the generosity of the system. In the latter case, rate cuts were justified as
preventive action against more catastrophic cuts if measures to
achieve fiscal stability were not undertaken. The first of two extensive cuts to payment rates were therefore claimed as action
to "safeguard the generous system we have" (Lenihan, 2009).
The issue of generosity was closely aligned to debates
about sustainability and the need to reach a sustainable
pattern of social expenditure. Sustainability encompassed the
broad fiscal policy landscape, which was deeply impacted by
a collapse in consumption/transaction dependent tax revenue
as the credit and housing bubbles burst. Consequently, tax
revenue fell by 33% between 2007 and 2010. Political debate
drew on a cluster of ideas associated with the notion of fiscal
responsibility and fiscal sustainability. Emphasis was placed
on adjusting expenditure to sustainable levels, which directly
implicated the social protection system, one of the largest areas
of current expenditure. Again, a blame avoidance strategy was
utilized, citing market pressure as a form of political cover
with respect to why cutting expenditure was the only credible option. The confluence of retrenchment with sustainability also became part of a credit-claiming strategy. This again
drew on the idea of retrenchment as necessary safeguarding
of the social protection system and the vulnerable. A similar
diagnosis of the unsustainability of social expenditure remains
central, with the current Minister for Public Expenditure and
Reform, Brendan Howlin (2012) asserting, for example, that
"our current levels of expenditure are no more sustainable than
the property bubble that once sustained them."
Concerns about the suitability of the focus and design of
the social protection system in the context of unemployment
(4.5% in 2007 to 14.8% by 2012) and the needs of the economy
came more to the fore as the crisis continued. However, associated debates about structural reform have not been altogether separate from the issue of generosity and cost containment. The relationship between social protection and the labor
market, and specifically activation policy, became the object of
greater scrutiny, because, as Fitzgerald (2012) puts it, "when
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money was abundant, such structural change in programmes
was generally off the agenda" (p. 1372). The crisis, therefore,
stimulated a debate that potentially indicates a catch-up with
more substantive adaptation that has taken place elsewhere,
variously labeled as the emergence of the ‘new welfare state’
(Bonoli & Natali, 2012) and the ‘social investment welfare
state’ (Morel, Palier, & Palme, 2012). The reform agenda of integrating the social protection system with labor market services was further driven by conditions imposed by the EU/
IMF. Initial debate revolved around the issue of disincentive
effects. This was articulated in ideas about the social protection system being "out of step with labor costs in the rest of
the economy" (Lenihan, 2009), and the need to keep the unemployed "as close to the labor market as possible" (Cowen,
2010). More explicit reference to re-orienting social protection
has occurred under the current government, which has tended
to use a ‘vice into virtue’ strategy of claiming to transform
the moribund legacy of a "passive welfare state to an active
welfare state" (Burton, 2012).
The remainder of the article looks at how these framing
ideas have influenced crisis-led change in social protection.
Although we have suggested that the Irish politics of austerity
has not solely been about blame avoidance, Pierson’s (2001)
conceptual distinction between cost-containment, re-commodification and recalibration is useful to deploy in looking at
how ideas about generosity, sustainability and suitability have
translated into policy change. Changes have therefore spanned
from high visibility cost cutting to re-structuring, though the
latter can be difficult to disentangle from the former. As an addendum to this, and to the concept of recalibration in particular, debates about the new welfare state and ‘new social policies’ have drawn attention to how retrenchment-led change is
not only about cutting back existing social protection, but also
about introducing new forms of provision and intervention.
In this sense, an era of austerity can have multi-dimensional
effects; Häusermann (2012) observes that change can simultaneously involve expansion of activation (flexicurity), re-allocation of spending from more generous to means-tested provision (welfare re-adjustment), and in some cases, preservation
of existing provision (welfare protectionism).
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Irish Social Protection
The Irish social protection system has traditionally been
primarily oriented towards the goal of poverty alleviation as
opposed to income replacement. It comprises social insurance
payments and a corresponding set of social assistance payments covering various contingencies such as unemployment,
illness and disability, caring, one-parent families, and pensions.
Social insurance is based on pay-related contributions and flat
rate payments, and for most working age payments, there is no
differential between the value of a social insurance payment
and its corresponding social assistance payment, whereas
for pensions the differential is 10%. The state (contributory)
pension payment is approximately 34% of average earnings
which is a comparatively low replacement rate (Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2011).
Replacement rates for unemployment payments also tend to
fall below the OECD average (NERI, 2012). Family and childrelated income supports comprise a universal Child Benefit
(CB) payment with additional means-tested payments targeted at low income families.
The Irish social protection system stands out for having
a significant proportion of means-tested payments, typically ranking highest on this indicator in the EU. In 2008 for
example, 25.2% of all payments were means-tested compared
to 11.1% for EU27 (Eurostat, 2012). Overall, therefore, the
Irish social protection system tends to "modify tendencies to
extreme inequalities rather than attempting substantial redistribution or universal social provision" (McCashin & O’Shea,
2007, p. 274). In the period prior to the crisis, this orientation
was manifest in poverty rates which remained above the EU
average, reflecting the fact that while payment rates grew,
they remained low relative to average incomes. The poverty
reduction effects of welfare payments did improve by the mid2000s when social protection rates were raised ahead of wage
growth rates, and the risk of poverty rate converged with the
EU average. However, the impact of subsequent recession and
welfare retrenchment is evidenced in increases in at-risk-ofpoverty rates (16% in 2011) and a sharp rise in the deprivation
rate, which has more than doubled since 2007 (24.5% in 2011).
Children remain the age cohort at highest risk of both poverty
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(18.8%) and deprivation (32.1%), and the at-risk-of-poverty
rate for unemployed people (30.6%) is also particularly high
(CSO, 2013). Against this backdrop, the role and impact of the
social protection system and its reform remains central.

Working Age Social Protection
Under the justificatory strategy of a generous system, outright cost cutting has formed a large part of the retrenchment
measures implemented. Rate cuts were applied to all working
age payments in Budgets 2010 and 2011. These cuts, together
with the abolition of an extra payment at Christmas, represent
a cumulative reduction of 10%. Despite comprehensive rate
cuts being a highly visible form of cost containment, relatively
little mobilization against them and against austerity more
broadly, took place. Pierson’s (2001) observation about the
institutional design of liberal welfare systems may be applicable, in that systems which have a high means-tested component militate against strong popular support for welfare. More
severe rate cuts have been applied to certain social assistance
payments. A 51% reduction to Jobseeker’s Allowance (JA) for
claimants aged 18 and 19 in 2009 was extended to claimants
aged 18-21 in 2010, with a 30% cut applied to those aged 22-24.
In addition, a 30% rate reduction sanction was introduced
where claimants refuse activation. Such change points to the
cross-cutting agendas of activation and cost-containment, as
well as the ambiguity of activation and ideas such as ‘making
work pay,’ which can emphasize ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’ (Kuhner,
2012).
Substantial re-commodification, a relatively more obfuscating strategy than rate cuts, is also being undertaken. This
is particularly evident in the case of Jobseekers Benefit (JB), as
qualifying conditions for social insurance payments were tightened and the duration of entitlement substantially reduced.
The number of contributions required to qualify doubled, and
the duration of entitlement has been significantly curtailed.
Other forms of re-commodification concern the complex rules
of entitlement and qualifying conditions which vary across
the contingency-based system. They include restrictions to
entitlements to concurrent payments; changes to income disregards where claimants may work but continue to qualify
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for a payment; stricter means-testing; expanding taxable
payments; reductions to qualifying adult payments, rent supplement and other additional allowances. The One Parent
Family Payment has undergone the most significant change in
this regard, stemming from reform ideas first broached in 2006
but substantially stalled until the crisis occurred. Eligibility is
now also being based on the age of the parent's youngest child,
which is being reduced on a phased basis (from 18 years in
2011 to 7 years for all claimants by 2015).
Although Irish activation expenditure has been highlighted as being relatively high in comparative terms, the crisis
has brought the system into sharper focus and opened up
the possibility of substantial recalibration. Activation policy
has been criticized for being "fragmented and lacking ambition," having a "passive and low-intensity" approach, and
lagging behind developments elsewhere (NESC, 2011, p. xv).
Given Ireland’s conservative and incremental culture of policy
making (Kirby & Murphy, 2011), the crisis and the influence of
transnational policy actors has stimulated significant institutional reform. Responsibility for activation services has moved
to the Department of Social Protection, and a new agency, the
National Employment and Entitlements Service, is being established. At the local level, the integration of social protection and activation services is being introduced under a single
new service, Intreo. Modeled on the UK system, the changes
entail a more individualized case management approach than
heretofore, including profiling techniques to tailor interventions based on claimant’s employability and risk of long-term
unemployment. Active labor market programs are also being
reformed, to include greater flexibility of qualifying conditions
to some, the introduction of some new schemes and the retrenchment of more ‘passive’ programs. In all, however, the
scale of provision falls far short of the scale of the unemployment crisis.
More far-reaching recalibration was signaled by a report
which examined the feasibility of introducing a single social
assistance payment for people of working age (Department of
Social Protection, 2010). It proposed a single payment with different levels of conditionality and support, depending on the
distance of the claimant from the labor market. Payment levels,
modeled on JA rates and rules, would represent a rate cut for
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claimants of other schemes, though it is not clear at present
whether such radical reform will progress.

Pension System Reform
Pension system reform has been on the policy agenda for
the last two decades, and has been marked by a series of incremental but limited reforms to incentivize supplementary
pension arrangements, whilst simultaneously attempting
cost containment and addressing inadequacies in state provision. The most recent policy statement, the National Pensions
Framework (NPF) (Government of Ireland, 2010a), places
particular emphasis on affordability and long-term system
sustainability. The core policy principles applied to first-tier
pensions appear largely unchanged, as "the State Pension will
continue to be the fundamental basis for the pension system"
(Government of Ireland, 2010a, p. 14). In fact, the stated 35%
replacement target rate represents an improvement on previous policy ambition. Payment rates increased during the precrisis period, before being frozen in 2009 when state pensions
were the only payments not to be cut in the retrenchment that
followed. This treatment could be read as welfare protectionism, in which privileges of existing beneficiaries have been
shielded against demands associated with newer/other risk
groups. However, it needs to be considered in conjunction
with simultaneous welfare re-adjustment measures introduced
with respect to social insurance eligibility requirements. The
proposal to move to a total contributions approach by 2020,
and the increase in the state pension qualification age from age
65 to 66 in 2014, to 67 in 2021 and to 68 in 2028, a comparatively
shorter timeframe than in most other European welfare states,
indicates the scale of the change (Considine, 2012).
In terms of second-tier pensions, the introduction of personal retirement savings accounts (PRSAs) in the early 2000s
marked an effort at re-commodification which sought to make
private pension arrangements more accessible. However,
PRSAs did not have a significant impact and the NPF proposes that a system of auto-enrolment be introduced to increase
supplementary coverage. This measure is proposed for 2014,
although its introduction remains contingent on a general
improvement in macro-economic conditions. This potential
change could be interpreted as path departure in terms of
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obligation to contribute to a second-tier pension, although
given the longstanding policy to incentivize individual/occupational provision through pension tax benefits; it is simultaneously a policy instrument which gives preference to a significant pre-existing element of provision, with enforcement to
broaden coverage. It may therefore be considered a structural
change that is potentially significant in terms of the role and
reach of quasi-mandatory second-tier provision. However,
the existing duality in the system, where half of the workforce already broadly conforms to this policy objective, and
the limited reform of core tax benefit arrangements, points to a
limited redirection of pension policy preferences to date. High
income earners remain much more likely to have supplementary pensions, make higher contributions and benefit from tax
relief, while lower earners are less likely to benefit from this
tax expenditure at all. Pension tax benefits were set to be substantially overhauled and made more equitable (Government
of Ireland, 2010a, 2010b). Measures introduced over recent
Finance Acts limit generous tax benefits to the highest income
earners, although the mainframe of the tax benefit structure
(delivered at standard and marginal rates of tax) remain unchanged. Budget 2013 maintains the status quo in this regard,
with focus centered on limiting tax relief to pensions that
accrue an income of over €60,000 per annum.
Finally, the Irish variant of the multi-pillar system, and in
particular the reliance on the market for the provision of adequate retirement income replacement and the risks to which
they are exposed, has been brought into sharper focus by the financial crisis, as Irish pension losses were second only to those
of the U.S. in 2008 (Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 2011). Approximately 70% of defined benefit
schemes in Ireland are in actuarial deficit (Pensions Board,
2012), contribution levels to many private pensions are widely
regarded as insufficient, and there is a lack of transparency/
clarity around charges applied and the impact of pension fund
losses more generally (Stewart, 2011). It is against this wider
backdrop that current Irish pension system reform needs to
be examined; existing patterns of dualization may be altered,
but the direction that will take depends on which elements
of the reform agenda are prioritized and the manner of their
implementation.
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Child Income Supports
Child Income Supports (CIS) evolved in an ad hoc and fragmented way over an extended period; these were designed to
meet a range of policy objectives, from alleviating poverty to a
state recognition of the costs associated with raising children.
The system comprises a mix of targeted and universal provisions, which underwent significant expansion in 2006 with the
introduction of an Early Childcare Supplement (ECS), paid in
respect of all children age 0-6 years to offset childcare costs.
This payment represented a typically liberal cash-based response to the cost of childcare issue. However, the ECS was one
of the first welfare payments to be abolished as retrenchment
took effect. It was replaced in 2010 with the Early Childhood
Care and Education (ECCE) scheme, an illustration of welfare
recalibration with an unprecedentedly rapid shift from cash
assistance to universal social service delivery. Whatever the
shortcomings of the ECCE scheme, its introduction at a time
of austerity represents a noteworthy policy departure that
engaged simultaneously in rationalizing and updating to accommodate wider policy goals in relation to the care and education of young children.
There has been considerable retrenchment of other elements of CIS since 2008. CB was noted for its cost containment
potential and was cut in successive budgets. Eligibility criteria
were also restricted, with payments no longer made in respect
of 18-year-olds still in education. CB rates have been cut by
almost 22% for the first two children, with higher reductions in
respect to subsequent children. Some compensatory measures
were instituted initially through Qualified Child Increases
and Family Income Supplement to protect low income families, although such measures were not applied in more recent
Budgets, and some other targeted payments were also reduced.
Pointing to the rapid increases in the cost of CB, which
saw the payment rate treble between 2000 and 2007, the need
for a more efficient and targeted approach is regularly espoused. Broadly speaking, this efficiency/equity argument
divides between preferences to tax CB and/or the removal
of its universal basis in favor of targeted means-tested
provision. A report on child and family income support
(Advisory Group on Tax and Social Welfare, 2012) advocates
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the retention of a reduced universal payment and proposes a
two-tier CIS payment comprising CB and an automatic supplementary payment (to replace the existing ones) in respect
of children whose parents are in receipt of a social assistance
payment. Other parents (including those in receipt of social
insurance payments) would be subject to application and
income-test for the supplementary element of this income
support, with a greater degree of means-testing one inevitable
outcome of this reform.
No government decision has been made at the time of
writing in respect to these CIS proposals, but the discussion
points to a shift away from the old ‘logics of welfare reform’
(Häusermann, 2012) with a particular focus on welfare re-adjustment. Significant retrenchment of universal child income
payments has been coupled with greater attention to the new
logic of social investment and needs-based child income supports. Wider social service supports in relation to children and
families matter to how this may develop, and consideration of
the social investment approach is a relatively new departure
in terms of the Irish welfare state. In this context, the relatively
swift introduction of the ECCE scheme, even at the height of
the economic crisis, may point to some shift in policy thinking that has social investment leanings. How far this extends,
however, is a far more open question, as the retrenchment
imposed through a series of rate cuts and changes to eligibility rules has simultaneously negatively affected the incomes of
many families with children.

Conclusion
In this article we have examined how the politics of austerity in the Irish case have been framed by a number of salient
ideas, in ways which blend blame avoidance with credit claiming in how changes to the social protection system have been
approached. We have located Ireland's policy choices within
the wider contradictory neoliberal response to the economic
crisis, from which the ‘no alternative to austerity,’ which simultaneously requires substantial state support of financial systems, has emanated. Turning to examine the impact
of austerity on the social protection system, and drawing on
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Pierson’s concepts of cost-containment, re-commodification
and recalibration, it is clear that all three types of change are
occurring. Substantial cost-containment and re-commodification across programs for working age adults have blurred
the already weak boundary between the benefits attached to
social insurance and social assistance payments, while in the
case of child income supports, universal payments are being
retrenched in favor of targeted forms of support. These trends
appear to accentuate the liberal characteristics of the social
protection system.
The crisis has also stimulated stronger recalibration, manifest in new types of services and program design for working
age adults and children. These are indicative of an effort to
re-orient the norms upon which the social protection system
has been built, from alleviating poverty by compensating for
unemployment and other ‘old’ social risks, to supporting and
incentivizing employment. In the crisis context, however, such
recalibration has been subordinated to and limited by the goal
of cost-containment, with the effect that rate cuts and sanctions
have constituted a significant element of the emerging activation approach. It remains to be seen how individualized case
management will evolve in this environment.
The crisis added urgency to a long-standing reform agenda
concerning pension sustainability and equity, yet wide ranging
tax benefit reform proposed has been only partially implemented, appearing to preserve existing inequities in the system.
While the absence of rate cuts to state pensions demonstrates
that welfare protectionism can occur even in severe crises, substantial re-commodification is in prospect for future claimants.
Altogether, these changes are producing a complex, uneven
picture of the impact of austerity on the Irish social protection system, the effects of which are still unfolding. However,
the current reform agenda displays less system hybridity than
heretofore, with Irish social protection moving towards more
archetypal liberal welfare principles and patterns in the ways
it is both being retrenched and recalibrated.
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Italian Welfare in the Aftermath of the
Economic Crisis: Neoliberal Reforms and
Limits to the Path Dependency Approach
Ijin Hong
Sungshin Women’s University
The 2008 world economic crisis provided a plausible rationale
for policy makers in Italy to push forward long needed welfare
cuts, resulting in the neoliberal austerity trend fostered by the
Monti government (2011-2012). This paper seeks to understand
the logic behind the welfare reforms in Italy after the 2008 economic crisis by describing implemented measures and reviewing
available theoretical approaches in literature that could account
for the reforms’ neoliberal shift from a path-dependent theoretical
approach. It is argued that external forces, that is the economic
crisis and EU pressures, represented the main trigger, and that
political elites marginalized the role played by civil society, with
social problems, such as unemployment, worsening as a result.
Key words: Crisis, neoliberalism, welfare reform, Europeanization, advocacy coalition framework

In 2008, a massive crisis hit the world economy: the financial system was collapsing, and the Lehman Brothers financial services company went bust, resulting in great hardships
for the American banking system. The negative implications
soon affected the European financial system, more vulnerable to shocks in the absence of controlling institutions such as
the American Federal Reserve (Eurispes, 2013). Suddenly, the
weaknesses of the dominant economic paradigm of neoliberalism and its laissez faire strategies of relegating increasing debt
to private households and markets became obvious.
Southern European countries were suffering the most from
the financial market instability, caught between the unsustainable costs of their public social insurance systems and the EU
requirement to keep their public debt levels under control.
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2014, Volume XLI, Number 2
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Weak economies such as those in Italy, Greece, Spain and
Portugal already had comparatively underdeveloped social
protection systems for the vulnerable, and less than developed
financial institutions. Moreover, neoliberal individualization of social risks had already started by the time the crisis
hit these markets (Guillen & Petmesidou, 2008; ISTAT, 2012;
Pizzuti, 2009). Additionally, these countries were already notorious for the politicalization of their welfare systems, or in
other words, political cronyism (clientelismo) (Ferrera, 1998;
Girotti, 1998). The neoliberal strategy of shifting responsibilities for social protection from the public sector to the private
sphere of families and the market only resulted in worsened
inequality when it came to adequately meeting Italians’ social
needs.
This study attempts to make sense of the consequences of
the 2008 economic crisis in Italy. In particular, I attempt to understand the mechanisms that led this welfare state to adopt
decidedly neoliberal social policy reforms: a puzzling strategy,
when considering that continental European welfare states, in
Southern Europe in particular, are commonly considered difficult to reform (Palier, 2010). What kinds of policy reforms were
implemented? What were the most important factors that determined such reforms? Which theories are helpful in gaining
understanding of this neoliberal shift in welfare reform in
Italy? What kind of lessons can be drawn from the post-crisis
Italian welfare state reform experience from an international
perspective?
By reviewing previous research in political economy theory
and policy analysis, this article provides insights into the social
reforms implemented in Italy in the post 2008 economic crisis
and the some of the key factors that could have caused the
crisis. The aim is to provide a theoretical framework within
which political bipartisanship, the influences of the economic
crisis and the European Union, poor policy learning mechanisms, and the reduced role of the civil society are all accounted for simultaneously (Crouch, 2008; Natali & Rhodes, 2004;
Palier, 2010; Sabatier, 1988).
The article is structured as follows. The second section
provides an account of the 2008 global economic crisis, and
the factors that could have caused it, with Italy as a primary
example. While neoliberal ideology had already been
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dominating past legislatures, this economic crisis, in particular,
resulted in the rise of more decisive cuts in social expenditure. The third part outlines the reforms that have been implemented in Italy following the crisis. Some of the major reforms
included rises in taxation and public expenditure, on the one
hand, and more direct cuts in the areas of pensions, labor
market, health, and social services, on the other. The fourth
part of the study attempts to assemble elements into a useful
theoretical framework that can help readers to understand the
logic behind the austerity-oriented neoliberal reforms adopted
in Italy.
Going past traditional theoretical approaches in political
economy, which are based on path dependency approaches
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hall & Soskice, 2001), I attempt to
explain the impact that the recent economic crisis has had on
social policy reform in Italy by highlighting pressures from
the European Union, and the ensuing lack of policy learning
processes and civil society participation. In doing so, I adopt
Sabatier’s (1988) advocacy coalition framework (ACF) approach. The final section draws some policy implications for reforming welfare states. Understanding the necessity to involve
different social actors in welfare reform serves as a reminder of
the dangers that an excessive focus on self-referential discourses of policy elites, with consequent neglect of societal needs,
can represent for the real economy: namely, increased levels of
poverty, unemployment and inequality.

Economic Crisis and Neoliberal Directions
The 2008 global crisis involved the global financial market
and uncontrolled flow of capital, therefore differentiating it
from previous economic shocks. For instance, Keynesianism
strategies were implemented to deal with previous crises:
Governments directly intervened in the economy by fostering
market demand, enacting protectionist measures, and utilizing
industrial policy initiatives put forward by active labor unions.
Governments were fostering aggregated demand via expansionary macro policies and employment protection, a strategy
that, in the long term, would yield negative consequences for
inflation and public debt levels (Crouch, 2008; Pontusson &
Raess, 2012). In contrast, the 2008 crisis hit a global economy
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that was permeated by neoliberal thinking, according to which
public institutions are perceived as an obstacle to the full
functioning of markets (Pizzuti, 2012). In such a context, the
strategy of demand management, typical of Keynesian governments, was replaced by a new ‘privatized Keynesianism,’
according to which “new risk markets to ordinary consumers, via extended mortgages and credit card debt, replace the
previous capitalist system based on rising wages, welfare
state and government-led demand management” (Crouch,
2008, p. 10). In particular, the European Union economy has
been heavily influenced by the German neoliberal model of
capitalism, in which capital goods production and exports are
considered more important than boosting domestic consumer
demand. Priority is given to balanced public budgets and the
avoidance of inflation (Cesaratto & Pivetti, 2012; Crouch, 2008;
Pontusson & Raess, 2012). Despite this emphasis, Germany’s
governmental debt was at 82 percent of its GDP, slightly less
than the United Kingdom’s debt of 90 percent.
Figure 1. Current Account Balance Trend in Italy (% of GDP)
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The assumptions inherent in neoliberal ideas (having
access to perfect information, perfect competition, and the
like) were de facto detrimental to Southern European countries not adequately equipped to directly compete with big
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export-led economies, such as Germany. In the absence of an
alternative economic paradigm, as Figure 1 illustrates, Italy’s
political elites, traditionally following a top-down policy
making model, have been very keen in responding to external pressures by the EU to redress the national public budget
deficit.
Figure 1 displays public account balance trends in Italy
since the 1970s. Apart from the oil crisis of 1973, the 2008 financial shock represented the second worst period in terms
of the deterioration of public finances. After recovering from
the 1970s oil crisis, public spending went through a relatively
stable phase that dramatically improved in the early 1990s,
when Italian politics was struggling both to regain some credibility from the political bribery scandals (the “Clean Hands”
police investigations) and to abide by the economic stability
conditions dictated by the Maastricht treaty as a condition for
access to the European Union. By the late 1990s, the opening of
the European Central Bank (ECB) had been announced as well.
Figure 2. GDP Growth and Household Final Consumption
Expenditure (percent)
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However, since the end of the 1990s ( when full membership to
the EU and participation to the monetary union were secured),
account balances started worsening again under the Berlusconi

2011

2009

2007

2005

2003

2001

1999

1997

1995

1993

1991

1989

1987

1985

1983

1981

1979

1977

1975

1973

1971

1969

1967

1965

1963

-8

1961

-6

78			

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

governments. In effect, the economic crisis of 2008 only worsened an already quite dramatic situation, since Italian public
debt was already abnormally high by that time. In order to
keep the situation under control, and with the collaboration
of the Italian President of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano,
Berlusconi was forced to resign and a new government of technocrats led by former European Commissioner Mario Monti
was formed on a temporary basis (2011-2012) to take charge of
the debt crisis in compliance with European directives.
The Monti government took charge at a time when the
Italian economy was already in a dire condition. Falling consumption rates (see Figure 2), however, were not to be overturned by a socio-political strategy that was admittedly neoliberal and unsupportive of the real economy’s aggregated
demand. I will now turn to a brief overview of the main social
policies introduced during the global financial crisis.

Social Policy Reform Trends
The Italian Welfare State Structure
Traditionally, the Italian welfare state had a higher proportion of expenditures dedicated to income protection measures,
and most notably, to pensions (see Figure 3 for a comparison
with selected European countries). When analyzing total social
expenditure trends over the last 30 years, it appears that the
immediate aftermath of the economic crisis caused a sudden
increase in social expenditure levels, a trend that can be observed for all Southern European countries (Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012).
But how did this increase in expenditure reflect on the
different policy fields? Expenditure trends divided by policy
sector show that the prevalence of pensions and health expenditures remained quite robust even in the post-crisis years
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
2012), which seems to suggest that the overall structure of
social expenditure in Italy remained substantially the same,
similar to the findings of previous studies in other European
countries (Chung & Thewissen, 2011; Vis, van Kersbergen, &
Hylands, 2011). Also, rises in social expenditure levels measured as percentages of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) might
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be biased when national revenues decrease in the face of economic crises.
Although overall expenditure levels might not have
changed visibly in the years following the crisis, previous
welfare institutions were not left unscathed. Instead, reforms
from the Monti government were following a neoliberal logic
of welfare cuts and individualization of social risk (Pizzuti,
2009).
Figure 3. Composition of Social Protection Spending in Selected
Bismarckian Countries* in 2009 (% of GDP)
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*Most continental European welfare states rely mainly on social insurance, a system
first introduced by Otto von Bismarck in Germany in the 19th century. This is also a
typical feature of the Italian welfare system, so that it commonly is compared with
continental European welfare states.

Monti Government's Reforms (2011-2012)
Financial Market
The priority goal for the technocratic government of 20112012 was to balance public finances. This was done mainly by
increasing the level of taxation—increasing indirect taxes on
consumption (Value Added Tax) and on alcoholic products,
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reintroducing the local tax on housing (IMU), and also on reducing the fiscal cost of hiring employees for firms (this cost
was relatively high due to social contributions levied for pensions and other social insurance systems) (Eurispes, 2013). It
was also done by containing public sector costs by cutting
budgetary expenses for public education and health, and by
adopting a three-year freeze on salary increases, along with
limits to new public sector hiring from 2010 (Maino & Neri,
2011).
Pensions
As for pensions, the main intent of the Minister of Labor,
Social Policies and Gender Equality, Elsa Fornero, was to
speed up the privatization of the pension system conceived
by the Amato and Dini reforms in the 1990s. These reforms
basically fostered individualization of social risk with the introduction of the Notional Defined Contribution system for
calculating the final amount of pensions, and provided incentives for the creation of private sector pensions based on
capitalization of funds (Hong, 2012). Pizzuti (2012) has argued
that further cutting expenses on pensions in Italy was not justified by the high level of expenditure in pensions compared to
other European countries; additionally, because private funds
transfer the costs of the volatility of private finance to the final
amount of pensions, beneficiaries pay the highest price due
to the uncertainty of foreign financial markets. What makes it
worse, NDC-based pensions are not adjusted for inflation, and
beneficiaries bear additional costs of higher administrative expenses and instability (Pizzuti, 2012).
Labor Market
Labor market reforms were met with high expectations,
since they were meant to correct inequalities in the highly
segmented Italian labor market, where the level of social protection largely depends on the type of employment contract.
The Fornero reform was, however, not adequately addressing
these issues: the apprenticeship contract had been introduced;
rules for dismissal were modified (granting more discretion
to judges); unemployment benefits were not broadened in
coverage; and the maximum duration for ‘mobility’ benefits
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(covering the time frame from dismissal to finding another occupation) was reduced. The piecemeal way these reforms were
enacted classified them as “incomplete” reform in the eyes of
some observers (Lavoce.info, 2012).
Health
Due to the reduction of public funds, the National Health
System (SSN) (financed through general taxation) has suffered
from budget cuts, leading to the reduction of the number of
beds in hospitals. Coordinated facilities for primary care should
have been set, but this depended on the successful renewal of
national agreements with general practitioners as stipulated
in the Balduzzi legislative decree, a legislative frame within
which the appointment of new general directors in hospitals,
new sanctions for illegal sale of tobacco, and opening hours for
pharmacies, among other things, are regulated (Lavoce.info,
2012).
Social Services
Social services and family policies were possibly the areas
that suffered the most as a consequence of the post-crisis
reforms. While funds for social assistance, child care, and long
term care are financed through regional budgets, the 2011
Budget Law caused a serious blow to the amount of public
funds allocated to the regions, which in some cases, were curtailed almost completely. Decentralization of powers to local
governments with no adequate financial coverage from the
central governments illustrated the neglect of social services in
a moment when Italian families needed them the most (Maino
& Neri, 2011).
In a nutshell, from a social policy perspective, neoliberal
strategies of cost containment and increased fiscal pressures on
Italian families were not adequately balanced by income and
social needs. As a result, overall social vulnerability worsened,
with soaring unemployment levels and rising intergenerational, gender, and territorial inequalities, thus contributing to an
already difficult social mobility in Italy. As Figure 4 illustrates,
unemployment rates have been rising dramatically since the
crisis, and dual labor market inequalities seem to have become
a more important issue than the gender gap.
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In Search of a Theoretical Framework
Classical Social Policy Theories
Italy’s social protection and capitalistic production systems
have long coexisted under the logic of social insurance and
life-long employment for male breadwinners. Following a
traditional perspective on social risks, viewed as the loss of
income in critical life situations (for example, illness, old age,
invalidity), the Italian welfare state developed incrementally
by letting the social protection system grow, with social contribution requirements increasing during the thirty years after
the end of the war. Those were the years of public expenditure
expansion, when concerted negotiations between government,
employers, and employees were determining the real level of
wage of industrial workers, and social expenditure growth
was beneficial to all. More specifically, it was particularly beneficial to the Democratic Christian Party (DC), a dominant political party in those years, that was willing to gather political consensus in exchange for a substantial lack of democratic
competition.
Figure 4. Unemployment Rate 1992-2012, per Gender and Age (%)
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This essentially static political economy system has been
variously interpreted in terms of being a coordinated market
economy (CME), a Bismarckian corporatist-conservative
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welfare state, and a Southern European type of welfare state
with its own characteristics, such as a high level of political
clientelism, low levels of social expenditure, low levels of redistribution, a focus on income protection rather than on direct
social services, and a strong degree of institutional stickiness
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996; Hall & Soskice, 2001;
Kammer, Niehues, & Peichl, 2012; Palier, 2010; Raitano, 2012;
Schroeder, 2008). However, these approaches tend to be problematic in terms of understanding policy change. Previously,
I argued that the economic crisis has seemingly triggered a
series of neoliberal responses. Is it correct, then, to assume
that the crisis alone caused welfare cuts? What was the role of
workers and civil society in this respect? Why did policy learning mechanisms not allow social policies to be more responsive to the economy’s real needs? Since welfare state classification theories are better suited to provide path-dependency
oriented interpretations, here I am attempting to explore some
more flexible theoretical frameworks to gain an understanding of the dynamics behind the neoliberal turn in the Italian
welfare state.
Understanding Policy Change
The reform window’s approach. The Bismarckian welfare
systems of continental Europe are commonly understood as
being structured in a way that is difficult to reform, so that
even when changes are made, they hardly represent a radical
change in their welfare state structure (Hinrichs, 2000; Palier
2010). Italy has been no exception to that, as mentioned
earlier. However, this does not necessarily mean that changes
in welfare are trivial and path dependency theories do not
apply. Faced with the task of understanding the nature of such
changes, Natali & Rhodes (2004) suggested that the spaceopportunity for reforms would be the result of two opposing
forces, internal and external. Internally, industrial relations
and institutional inertia/stickiness tend to keep the system
as it is. Externally, neoliberal dictates of competitiveness and
financial sustainability, the Europeanization process, and the
need to respond to societal problems, tend to push in the direction of change (Natali & Rhodes, 2004).
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Figure 5. The reform window’s approach for Bismarckian countries
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Source: Natali & Rhodes (2004, p. 3).

The policy arena approach. The policy arena approach is commonly used to understand, through an ideal situation model,
what happens inside the policy decision-making process once
a social issue has successfully entered the political agenda.
A typical diagram presents a vertical structure with arrows
progressing through subsequent stages, from top to bottom.
The policy making path would start with a public policy crisis
marked by the clash between ‘old’ and ‘new’ problems (first
stage), which would then result in the civil and political actors’
mobilization and the creation of coalitions and institutional
projects (stage two). Eventually, these conflicting plans and coalitions would compete in the political arena (stage three), and
ultimately, the result of such conflicts would be the generation
of reform outputs (stage four) (Ferrera, 1993).
Girotti (1998) imagined a more static model for describing
the development of the modern welfare state that would resemble a balance between actors in the public administration,
the economic system, the civil society, and the government.
But ultimately it was the political elites that made final policy
decisions in the politics arena, by putting together possible
solutions presented from both political institutions (public
administration and government) and the socio-economic
system (civil society and the economic system). Unfortunately,
these ideal-typical schemes do not help us account for policy
change/reform.
An alternative approach. Natali & Rhodes (2004) are correct in
stressing the importance of external forces determining policy
change; however, they are not very specific on the modalities
the political struggle would follow. Also, why were real needs
of society left unattended in the Italian case? The main limit of
the above theories is evidenced by the simplicity with which
political competition among different coalitions is imagined.
Power balances and the way in which they communicate are,
in fact, much more complicated, and external pressures are
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not taken into account within the interpretive frames of the
policy arena. Why, for example, were trade unions and social
movements not successful in influencing political agendas like
in the past? What happened to policy learning processes? In
the Italian case, it looks as if the political arena was too elitist
and narrowly self-referential to respond to the real needs of
the society, whereas it was more easily affected by the external
influence of the economic crisis and pressures from the EU.
In searching for an interpretive model that could properly
account for such external pressures and the real economy, I
chose to apply Sabatier (1988)’s Advocacy Coalition Framework
(ACF) to the analysis of the Italian post-crisis welfare reforms.
While this model has its roots in public policy theory1, its complexity serves to grasp the dynamics laying behind neoliberalism in the Italian form, since it stresses the role of advocacy
coalitions that can successfully influence the policy agenda.
In Sabatier’s (1988) view, the policy arena (“policy subsystem”) is but one of the areas through which policy outcomes
see the light of the day. Other important aspects that give rise
to policy reform processes are the real world and its problems, resources, values, and rules (“relatively stable parameters”). “External system events” are represented by external
socio-economic and political changes. Summarizing, external
systems and stable parameters influence the policy arena by
defining needs and tasks that the government needs to take
up. However, such influences are not easily injected into the
political agenda, since they also have to be efficiently organized at a societal level ( e.g., trade unions, social movements)
and the constraints and limited resources of subsystem actors
(Sabatier, 1988) have to be accounted for. An overview of the
ACF theory can be seen in Figure 6.
When applied to the case of Italy, the ACF diagram could
be reinterpreted in the form presented in Figure 7. In the
figure, arrows connecting one area to another in thicker black
whenever these links are stronger, and in lighter black whenever they tend to be fainter. External system events (box no.
1) are, in this case, represented by the concurrent demands of
the economic crisis and the EU pressures for fiscal austerity.
The policy subsystem area (box no. 2) is depicted as the policy
decision making process, and the real economy’s relatively
stable parameters can be seen in box no. 3. The most peculiar
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characteristic for the Italian case consists in the fact that, due
to political opportunist strategies of clientelism and big coalitions of governments led by the DC party, democratic competition tended to be restricted. In this light, policy discourses, expectations, paradigms, were not really produced as a result of
democratic competition in the policy arena; the preponderance
of the DC party led instead to a set of cognitive assumption
that were already given for granted. As a result, final decisions
and policy outputs were quite self-referential, bearing little
connection with the real society. In a word, the cognitive activity of policy elites was trapped in a paternalistic, top-down approach to policy making, with discussion among social parts
left to a minimum and weak policy learning mechanisms.
Figure 6. General Model of Policy Change Focusing on Competing
Advocacy Coalitions within Policy Subsystems.
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Given this conservative political landscape, it was challenging for society’s real needs (box no. 3) to gain access to the
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political agenda, due, in part, to a low capacity of organization from Italian trade unions and civil society organizations,
and possibly also due to the indiscriminate pro-government
use of television and media that delivered distorted images of
societal issues and governmental actions, especially during the
years of Berlusconi’s legislature.
Figure 7. Applying the ACF Model to Social Policy Reform in Italy.)
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On the other hand, the economic crisis and EU pressures
for austerity (box no. 1) were providing a good rationale for
neoliberal political forces to continue to fail to substantively
reform the welfare system in a way that could seriously reflect
societal needs. This created a vicious circle in which EU pressures and the economic crisis were pushing towards austerity reforms. This resulted in increasing fiscal pressure and cuts
in welfare services for Italian households; as a consequence,
available resources, represented by tax revenues, were shrinking. Ultimately, such a vicious circle helped push the country to
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the verge of economic recession (Eurispes, 2013). Although the
Monti government first, and the incumbent Letta government
afterwards, repeatedly assured people that the Italian economy
was recovering, this risk has yet to be averted. If the government and the industry continued to only care about keeping
financial markets afloat by financial bailouts (in the absence
of compensating support to the economic demand of middle
and low-income families), a way out of the vicious circle was
difficult to imagine. In the absence of a strategy that does not
contemplate participation from the economy’s civil coalitions,
relying on politically elitist decision making is going to widen
the gap between the rationale of electoral competition and the
need to structurally reform the Italian welfare system. Monti
government’s reforms, in this sense, demonstrated the limits
of a neoliberal strategy that had proven to be substantially incapable of pushing the country out of the crisis, the effects of
which continue unabated to this day.

Conclusions and Policy Implications
This study sought to provide a theoretical lens to explore
social policy reforms enacted in Italy after the 2008 world
economic crisis. Special attention has been paid to the 20112012 Monti government, specifically to its neoliberal strategy of prioritizing austerity measures that, to a large extent,
failed to change the structure of the segmented labor market
in Italy and to reduce hardships of impoverished Italian families through better social services. Instead, tax increases and
the privatization of social protection and the retrenchment
of regional funds dedicated to social services, education, and
health, contributed to further aggravating Italy’s economy. By
applying Sabatier’s (1988) ACF theoretical approach to the dynamics of Italian welfare reform, it has been argued that external pressures from the economic crisis and the European
Union’s demands for balanced public accounts, coupled with
Italy’s traditionally elitist decision making, systematically prevented the forces in civil society from positively contributing
to the policy change process. In the absence of adequate democratic competition, the only available economic paradigm
was neoliberalism, which included the policy choice of a punitive laissez-faire strategy of individualization of social risks

Italian Welfare in the Aftermath of Economic Crisis

89

(Pizzuti, 2009). At this stage, it is still not possible to rule out
the possibility that Italy will fall into a similar economic recession as Greece (Eurispes, 2013).
This analysis of the policy decision making process in
Italy can have useful political implications for social-insurance based welfare states also in need of reform. It appears
that leaving the assessment of social needs and the choice of
viable policy strategies to only electoral competition tends to
exacerbate policy inefficiencies, especially for those policy subsystems with high levels of political cronyism. To put it differently, the decision making process is essentially flawed by
the need to be politically more attractive to the masses, which
can lead to a lack of efficiency in the use of public resources,
a blurred perception of the main social priorities that have to
be tackled by national social policies, and vulnerability to the
economic requirements dictated by the world’s economy and
financial institutions. An active involvement of trade unions
and civil society, a more transparent media system, and more
democratic competition in the political arena are indispensable
to help the whole policy mechanism work smoothly (Sabatier,
1988). It is particularly important for welfare states that resemble the Bismarckian model, such as continental European and
East Asian countries (Holliday, 2000), to not fall into a vicious
post-crisis neoliberal cycle, in which the external economy’s
pressures and political elites’ self-referential thinking strongly
enforce each other in neglecting real society’s needs.
Acknowledgement: A version of this article previously appeared in
the Korean Journal of Social Policy, 20(3), 2013.
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Rolling Downhill: Effects of Austerity on Local
Government Social Services in the United States
David B. Miller
Terry Hokenstad
Case Western Reserve University
Austerity policies have been instituted in countries around the
world attempting to address the fallout from the global economic
crisis beginning in 2008 and still lingering through today. While
the literature debates the economic impact of these policies, limited attention has been given to the effects of austerity at the local
governmental level. It is posited that at the local government level,
the effects of austerity policies are most noticeable and detrimental.
States and local municipalities are “switching roles” with the federal government (Davidson, 2013, p. 1). They are providing jobs
and social welfare services in the gap left by the departure of the
federal government from a broad social welfare delivery perspective. The ideological rationale associated with state budgets being
balanced through austerity-like reductions in revenue sharing
and the reducing the social safety net will be highlighted. In the
U.S., the majority of those states which implemented drastic and
sometimes draconian budget reductions have been under majority Republican legislatures and governorships. Characteristics of
austerity policies and the modern welfare-state are discussed in
relationship to the reduction in public investment, particularly
in government non-education employment through discretionary spending. The results of austerity policies on funding for
social welfare services and public employment will be illustrated.
Key words: austerity; local government; stimulus spending;
social welfare services; social policy

“The boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity
at the Treasury.” John Maynard Keynes, 1937, Collected
Writings (Jayadev & Konczal, 2010)
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2014, Volume XLI, Number 2

93

94			

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

Austerity has become a buzzword as nations worldwide, along with many American states, address the fallout
and effect of the world-wide economic crisis stemming from
financial and housing downturns in the United States to the
crisis among some Euro-zone countries brought on in part by
growth in social welfare expenditures. Nations have attempted
a variety of measures to address the economic crisis, including
both stimulus packages and reduction of expenditures. Those
measures focused on budget reduction are commonly referred
to as austerity. While articulated by those on the political right
as the only viable option out of the economic crisis, evidence
documenting the limitations of austerity measures continues to
mount. One only needs to look to the United Kingdom, Greece
and Cyprus to see the effects of austerity measures on the populations and economies of those countries. These include continued economic malaise as well as human deprivation. In the
United States, austerity measures have contributed to the continued political gridlock and competing proposals to address
this nation’s economic and social welfare program future.
Budget sequestration at the federal level is part of the austerity
movement in the United States (Usborne, 2013). Congressman
and Republican Vice-Presidential nominee Paul Ryan’s budget
proposal and the Bowles-Simpson Fiscal Responsibility and
Reform plan are but two examples of austerity-focused proposals which have been put before Americans. These proposals, at their core, would have a major negative impact on social
welfare and safety net programs.
Nations have implemented budget balancing measures
by reducing spending on social welfare and entitlement programs, reducing public employment and raising taxes to increase revenue. In the United States, the focus has been primarily on decreasing expenditures at the federal and state
levels of government. This action has had a direct impact on
the budgets and services provided by local government. Local
governments are downstream from austerity policies implemented at the federal and state level. However, as suggested
by Clark (2012), local governments are inextricably linked to
the financial condition and health of state and federal government. As revenue sharing from federal and state sources is
reduced due to austerity policies, local governments are faced
with reducing public service employees, reducing the number
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of public and social welfare services, and/or asking residents
to pay higher taxes in order to maintain existing services. With
few available options to close the gaps between revenue and
expenditures, local governments face daunting fiscal challenges. Unmistakably, local governments are on the frontlines
when it comes to experiencing the effects of austerity policies.
This paper will focus on the impact of austerity policies on
local government, and, in particular, their major role in providing health and social services in communities throughout
the United States. As the extant literature on this topic indicates, local government is most often discussed in terms of
large metropolitan areas; however, in this paper, the effects of
austerity on smaller local governments (i.e., less than 50,000
residents) will be included. The implementation of austerity
policies is overtly characterized by its proponents as steps to
reduce federal and state budget deficits that are the result of
spending and public indebtedness. More covertly, it is suggested that the implementation of austerity measures is an
attempt to dismantle social programs (Krugman, 2012; Peck,
2012). Characteristics of austerity policies and the modern
welfare state will be discussed in relationship to the reduction
in revenue sharing with local communities for needed and
necessary community services. It is posited that the effects of
austerity policies are most noticeable and detrimental at the
level of local government. States and local municipalities are
“switching roles” with the federal government (Davidson,
2013, p. 1) in that they are providing jobs and social welfare
services in the chasm left by the departure of the federal government from a broad social welfare delivery perspective.
Now states are also engaged in austerity measures, including
reduced revenue sharing to municipalities, which impacts directly on service provision at the local level (Delisle, 2010).
This paper also highlights the ideological rationale associated with deficit-driven budgets and the resultant reductions
in revenue sharing with local government and social welfare
services. The majority of states implementing drastic and
sometimes draconian budget reductions, including sharp decreases in revenue sharing with local government, have been
under majority Republican legislatures and governorships.
In Ohio, losses from reduction in the local government fund
and tax reimbursements totaled nearly a billion dollars for
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calendar years 2012-2013 (Patton & Krueger, 2012). Additionally,
the states workers were reduced by approximately 51,000
workers through layoffs and attrition. The effects of these reductions are realized at the micro (e.g., local) level. Discussion
of the effects on the local level in northeastern Ohio communities will be used to exemplify how austerity policies affect the
delivery of social welfare services, as well as shift the burden
onto local taxpayers to pay for needed public safety and other
basic services.
This paper will conclude with a discussion of the policy
alternatives for local government, state and federal policymakers. Katz’s (2010) position that the recent economic downturn
altered the structure of poverty and risk among the middle
and working class is reflected in no better place than the experiences of local government as a result of austerity-like policies
emerging from the federal and state levels.

Background
Upon taking office in 2009, one the first pieces of legislation
signed by President Obama in response to the economic crisis
was the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).
The ARRA appropriated $831 billion dollars to address the
multiple negative consequences of the Great Recession. As reported by Recovery.gov (2013), $796 billion dollars has been
expended through the ARRA as of 2012. The ARRA provided cash-strapped states and local governments with needed
funds to keep public employees, hire additional ones, promote
infrastructure development, and support safety net programs
such as Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program, which saw increased usage as a direct result of rising
unemployment. However, funding for the ARRA ended in
2012, and in the current political climate an additional stimulus package is not likely. As will be highlighted in this paper,
stimulus spending has been replaced with calls for austerity.
The current sequestration reinforces austerity policies across
federal and state government (Appelbaum, 2013).
What is Austerity?
It is important to offer an explanation of “austerity” as it
applies to governmental economic and social policy. In 2010,
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the word austerity was named as the word of the year by
Merriam Webster dictionary (McBride & Whiteside, 2011). The
Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus (Abate, 1996) defines austerity with the phrases "moral severity" and "severe simplicity."
It goes on to indicate that austerity is synonymous with hardship. Growing evidence indicates that fiscal hardships due
to austerity measures are being experienced by communities
and individuals across the nation. An estimated $717.1 million
dollars will be lost due to sequestration in Ohio—funding
for children with disabilities, job assistance and public safety
forces (Plunderbund.com, 2013). Stuckler and Basu (2013)
posit that austerity measures can have deleterious effects on
health services and health outcomes. They point to the loss of
nutritional funding for pregnant women and an $18 million
dollar cut in the Centers of Disease Control’s budget—our
nation’s bulwark against disease and epidemics—all due to
sequestration.
Lest one thinks of austerity as it applies to governmental
policy as a recent description, Terrell (1981) highlighted the
effects of such policies on social welfare expenditures in the
state of California due to the passage of Proposition 13. What
Terrell’s discussion provides for us today is that austerity, or
related terms such as “retrenchment” “cutbacks” or “containment” (p. 275), continue to effect the delivery of general and
social services at the community level. Appelbaum (2013)
highlights that the periods of the Vietnam War and for most of
the 1990s, federal government approaches to the reduction of
spending were of longer duration and depth.
Konzelmann (2012) defines austerity as a combination of
reductions in public expenditures along with increased taxes.
Hazel (2012) indicates that austerity is a reduction in government spending when deficits are high. Austerity in these circumstances denotes governmental actions or measures taken
to reduce public expenditures and in some cases increase
taxes. The Congressional Budget Office (2010) succinctly states
“Austerity programs generally include both tax increases and
spending reductions” (p. 8). These measures are taken when a
government’s expenditures exceeds its revenues, creating significant debt burdens due to borrowing. Peck (2012) employs
the term “fiscal purging” (p. 630) to describe the manner in
which governments reduce their spending, particularly in the
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area of social welfare expenditures, including the employment
of public sector employees.
Since the beginning of the global economic crisis, local
governmental entities in the United States have seen reduced
spending due to reductions in both federal and state funding.
The PEW Charitable Trusts’ report, The Local Squeeze: Falling
Revenues and Growing Demand for Services Challenge Cities,
Counties and School Districts (2012), states that aid to local government fell by $12.6 billion dollars in 2010. This has resulted in broad declines in public employment at the local level
across the nation (Dadayan & Boyd, 2013). Lucas (2011) indicates that since August of 2008 public payrolls at the local
level have decreased by 450,000 jobs, a rate of nearly 15,000
jobs being lost monthly. Another analysis of the employment
number places public sector job loss at 627,000 since June 2009
(Bivens & Shierholz, 2012). Appelbaum (2013) indicates that
there are 500,000 fewer public employees across all three levels
of government since 2007.
The loss of those jobs and the continued shedding of
government jobs at the local level contribute to the increase
in long-term unemployment and increased usage of safety
net programs (e.g., Supplemental Nutritional Assistance
Program). With the ending of stimulus funding from the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009,
many of the jobs that were preserved through this policy are
now being phased out. Local government is faced with declining revenue yet increasing need for services to residents.
Ironically, when austerity measures are implemented, and
particularly when public sector jobs are reduced, there is an
increased usage of safety net services due to the job losses.
Increases in unemployment compensation and Medicaid costs
have been tied to cutbacks in local government employment
(Larson, 2012). Larson’s observation regarding entitlement
programs is a perspective which offers a crystal clear portrayal of these programs. He states, “entitlement programs are
open to everyone who is eligible, and there is no cap on how
many eligible persons are allowed into a program” (p. 13). It is
through austerity measures that more, not fewer, individuals
seek services from the social safety net, leading to increases in
spending for programs. Blinder and Zandi (2010) report that
$321 billion dollars of the stimulus appropriations were spent
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on Medicaid, food stamps and unemployment benefits.
Friedman (2013) indicates that austerity measures continue
to be pushed, even in the face of mounting evidence reflecting their failure to facilitate economic growth and employment. The slashing of public spending continues to contribute
to both unemployment, particularly among the middle class,
and stagnant economic growth. Republican-controlled state
legislatures (e.g., Ohio) are inflicting austerity measures which
force local governments to either ask residents to make up the
shortfall with higher taxes or lose services, or in some cases,
both.

Austerity Impact on the Welfare State
The welfare state as defined by Esping-Andersen (1990)
is basically the provision of welfare services and support to
the citizens of a particular state. This includes both cash assistance and non-cash assistance to meet a variety of human
needs. In addition, government spending for social welfare
provides public employment opportunities which contribute
to the growth and expansion of the middle class. It is posited
by scholars (Krugman, 2012; Peck, 2012) that austerity measures have a negative impact on welfare state provisions by
reducing employment opportunities, in addition to decreasing
social welfare programs and services. This is particularly true
at the level of local government. The U.S. Census reported that
state and local government employed 19.6 million people in
20110!!, nearly 250,00 less than 2009 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).
The overwhelming majority (14.3 million to 5.35 million) were
employed by local government, with a proportional loss of
jobs. Haze (2012) poignantly points out that the impact of austerity measures is experienced the most by the poor in society
through the loss of both income and services. However, as
austerity measures lead to a reduction in public employment,
members of the middle class are also directly affected.
Democratic versus Republican Approaches to Austerity
Austerity measures and policies can come from different
points of the political spectrum. In California, Governor Jerry
Brown’s initial 2011 budget contained significant reductions
in funding to schools, corrections and human services (Pollin
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& Thompson, 2011). Governor Brown’s budget cut nearly $13
billion dollars from those aforementioned areas. Not only were
services reduced, but there were significant employment losses
among the middle class of the state.
Republican approaches are often associated with cutting
taxes and privatizing or contracting out governmental services. However, recently state legislatures, many of them
Republican-led, have introduced bills which would expand
the sales tax to services ranging from haircuts to funerals. In
his second budget, Governor Kasich proposed taxing over 500
different services in order to partially compensate for a decrease in the state’s income tax. In this case, the proposed sales
tax expansion was removed by the legislature.
Funding to local governments in the current Ohio budget
remained flat; however, the 12.5% share of property-tax payments that the state had subsidized in previous decades
will cease to exist for all future tax and school levies, therefore leaving citizens to the pay the full amount of any future
income tax or school levy increases. For example, before the
2014-2015 Ohio budget was signed, in the first author’s city,
legislation was passed to place a safety forces tax levy on the
ballot. At first introduction, if approved by voters, the cost to
the homeowner of a $100,000 home was $99.00 a year, but with
the passage of the new budget, with the elimination of the
12.5% credit, the cost to the homeowner rose to $114.00.
Another potentially devastating legislative proposal in the
state of Ohio would further reduce allocations to local governments. This is the proposal to establish a uniformed code for
the purposes of tax collection. It is estimated that this legislation, if passed and signed into law, will cost local governments
$46 million dollars. States such as North Carolina are pushing
austerity policies which clearly harm those most in need of
safety net services. The recently passed North Carolina budget
reduced income taxes for higher-income individuals and families, reducing the number of weeks individuals can receive
unemployment and refusing to participate in the Medicaid expansion portion of the Affordable Care Act.
Following the reduction in the Local Government Fund
(LGF) in Ohio, the state legislature implemented a competitive grants initiative called the Local Government Innovation
Program (Gurwitt, 2011). In essence, local governments could
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compete for a portion of a $45 million grant resource to study
and implement the centralization and sharing of services. The
seeking of competitive grants and the move towards cities
joining together to address the reduction of services is seen by
those supporting austerity measures as an example of reducing redundancies in local economies but also shrinking public
sector jobs and services. Also, the Republican-led legislature is
proposing in its 2013-2015 biennial budget that the surplus of
over $2 billion dollars be used to cut income taxes to residents
with the hope of eventually eliminating the state’s income tax
all together.
Democratic approaches tend to target a mix of government
spending. Paul Krugman (2012), winner of the Nobel Prize in
Economics, has frequently highlighted that austerity measures
are not what governments should implement during severe
economic downturns. Instead, governments should increase
spending so as to prime the employment engine. Additionally,
as was seen during the Great Recession, the government could
provide stimulus funds for states and local governments to
keep public service employees working and assure that safety
net services are maintained. Given the level of job loss during
the economic crisis, reduction in safety net programming could
contribute to significant hardship on individuals and families.

Austerity Effects on Local Government
Unlike the federal government, state and local governments are required to balance their budgets. Nearly every
state faced historical budget deficits in the aftermath of the
Great Recession (Jimenez, 2009). The austerity measures taken
by the federal and state governments intensified the effects of
two essential sources of revenue on which the majority of local
governments build their budgets: property taxes and transference of resident income tax payments back to the community.
A report by the Pew Charitable Trusts (2012) calls this a “onetwo punch” (p. 1) to local governments. Recently, the terms
"fiscal stress" or "fiscal shock" have been applied to the manifestations of austerity policies on local governments. With the
decline in real estate values seen during the housing crisis,
local government budgets have realized significant reductions in funding from property tax collections. For example, in
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South Euclid, Ohio, the first author’s city, property valuations
dropped on average 12% This resulted in a significant decrease
in the amount of property taxes collected and returned to the
city.
The second factor is that states, in efforts to improve their
budget shortfalls, have reduced the amount of funding that
they return to the local municipalities. In the state of Ohio, the
local government funds were reduced by nearly 50% across
the board, equaling a reduction of nearly $630 million from the
2010-2011 to the 2012-2013 budget years (Local Government
Fund Coalition, 2011). The Local Government Funds (LGF) are
state revenues returned to local governments following the
collection of taxes. These funds are then used to support critical and essential city functions from police and fire to social
services (Plunderbund.com, 2013). In addition to the reduction of the LGFs, the state budget eliminated the estate tax in
2013 and the Commercial Activity Tax, which further reduced
financial resources used by local governments to pay for and
provide essential community and services.
From police and fire to health clinics and public recreation
facilities to community centers for older people, LGFs are essential to a local government’s ability to provide services to its
residents. While Ohio’s governor is able to tout that he wiped
out the state’s deficit and balance the budget without raising
taxes with his initial budget, local governments were left with
few options to make up the reduced allocations and were left
scrambling to fill in the budget gaps with tax increases to residents, laying off of public employees, reducing services. or in
some cases, seeking to merge services with neighboring cities
or actually merging with other cities. In some states, cities filed
for bankruptcy as a result of cuts in their allocations from their
state government, as states grappled with the consequences of
the financial and housing crises (Delisle, 2010). Measures taken
by local governments to achieve fiscal balance in their budgets
have led to a reduction in public employment and payrolls.
Estimates vary as to the number of public sector employees
whose jobs were eliminated since 2008, yet those estimates
consistently suggest that more than 500,000 of these jobs have
been lost in this time period.
For example, in Ohio, local governments have seen a significant reduction in public employees and services (Local
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Government Fund Coalition, 2011; Scott, Schleis, Antoniotti
& Warsmith, 2013) as result of the reduction in LGF from the
state government. In Ohio’s smallest county, Vinton, there
are no safety forces and the criminal justice system consists
of only a judge and sheriff. In the city of Cleveland, the reduction of $35.7 million dollars in LGFs in 2012 contributed to
the reduction of between 350-400 public employee jobs. The
state of Ohio has lost 33,500 jobs in the local government sector
since the end of the recession. The fact that many of these laid
off workers utilize unemployment, Medicaid and food stamp
programs during the time they are unemployed, increases the
need for safety net services. While stimulus spending was criticized by conservatives, the city of Akron, Ohio was able to
retain 36 firefighters while adding an additional 38, plus 12
more police officers (Scott et al., 2013); this would not have
been possible without the funds appropriated in the ARRA.
Peck (2012) presents several options that local governments are pursuing as they address the realities of austerity
measures. While reduction in public employees and increased
taxes are the most commonly advanced examples, the options
of privatization of services, “grant hustling” (p. 649), and increased reliance on voluntary and non-profit organizations to
deliver social services are focal points for local governments
seeking to do more with less. The city of Cleveland had to
enact major reductions to make-up the shortfall in its LGF allocation from state government (e.g., charging fees for garbage
collection), but it also has available options that smaller cities
do not have. Admission fees for sporting events and entertainment, along with increased taxes on region-wide services such
as water service, have enabled the city to bring in additional
sources of revenue: That, however, is not the case with the
smaller local governments in the region. In the city of South
Euclid, one action taken was privatization of garbage collection. What was once a city function and a source of employment is now contracted with a private agency for rubbish and
recycling efforts. Although the city realized a savings of nearly
$1.2 million dollars, several positions in the city’s service
department were left unfilled, with the remaining workers
needing to fulfill extra duties.
One option, of course, is to increase taxes at the local level.
In Shaker Heights, Ohio, the second author’s city, citizens

104			

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

voted to increase the municipal income tax rate by .5% to 2.25%
in order to preserve essential city services (Brown, 2012; Jewell,
2012). Shaker Heights is a diverse but largely upper middle
income community. While pride in strong public service is an
important reason for the passage of the income tax increase,
ability to pay the increased tax based on income level also was
a significant factor. The reliance on local tax levies to fill the
budget gap caused by federal and state austerity policies is
resulting in increasing disparity between have and have not
communities. This growing inequality is again exacerbated by
public policy.

Conclusion
It is evident that local government is a major focal point
for the hardship synonymous with austerity. This paper has
identified the manifold impact of national and state austerity
policies on both public services and public employment at the
local level. Municipalities, for the most part, are ill-equipped
to compensate for the sharp drop in income resulting from the
rollbacks in state government revenue sharing. This, coupled
with decreased funding for many health and social service programs through federal sequestration, has resulted in an austerity induced crisis at the local level.
This crisis is likely to deepen in the coming years. Local
governments in states where policy makers are intent on reinforcing federal austerity policies are particularly vulnerable.
For example, in Ohio municipalities will increasingly experience the ramifications of austere state budget policies and allocations. According to Wendy Patton (2013) of the policy advocacy think-tank, Policy Matters Ohio, the recently passed
biennial budget for 2014-2015 contains additional significant
allocation reductions that will directly affect local governments. The elimination of the estate tax and further reduction
of revenue sharing through the Local Government Fund will
simply add to the difficulty of choices facing municipalities
large and small. These choices are to reduce services, lay off
public employees, increase taxes or some combination of the
three. Some have argued for greater efficiency through privatization of services and increased payment of fees by residents.
However, studies have documented the fact that this has not
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proven to be an effective way of controlling costs (Patton &
Kruger, 2012).
Increasing taxes at the local level is a difficult choice, not
least because most communities already have property tax
levies to support public schools, and larger counties have
levies to support various human services. Some affluent
suburbs, such as Shaker Heights, can be successful in passing
local income tax increases, but this also increases disparity in
public service provision based not upon need, but rather on
income. An axiom of taxation policy is that the more that services are funded by local taxes, the greater the differentiation
between the haves and have nots. This has traditionally been a
major issue in public education policy and now is becoming an
increasingly important issue in health and social service policy.
Thus, there are no easy answers to counter the impact of
austerity policies on local governments. Clearly the policy
battles must be fought at the national and state levels both
through electoral politics and policy advocacy. Austerity produces hardship at the local level, but its policy activation and
impact is basically determined by federal and state government. Mayor Georgine Welo of South Euclid has said, “It is
fend for yourself local government” due to the austerity measures being employed in by Ohio’s governor and legislature.
Is this truly how we, as a civilized society, want our elected
officials to perform?
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Weathering the Storm:
Botswana's Culture of Care
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Botswana, a semi-desert southern African state ranked among the
poorest in the world in the 1960s and 1970s, has emerged as an
upper middle income country in the new millennium and a beacon of
democracy and good governance on the continent and in the world.
Since the discovery of diamonds, Botswana has prudently utilised
the ensuing wealth to improve the lives of her citizens. Through a
succession of National Development Plans the state has provided
social services that have addressed many of the needs of the population. This trend has continued into the challenging era of the world
economic crisis of 2008-2009 that culminated in global financial
meltdown. The country has weathered the storm but continues to
face several challenges including unemployment, drought, economic diversification, an on-going HIV and AIDS-related crisis,
and the restraints of a commodity-based economy. However, with
a resilience which has characterised its post-independence performance, Botswana continues to display an aspect of African stoicism and care that defines this environmentally compromised land.
Key words: Botswana, poverty, democracy, Africa, youth, diamonds, economy, unemployment, HIV, AIDS

Botswana is a landlocked, semi-arid country with a small
open economy, a population of just over two million, and
an annual average rate of population growth at 1.2 percent
(Republic of Botswana, 2009). It has an approximate area of
582,000 square kilometers and shares borders with Zambia in
the north, Namibia in the northwest, Zimbabwe in the east,
and South Africa in the southeast. It embraces most of the
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Kalahari Desert, thus constituting a largely challenging and
non-productive natural environment (Ulriksen, 2011).
Botswana gained independence in 1966 after being a
British Protectorate for approximately 85 years and was to a
large extent regarded as an outpost on the African continent
with very little to offer, before diamonds were discovered. At
the time of independence, Botswana was the second poorest
country in the world (after Bangladesh) but has now emerged
as an upper middle income country characterized by a relatively high standard of living (Republic of Botswana, 2009).
The country has also been recognized as one of the top performing economies in Africa, with relatively high per capita
income and, since 2001, the highest sovereign credit rating on
the continent (Bank of Botswana, 2012). Botswana is the largest
producer (by value) of diamonds in the world. Until recently,
this translated into a relatively high GDP growth rate compared to other resource-rich African nations. Prudent financial policy and institutional arrangements, foreign exchange
control, and fiscal regulations are jointly responsible for the
country’s success in economic management.

The Context
Observers of Botswana’s development point to a number
of factors that account for the nation’s success, including the
establishment of modern institutions of governance, adherence to the rule of law, and respect for human rights. Botswana
has held free democratic elections every five years since independence (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance [IDEA], 2013). Furthermore, a strong foundation
for effective fiscal management was laid by the country’s postindependence government which espoused the principle of
budgetary self-reliance (before mineral wealth became apparent). Sound macro-economic policies were encapsulated in a
series of national development plans and statutory measures.
There has been a visible transformation of an exhaustible resource into a continuing investment in the economy and enhancement of living standards for the population as a whole,
notably the disadvantaged.
The country is internationally recognized for its principles of free market enterprise and property rights. However,
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despite advancing a neoliberal agenda, Botswana has also been
forthright in developing the climate and policy framework
and instruments that would lead towards welfare statehood.
Specifically, this has included objectives of redistribution of
national resources through pro-poor legislation, policies, and
programs (Republic of Botswana, 2009).
Since independence, national service delivery in Botswana
has been influenced by four guiding principles—democracy,
development, self-reliance, and unity—which have been incorporated in all subsequent national development plans. With
the adoption of the Long Term Vision for Botswana (Vision
2016) in 1997, a fifth strand, ‘botho,’ was added to the national
principles (Republic of Botswana, 1997). This defines a process
of acquiring respect and empowerment through demonstrating the principle to others in a spirit of social justice for all.
The principles are derived from Botswana’s cultural heritage
and are designed to promote social harmony, or ‘kagisano.’
At the same time, the state has focused on ensuring economic
freedom, creating competitive markets, and attracting foreign
direct investment to the extent that the World Bank (2009)
rated Botswana as the third best country in Africa in which to
conduct business.
In view of the current challenges, a program of fiscal reform
has been developed which includes the rebalancing of government expenditure to focus on economic and social high return
investment and more efficient and robust management processes. This approach has led Botswana to enjoy a fiscal policy
formulated in the context of national development planning,
the annual budgeting exercise, a development strategy, public
finance legislation, and wide consultation (United Nations
Development Programme [UNDP], 2013).
Social Development
When President Ian Khama assumed office in April 2008,
he adopted a philosophy of the Five D's: democracy, development, dignity, discipline, and delivery. Furthermore, all
development activities have to reflect Vision 2016, which has
now become a reference point for national development initiatives. Mwansa (2012) observes that although there are many
African countries rich in natural resources, they are unable to
fully benefit the population due to nepotism, corruption, and
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mismanagement. He states that the situation in Botswana is
refreshingly different in terms of what the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP, 2006) refers to as prudence,
political will, and commitment to the delivery of essential
services.
In its development efforts, Botswana is aided by the
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) which were conceptualized by the United Nations in 2000 and adopted by all
member states (including Botswana) for attainment by 2015.
The National Development Plan 10 (2009-2016) poverty reduction strategy focuses on economic empowerment, sustainable
livelihood, improved social functioning, and access to quality
shelter. Key areas in which the state and civil society partners
are collaborating include sustainable job creation (especially
in rural areas where the incidence of poverty is highest); development of human resources that enable the poor to utilize
job opportunities in their localities; and the provision of social
protection to vulnerable groups through training, counseling,
and other support services. Specific social protection programs
have also been scaled up in regard to orphaned and vulnerable children with provisions in the Children’s Act of 2009 for
a statutory foster care program, a national children’s council,
a national consultative forum of and for children, and a bill
of children’s rights, all of which are in the process of operationalization (Department of Social Protection and Childline
Botswana Trust, 2013).
HIV and AIDS
Political stability and natural resources, primarily in the
form of diamonds, prevented Botswana from falling prey to
World Bank and International Monetary Fund policies on
structural adjustment. This enabled the country to continue building its resource base, despite the threatening public
health situation associated with the HIV and AIDS epidemic
(Heald, 2006). Botswana has one of the highest HIV prevalence rates in the world, with statistics indicating a prevalence rate of 17.6 percent nationally and new infections at 2.9
percent. Prevalence rates for females are higher than those
for males (20.4 compared to 14.2 percent) (Southern African
Development Community [SADC], 2008), highlighting the
need for program-specific interventions for different sectors of
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the population.
The state acknowledged the seriousness of the HIV epidemic at an early stage, and international organizations were
expeditiously called upon for help relatively soon after the
first case was diagnosed in 1985. However, many donors withdrew after 1995 because of the relative economic and political
stability of the country. The lack of relevant information and
policies then became evident (Allen & Heald, 2004), forcing
Botswana to take responsibility for its own strategic and operational HIV and AIDS planning. Initially, the state focused on
providing surveillance and education and, in 2001, Botswana
became the first country in southern Africa to pioneer antiretroviral therapy for its population, ahead of the World Health
Organization’s (WHO) goal that three million people in the developing world would be provided with treatment by the end
of 2005 (WHO, 2003). By September 2007, 84 percent of known
cases of advanced HIV infection in Botswana were receiving
antiretroviral therapy (ART) (Jacques, 2007).
Botswana's Economy
The World Bank Institute Report on Worldwide Governance
Indicators for 1996-2012 stated that Botswana was ranked
number 16 internationally (and first in Africa) out of a total of
212 countries and territories in the category of political stability and the absence of violence, with a near perfect score of 92.8
percent. This ranking placed Botswana above all G8 nations, all
but two of the member states of the EU, and all but three countries in Asia (Office of the State President, 2008). Botswana’s
per capita GDP rose from US $70 at independence in 1966 to
US $16,800 in 2012 (CIA World Factbook, 2013). The country’s
Human Development Index (HDI) increased between 1980
and 2007 by 0.94 percent annually, placing it in the category of
upper middle income countries internationally (Sebudubudu,
2010).
Botswana has experienced decades of high economic
growth based largely on diamond sales, although traditional
beef rearing and a small manufacturing sector have contributed to the financial stability of the society. Over the last three
decades diamond mining and tourism (in particular) have
made a considerable contribution to the country’s economy
(Siphambe, Narayana, Akinkugbe, & Sentsho, 2005). The
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decline in diamond revenues resulting from the global recession led to the reduction of foreign exchange revenues and a
cumulative budget deficit of US $2.1 billion from April 2009 to
May 2012. (This deficit was considerably less than the projected
US $4.4 billion at the commencement of National Development
Plan 10). Before beginning a slow recovery, the declining economic scenario resulted in a 6.3 percent economic contraction
in 2008 and a further 20.5 percent during the first quarter of
2009 (Republic of Botswana, 2010). Policy debates in Botswana
in the recent past, and up to the present, have centered on improving international competitiveness and ensuring efficiency
and sustainability around social spending. This was expressed
by the Minister of Finance and Development Planning in the
2010 Budget Speech, as the need to find “innovative solutions
that are consistent with the changed environment” (Republic
of Botswana, 2010, p. 2).
Botswana has, however, made dramatic progress in socio-economic growth, resulting in significant improvement
in human development indices in a relatively short period of
time. Unlike other countries with similar endowments, what
has been most remarkable is the country’s comparatively effective escape from the so called ‘Dutch disease,’ ‘resource curse,’
and ‘blood diamonds.’ This success has been attributed, in
part, to prudent macroeconomic management, efficient use of
commodity revenues for national development, attainment of
redistributive justice, constant economic growth, committed
leadership, judicious management of wealth, and avoidance
of ethnic conflicts. This is in contrast to many other underdeveloped, resource-rich countries where there has been national
strife, instability, and civil war (Mills, 2012). Furthermore, the
pre-recession growth in diamond revenue ensured large government reserves, a budget surplus, and little external debt
(Republic of Botswana, Budget Speech, 2013).
Each of Botswana’s national development plans since independence has pursued four objectives: economic growth,
social justice, economic independence, and sustained development. During the past three decades, the government has specifically incorporated philosophies surrounding gender equality, environmental conservation, and assistance for remote
area dwellers (RADs) into its development goals. (Republic
of Botswana, 2009). The country is also rated highly for its

Botswana's Culture of Care

115

democratic governance and rule of law. The Institute for
Economics and Peace, working with the Economist Intelligence
Unit, has again ranked Botswana “as one of the world’s most
peaceful and best governed” countries. In fact, according to
this ranking, Botswana is placed above half of the European
region countries surveyed, as well as all five of the Permanent
Members of the United Nations Security Council (the United
Kingdom, France, the United States of America, China, and
Russia) (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2013).

Botswana's Response to the Global Financial Crisis
Pro-cyclical fiscal policy increases spending and tax cuts in
boom times and reduces spending and raises taxes in response
to economic downturns. Countercyclical or Keynesian economic policy is the reverse, with governments saving up for a
rainy day when the markets are in positive territory. The former
has been observed in recent years in the United Kingdom and
other Eurozone nations where large fiscal deficits were racked
up during economic expansion, followed by fiscal contractions
in response to an economic downturn or recession. In contrast,
Botswana took advantage of the boom period (2003 to 2007) to
strengthen its budgetary position and thus had available resources when the recession hit in 2008 and 2009 (Frankel, Vegh,
& Vuletin, 2013). By so doing, the country managed to achieve
a measure of success with a countercyclical fiscal policy precisely during the time when many developed economies in the
world failed to do so!
The budget deficit of 2009-2010 and borrowing from the
African Development Bank for the first time since becoming
a self-sustaining economy were momentous indicators of the
impact of the global recession on Botswana. During the same
period, the mining sector declined by 12.5 percent, reflecting
global uncertainties, especially for the gemstone diamond industry (the mainstay of Botswana’s economy). Consequently,
foreign exchange reserves declined by 8.6 percent to US $7.4
billion, while the Special Drawing Rights fell by 9.4 percent
to US $4.8 billion. Although mining continues to be the
largest sector in the Botswana economy, its contribution to
GDP decreased by 30.3 percent in 2011 due to the aforementioned depressed global demand (Bank of Botswana, 2012).
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The weak performance of the diamond sub-sector continues
to sound a warning bell to the country’s dependence on its
diamond industry, indicating the essential need for economic
diversification through employment creation and sustained
growth and development. On the other hand, domestic
demand was strong in 2012, with a growth of 13 percent in
consumption and investment (Republic of Botswana, Budget
Speech, 2013).The financial year 2012-2013 saw a balanced
budget for the first time since the 2008 crisis. Furthermore, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that the country’s
real GDP growth rate will pick up to 4.5 percent in 2015, supported by increased electricity production and a mining sector
recovery. The IMF welcomed the government’s promotion of
diversification (an on-going challenge to Botswana) through a
multipronged approach leveraging the country’s areas of competitive advantage (IMF, 2013).
Although there has been noticeable economic recovery in
2013, the situation is fuelling the fears of another global economic crisis that may be triggered by unresolved financial
issues in southern Europe. The unfolding situation of the U.S.
government shutdown in 2013 remains unresolved, as in 2014
the same situation will likely have to be confronted again. This
poses fears for long term recovery, as global financial markets
are adversely affected and world consumer confidence is
challenged. For a country like Botswana this has serious
fiscal policy implications. In general, however, the domestic
economy, based on current indicators, appears to have weathered global volatilities and achieved a budgetary surplus. Time
will tell whether it has been sufficient to “ride out” the storm.
Social Programs
Botswana has developed social policy initiatives focusing on expanding human capital through high spending on,
and universal access to, education and health services. There
is no comprehensive national social security legislation in the
country, and generally provision is means tested (such as the
Destitute Policy of 2002) and relatively small (even in the case
of the universal old age pension scheme) (Nthomang et al.,
2007). However, the Government of Botswana has underlined
its commitment to achieving a dignified life for all citizens
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to ensure the uplifting of the economically marginalized as
well as the socially vulnerable. The two focus areas are social
development and health (including addressing the HIV and
AIDS epidemic and related issues). The primary goals in this
regard are the eradication of poverty, adequate social protection, youth empowerment, affordable quality health care services, and the prevention of new HIV infections. In order to
achieve these goals, a multi-sectoral approach that promotes
sustainable livelihoods and socio-economic empowerment has
been adopted (Republic of Botswana, 2009).
One of the priority areas of government budgets since
2008, including 2013-2014, is sustaining social programs that
ensure human dignity. The Ministry of Education and Skills
Development has the largest budgetary allocation to continue
building human capital. This is followed by the Ministry of
Local Government and Rural Development to cater for the
majority of the needy. The third largest allocation is for the
Ministry of Health whose remit is, inter alia, HIV and AIDS
planning and programming. The Development Budget prioritizes water resources (a problem area in this drought affected
country), educational infrastructure, and social development
programs such as Ipelegeng (a public employment creation
project). It also addresses village water supply, sewage disposal, and municipal services (Republic of Botswana, Budget
Speech, 2013).
Botswana’s Domestic Development Fund has been created
for development projects and for external financing organizations, thus seamlessly integrating foreign aid into annual
budgets. This process prevents delays in the implementation of development-funded projects, thus allowing them to
proceed smoothly through reimbursement arrangements.
Furthermore, Botswana’s long established sustainable budget
index rule protects and steers mineral revenues into investment in physical and human capital (Bank of Botswana, 2012).
The 2002 National Policy on Destitute Persons emphasized rehabilitation as a people-centered philosophy behind
the destitute program. This included the provision of income
generating projects ranging from beadwork to laundry, shoe
repair, and basketry. However, it was still viewed largely as
a social safety net for the deserving poor and thus, in 2007, a
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government review of all relevant programs was conducted.
The conclusion was that there was need for measures to ensure
policy sustainability and more relevant identification of those
in need. The recommendations were accepted apart from the
introduction of means testing for the old age pension (Seleka,
2007).
The subsequent three years saw the state attempting to
transform the public sector through conducting a review of expenditure in collaboration with the World Bank. At the same
time, the National Policy on Destitute Persons was reviewed as
government considered the growing—and non-sustainable—
numbers of recipients not necessarily representative of the deserving poor. As a result, only the eligible became beneficiaries and the able-bodied were to be enrolled in the Ipelegeng
program on a permanent basis. This was formerly the Labour
Intensive Public Works Programme, a drought relief initiative
originally designed to create temporary employment and a
supplementary income level for the able-bodied poor using
substantial governmental funding (Republic of Botswana,
2009; Ulriksen, 2011).
Poverty still persists in Botswana, and the government
has thus adopted a National Strategy for Poverty Reduction.
In addition, a poverty initiative, the Community Resilience
Project, was set up and has been piloted in various districts
in the country. The philosophy behind this program is community empowerment for self-development, which is being
planned to be extended to other areas in the country (Republic
of Botswana, 2010).
Demographic Challenges
With a limited industrial base, the country has been challenged to diversify its commodity-based economic activities.
This has impacted employment creation, especially for the
youth (15-35 age group), who are the largest proportion of
the unemployed. While overall unemployment stands at 17.8
percent, youth unemployment is 69 percent (largely in rural
areas) (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2013). This is likely
to be another issue that the country will have to address in the
near future.
Every year, thousands of students graduate from the
country’s tertiary institutions. However, many remain
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unemployed. Based on the principle of social justice and parity
(one of the national development objectives), there is need to
give young people special consideration in terms of social
investment. Meredith (2011) points to reasons for this approach,
including sheer numbers and the peculiar situation of the
youth in safeguarding the future of the nation and ensuring
national development. The large numbers of young people immersed in poverty, despite their level of education, do not participate in the process of national development. This exclusion
is a challenge that the country is attempting to resolve, as the
numbers of unemployed youth continue to grow to unprecedented levels, leading to distorted development and social
inequality. In an ironic twist of fate, the increasing inability of
the free market to provide adequate opportunities for young
people makes it difficult (in an era of global economic crisis) to
involve the youth in development (Mills, 2012 ).
Unemployment and a relatively high GINI coefficient of
0.6 percent are worrisome elements of the nation’s social kaleidoscope. Thus, despite sustained economic growth, the
country’s wealth has not been evenly distributed. Although
the Botswana Core Welfare Indicators Survey (BCWIS) 20092010 shows a decline in poverty from 47 percent in 1997 to
20.7 percent in 2009-2010, the issue of youth unemployment
remains a substantive challenge to national development and
individual and family well-being. Rural areas have been the
worst affected due to the fragility and vulnerability of the
rural economy, which has been largely dependent on rain-fed
production. The country has historically suffered prolonged
periods of drought, heightening the incidence of poverty
in those areas categorized as Remote Area Development
Settlements (RADS), considered to be marginalized and on the
fringes of society. High levels of unemployment and adverse
climatic conditions in these areas have contributed to correspondingly high levels of poverty (Central Statistics Office
[CSO], 2010).
According to the 2008 Botswana AIDS Impact Survey (CSO,
2009), the overall unemployment rate was 16.8 percent with 78
percent of the unemployed being less than 30 years of age. The
2011 census revealed that nearly half (47 percent) of all households were female-headed. About 50 percent of people in female-headed households were living below the poverty line,
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compared to 44 percent of male-headed households. Moreover,
the severity of poverty experienced by female-headed households was greater than for male-headed households. The main
reason for this disparity is that, on average, female-headed
households have more dependants and fewer income earners
than male-headed households. This was more pronounced in
urban areas, where both the mean and the median incomes
of female-headed households were less than half that of their
male counterparts (CSO, 2011). This level of poverty is likely to
make people, especially women and children, more vulnerable
to HIV infection.
Botswana’s high public sector wage bill is a cause for some
concern, especially in comparison to other similar countries.
However, this issue has to be viewed in relation to the fact
that Botswana is a large country (similar in size to France and
Texas) but sparsely populated, necessitating the duplication of
infrastructure and some social and extension services. Desertlike conditions in much of the country are a threat to human
and natural resource sustainability, which adds further weight
to the contention that Botswana is, in many ways, an extraordinary society (IMF, 2013).
Cost recovery (charging fees for services) helps to ensure
the sustainability of government services. To that end, a Cost
Recovery Unit was established in the Ministry of Finance
and Development Planning in 2012. Variations of cost recovery exist across the spectrum of government services in areas
such as health and education, but it has been found that, in
most instances, these are provided at below cost. This issue is
being addressed, in part, through improving the viability and
participation of the private sector by provision of finance and
infrastructure, promotion of domestic and external markets,
and business skills development supported by a variety of
institutions. Economic diversification is encouraged through
organizations such as the Local Enterprises Authority (LEA),
which provides development and support services to domestic small, micro, and medium size enterprises (the SMME industry) (Republic of Botswana, Budget Speech, 2012).
Sustainability
Without doubt, the economy of Botswana hinges on
mineral production, especially diamonds, which form the
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largest single component of national wealth, accounting for
almost half of government revenues. However, Botswana has
been a notable exception to the dismal performance of many
resource-rich developing societies. It is for this reason that
the country has been widely cited as an example of prudent
management, given investor grade sovereign credit ratings
as number one in Africa, and compared favorably to other
countries internationally (Lange & Wright, 2002). However,
it is somewhat doubtful whether mineral resources will continue to contribute as much to national wealth, given the often
volatile nature of commodities. The recent global financial and
monetary crisis provides a genuine lesson about the fragility
of the country’s diamond-based economy. The IMF (2012) has
expressed similar sentiments and urged the government to
realize its full revenue potential, maximize the effectiveness of
public expenditure, reduce public spending according to longterm revenue prospects, and control the public sector wage
bill. This approach will also enhance Botswana’s capacity
for macroeconomic monitoring and fiscal analysis. However,
while these measures appear to be logical and reasonable, they
are extremely difficult to implement.
Issues of HIV and AIDS continue to generate a great deal of
controversy as the government endeavors to find solutions to
this elusive problem. A recent study by the Ministry of Health
(2013) of most at-risk populations (MARPS)—commercial
sex workers (CSW) and men who have sex with men (MSM)
(Republic of Botswana, Ministry of Health, 2013, July)—has
given rise to recommendations for strategies suggestive of
the abuse of the human rights of these marginalized sectors.
As much as the spread of HIV infection by certain groups is a
cause for concern, program design should incorporate an approach that taps into an appreciation of people’s varying needs
and the availability of programs to address them in a positive
manner.
There are possibilities in the values of community and
cooperation to improve people’s quality of life without extra
public spending. Relationships are considerably more important than the taxable portion of a human being’s income
in terms of happiness and participation in community living
(Frey & Stutzer, 2002; Helliwell, 2003; Layard, 2005). Thus the
concept of high quality interactions in groups and associations
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(as is customary in an African setting), rather than individual material consumption, should be promoted (Jordan, 2008,
2010).

Conclusion
Botswana has a mixed economy with emphasis on neoliberal, free market enterprise. At the same time, based on
the principle of consultation, the country has managed to
develop strong social welfare policies which guide the actions
of government in resource distribution. The Government of
Botswana is increasingly concerned with cutting public spending and making social policies more sustainable and efficient.
It is dedicated to identifying strategies to resume accelerated
economic growth and transform the economy into one that is
globally competitive, more diversified, and resilient to external shocks, such as the recent economic crisis.
Despite rapid population growth and global economic
meltdown, government has been steadfast in providing its
citizens with a variety of institutional services. These include
education, health, poverty eradication programs, infrastructure development, employment creation, and social security.
In some cases, there has been an increase in resource allocation, such as the destitute allowance and old age and war veteran’s pensions. Perhaps what is most noteworthy is that there
is exponential growth in resource distribution as the population grows.
The transformation of economic prospects in developed
and developing countries has to be built on a foundation of
activism, trustworthiness, virtue, and responsibility among
citizens, and by a considerate government that espouses such
qualities through social policies and education. Both capitalism and the state will require citizens of this nature, and governments have a responsibility for enabling their emergence.
For the developed world facing an adverse economic outlook,
active government policy in this direction is necessary. For developing countries, such as Botswana, it is vital.
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Considering Post-Crisis Stimulus Measures:
Welfare Policy and Social Inclusion in Brazil
Lenore E. Matthew
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
School of Social Work
The onset of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis slowed economic
growth in Brazil and threatened the country’s established trajectory of decreasing poverty and inequality. To mitigate prolonged
effects of the crisis, leadership implemented a growth-with-equity
stimulus plan, of which investment in income augmentation and
human capital-building programs for the poor were primary elements. This article examines the economic and social impacts of the
stimulus package. It shows that stimulus measures had overall positive effects on the economy, but mixed effects on the well-being of
the underprivileged. Improvements in the underprivileged population’s well-being may be less profound than officials have reported,
as gains on poverty have been assessed in terms of income level and
social program utilization rates, while the low quality of human
capital-building services has been less considered. If the quality of
these services is not improved, human capital development may
be stunted, which could hinder future socioeconomic progress.
Key words: Brazil, fiscal stimulus, global financial crisis, Bolsa
Família

Throughout the first years of the new millennium, Brazil
established an impressive track record of rigorous economic
growth alongside a rapidly declining national poverty rate.
The onset of the 2007-2008 global economic crisis threatened
these achievements (International Labor Organization, 2010;
Serrano & Summa, 2011). The collapse of Lehman Brothers
triggered a domino effect across the international banking
system, choking credit to the private sector, driving investor
and consumer uncertainty, and threatening the socioeconomic
security of the public (Arestis & Karakitsos, 2012; Davies &
McGregor, 2009). Immediately following the onset of the crisis,
G20 countries coordinated a stimulus agenda in an attempt
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to ward off prolonged recession (Cooper, 2010), but by 2010,
several European and Global North states had reevaluated the
financial burden of expansionary policy and switched their
crisis management strategy to one of fiscal austerity (Salmon,
2010; Wren-Lewis, 2011). Brazil, however, maintained a commitment to stimulus measures to minimize social suffering
and jumpstart economic activity. In 2009, Brazilian leadership
implemented a growth-with-equity stimulus plan primarily
aimed at increasing investment in the well-being of the poor
(International Labor Organization, 2011). This policy was expanded even further in the years following the crisis. As countries across Europe and the Global North continue to struggle
with the economic and social repercussions of the financial
crisis, Brazil has bounced back with reinstated growth and
continued gains on poverty (Ministry of Finance, 2011). This
recovery is impressive, yet the social and economic achievements are not without their limitations.
This article explores the social and economic effects of
Brazil’s recent stimulus agenda, with the well-being of the underprivileged being the focal point of analysis. To begin, this
article sets forth the two responses to economic crisis that leadership may implement: fiscal austerity and stimulus spending.
The article then examines Brazil’s stimulus plan and considers how policy measures impacted economic factors, namely
employment and growth, and social variables, such as income
level and human capital development. As the article suggests,
stimulus measures have had mixed effects on underprivileged
persons, which, if not addressed, may compromise future
social and economic progress. Policy and advocacy implications are then considered. Finally, suggestions for social policy
and future areas of research are recommended.

Managing Economic Crisis: Two Perspectives
The onset of the global financial crisis sparked international debate on how economies should recover from downturned growth, with economists grappling with the costs and
benefits of the two available options: fiscal austerity or stimulus spending (Tcherneva, 2012). With austerity programs, political leaders seek economic expansion through fiscal contraction, employing a series of spending cuts and tax increases to
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reduce the budget deficit and manage debt (Stone & Cox, 2008;
Tcherneva, 2012). Proponents of austerity argue that fiscal
conservatism spurs private spending by calming uncertainty
about federal debt and boosting confidence in federal fiscal
management (Schoenbaum, 2012). Critics, however, argue that
austerity fails to activate new economic growth, and inflicts
massive human costs on the population (McKee, Karanikolos,
Belcher, & Stuckler, 2012). Critics also claim that austerity aggravates unemployment, drives civil unrest, and destabilizes
society by cutting access to public programs, like social security, unemployment benefits, and public education and health
services. As critics further argue, trimming such programs disproportionately affects the poor (United Nations Office of the
High Commission for Human Rights, 2012).
Stimulus, on the other hand, combats recession by
pumping money into the national economy, typically through
a combination of government borrowing and tax cuts (Stone &
Cox, 2008). Guided by the overall goal of spurring job creation
by augmenting consumption demand (Davig & Leeper, 2009;
Romer & Bernstein, 2009), stimulus plans typically introduce
focused, short-term, timely programs, such as infrastructure
development, investment in local economies, and support for
the unemployed, the poor, and other socioeconomically vulnerable groups (Salmon, 2010). Opponents of stimulus measures argue that deficit spending can balloon to unsustainable
levels over time, and may yield uncertain long-term gains on
problems like unemployment (Schizer, 2012). Advocates for
expansionary policy counter-argue that stimulated consumption and demand encouraged by increased federal spending
reestablish market engagement, curb job loss, and minimize
social suffering (McKee et al., 2012). They also argue that once
the economy recovers, employment and tax revenues will increase, resulting in reduced need for public benefits and deficit
spending (Stone & Cox, 2008).

Post-Crisis Stimulus Measures in Brazil
After experiencing economic downturn in late 2008, Brazil
mitigated prolonged effects of the global financial crisis by
implementing an equity-and-growth stimulus package in 2009
(International Labor Organization, 2010). The rationale for
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Brazil’s stimulus policy has deep political, historical, and social
roots. After enduring two decades of dire socioeconomic instability characterized by massive unemployment, hyperinflation, fluctuating output, and extreme destitution and inequality, stabilization efforts introduced in the late-1990s paved the
way for Brazil’s new economic path. By the early 2000s, this
path consisted of robust economic growth alongside rapidly
decreasing poverty and inequality (Paiva, 2009).. From 2004
to 2007, Brazil’s annual growth averaged 4.4% in real terms
(International Labor Organization, 2010), more than double its
annual growth from 1999 to 2003 (Serrano & Summa, 2011).
The national poverty rate1 fell from 35.3% of the population in
1999 to 33.7% in 2004, speeding up to drop to 21.4% by 2009
(United Nations, 2013).
Recent economic growth is primarily due to an early-2000s
boom in Brazilian exports and subsequent development of
domestic markets (Kandil & Morsy, 2010). Brazil’s exportled growth began to cool in the middle of the decade, due to
declining international demand with the onset of the global
crisis. However, expansionary monetary policy bolstered burgeoning internal markets and established the spending trajectory on which post-crisis stimulus measures would be built
(Serrano & Summa, 2011). The recent rapid decline in poverty
that accompanied economic growth is primarily attributed to
the 2003 introduction of the flagship social assistance program,
Bolsa Família (“Family Grant”), a conditional cash transfer
program. While Bolsa Família’s achievements have been noteworthy, millions of Brazilians continue to live in poverty, with
over 16 million of the country’s 190 million people residing
in extreme poverty2 today (Ministry of Social Development,
2012). This has only fueled the rationale for increased social
spending.
When the 2008 global crisis hit, the international
credit crunch and environment of uncertainty that rippled
global markets also threatened Brazil (International Labor
Organization, 2010; Williamson, 2009). To mitigate reversion of socioeconomic gains achieved over the last decade,
Brazil introduced a “growth-cum-equity” stimulus package
that totaled US $20 billion, or just over 1% of the national
GDP (International Labor Organization, 2010). The multifaceted package included spending on infrastructure (41.5%
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of package budget), tax cuts (35%), subsidies (15%), transfers
to municipalities (5.5%), and investment in social protection
programs (International Labor Organization, 2010). This latter
component included an expansion of Bolsa Família (1.5% of the
package budget), an extension of unemployment insurance for
up to two months (1%), and the introduction of the Minha Casa,
Minha Vida (“My House, My Life”) public housing plan, a component of the infrastructure investment initiative (International
Labor Organization, 2010). Since the 2009 stimulus package
was introduced, subsequent anti-poverty measures have been
implemented, most notably Brasil Sem Miséria (“Brazil Without
Misery”), a comprehensive program that targets people living
in extreme poverty.
Impact of Stimulus Measures on the Economy
Brazil’s pre-crisis economic environment was characterized by a decade of booming domestic growth, an agenda of
coherent macroeconomic policies based on monetary stability and fiscal equilibrium, and a restructured financial system
carried over from stabilization reforms of the late 1990s (Paiva,
2009). This structure alleviated the blow of the financial crisis
and set the stage for stimulus measures to deliver quick economic recovery (Paiva, 2009). After only two quarters of negative growth, Brazil’s GDP growth pivoted towards the positive by late 2009, registering at 4.4% by the final quarter of that
year (International Labor Organization, 2011). Had the stimulus package not been introduced, the government believes
that GDP would have contracted by 2% (International Labor
Organization, 2010). By 2010, 2.2 million new formal sector jobs
had been created (a 6.7% increase), and prolonged expansion
of the informal labor market had been avoided (International
Labor Organization, 2011). Domestic markets, particularly in
the service sector, developed further, supported by credit supplied by the three public banks at a time when private banks
were hesitant to lend (Ocampo, 2012). Additionally, low- and
middle-income families’ purchasing power was increased by a
reduction in taxes and, for some, by income supplementation
vis-à-vis Bolsa Família cash transfers (Barbosa, 2012).
The stimulus package’s social programs contributed to economic rejuvenation in various ways. Overall, Bolsa Família cash
transfers injected US $30 billion into the national economy, and
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had multiplier effects of 1.4 on GDP and 2.2 on family incomes
(International Labor Organization, 2011). Furthermore, coverage and targeting expansions of the flagship social welfare
program is estimated to have created and saved a total of 1.3
million jobs (International Labor Organization, 2011). As a
result of the public housing program Minha Casa, Minha Vida,
1 million homes for low- and middle-income families were
built by 2010, with another 2 million scheduled for construction by the end of 2015 (World Bank, 2012). As of 2012, Minha
Casa, Minha Vida had created 1.4 million jobs in the construction sector, an industry that had been negatively impacted by
the financial crisis (Ministry of Development, Industry, and
Foreign Trade, 2013).
Brazil has fared well in comparison to other countries
hit by the global recession, including those that adopted an
agenda of fiscal austerity. Recession continues to burden the
Iberian states of Spain and Portugal, for example, where both
private and public demand remain depressed (Koumparoulis
& Wong, 2012). Spending on human development services
has been dramatically reduced in that region, as exemplified by Spain’s education budget, which has been slashed by
20% (Burridge, 2012). Such cuts have driven social backlash
and unrest (Hughes, 2011). Unemployment of youth under 25
years of age registers at 55% in Spain, and the persistent downturned labor market across the Iberian Peninsula has driven
youth and professionals to migrate in search of work to nowbooming former Latin American colonies, including Brazil
(MacSwan, 2012; “With Youth,” 2013). While Brazil’s post-crisis environment is remarkably different from that of its Iberian
counterparts, it is important to note that Brazil’s position as
an “emerging economy”—characterized by a half-decade of
vibrant internal growth, booming international market activity, and recently reformed financial structures—helped drive
its prompt recovery (Paiva, 2009).
In the years following the economic crisis, Brazilian growth
continued, albeit at a slower pace than anticipated (Ministry of
Finance, 2011). Investment in transportation and other infrastructure has been amplified, and spending on social programs
has been further augmented, which has helped keep unemployment low (5.3% in 2012) and consumption high (Winter
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& Pereira, 2012). The massive expansion of credit in domestic
markets has expanded economic participation to new members
of society and supported local business growth.However, reliance on credit has also introduced vulnerabilities, and many
consumers have reached their debt limits (International
Monetary Fund, 2012).
Increased spending has sparked debate. Some question
whether the state can sustain growth alongside fiscal injections
(Winter & Pereira, 2012). Nevertheless, the Brazilian Ministry of
Finance (2011) projects that the economy will maintain healthy
performance going forward, displaying positive growth, sustained domestic demand, and positive consumer and industry
confidence.
Impact of Stimulus Measures on Social Well-being
While the 2009 stimulus package had an overall positive
impact on the economy, the measures had mixed effects on
the social well-being of the underprivileged. To begin, extended employment insurance had little to no impact on the
economic security of the poor. The insurance initiative offered
support to 310,000 workers in key downturned industries, like
mining and steelmaking (International Labor Organization,
2010). However, the program targeted the formal sector, an
area in which poor people in Brazil typically do not work
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
2011; World Bank, 1995). Thus, few, if any, poor people directly
benefitted from the extended insurance measure.
The public housing program, Minha Casa, Minha Vida,
however, did have direct benefits on the underprivileged.
Funded by a blend of government and private investment,
Minha Casa, Minha Vida assisted over 1 million low-income
Brazilians in obtaining housing, either as renters or mortgaged buyers (World Bank, 2012). By moving into Minha Casa,
Minha Vida housing complexes, many families received access
to basic human and sanitation services for the first time, such
as sewage systems, treated water, and electric power (Santin,
2012). Furthermore, individuals with special needs, such as the
elderly and wheelchair users, were provided housing that accommodates their lifestyles and needs, which many did not
have in their previous accommodations (Santin, 2012). After
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the 2009 stimulus package was introduced, a second wave
of Minha Casa, Minha Vida investment was unveiled in 2011,
with the federal government dedicating R$140 billion reais
(US $70 billion) to program expansion (Maresch, 2011). As a
part of this second wave of investment, two socially progressive initiatives were introduced to the housing program: first,
women no longer need their husband’s signatures to enroll,
and second, all homes were designed to be powered with solar
energy panels (Maresch, 2011).
While Minha Casa, Minha Vida has provided numerous underprivileged Brazilians with access to adequate housing, the
program is not a total success story. Many residents state that
the complexes are being built in the distant periphery without
adequate access to health facilities, schools, or public transportation (Duarte & Benevides, 2013; Santin, 2012). In metropolitan areas, where onerous commutes are commonplace,
housing complex isolation is particularly burdensome. In Rio
de Janeiro, for example, the average walk from Minha Casa,
Minha Vida complexes to bus and metro stops is approximately
thirty minutes, and many residents must take multiple modes
of transportation to access the city center and places of employment (Duarte & Benevides, 2013). This imposes high costs
and travel time on commuting residents.
Economic motivations may be at the heart of these burdens,
as economic planning commissions within the government,
rather than local participatory coalitions, established the program’s real estate development plans (Valença & Bonates,
2009). Furthermore, contractors and investors are arguably
more likely to develop complexes in the distant periphery
because land purchased for construction is less expensive in
this area, thus yields higher profits for builders and investors
(Duarte & Benevides, 2013).
Among all other social measures introduced with the
2009 stimulus package, the principal welfare investment was
the expansion of Brazil’s principle anti-poverty program,
Bolsa Família. Bolsa Família is a means-tested, targeted, conditional cash transfer program that provides underprivileged
families with monthly cash benefits in exchange for meeting
education and health “conditionalities,” which aim to
build human capital (Lindert, 2006; Lindert, Linder, Hobbs,
& de la Brière, 2007). Conditionalities require that every
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school-age child between the ages of 7 and 17 years must be
enrolled in school and attend 85% of monthly school hours,
and that mothers and children under 7 years of age complete
an agenda of pre-natal care, vaccinations, and health and nutrition surveillance (Santos, Paes-Sousa, Miazagi, Silva, &
Medeiros da Fonseca, 2011).
The 2009 expansion of Bolsa Família was delivered in two
ways. First, the targeted beneficiary pool was broadened,
and second, cash benefit amounts were increased (Fiszbein,
Ringold, & Srinivasan, 2011; Soares, Ribas, & Soares, 2010). The
qualifying income level was raised, which added 1.3 million
families to the previous target population of 11 million families, and the amounts of fixed and variable per-child stipends
were increased, only to be raised again in 2011 (Soares, 2012).
As a final 2009 stimulus measure, new local-level poverty estimation methods were implemented, which allowed for a more
accurate determination of the number of eligible families, and
increased participation of beneficiaries in previously excluded
areas (Fiszbein et al., 2011).
While the 2009 increase in Bolsa Família accounted for only
1.5% of the total stimulus budget, the cumulative gains that the
program has had on inequality and poverty alleviation since
2003 are significant (International Labor Organization, 2011).
Today, Bolsa Família is the largest conditional cash program in
the world. It extends benefits to 25% of the Brazilian population—almost 13 million families, or about 52 million people
(Santos et al., 2011). There is evidence that Bolsa Família income
augmentation has led to various improvements in beneficiaries’ well-being, such as increased food security (Rocha, 2009),
healthier diets (Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations, 2006), and investment in basic necessities, such
as clothing, medicine, and school supplies (O Futuro Começa
Agora, 2012). Official sources emphasize that Bolsa Família has
“lifted” millions of families out of poverty (i.e., above the national poverty line) (Ministry of Social Development, 2013).
However, some independent program evaluators suggest that
the program is more successful in closing the income distribution gap, rather than in relieving poverty (e.g., Soares & Sátyro,
2010). Others argue that while achievements are significant,
due to means testing, the program excludes people residing
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just above the poverty line who may also be socioeconomically
insecure (Soares, Ribas, & Soares, 2010). Hence, because Bolsa
Família enforces a qualifying income limit, it may keep vulnerable individuals from receiving the services they need.
Evaluations of human capital building initiatives in education and health have yielded varied results. In terms of health,
Bolsa Família enhances public awareness about health services
(Soares, Ribas, & Osório, 2010), and increases the likelihood
that pregnant mothers will attend prenatal care visits and children will be vaccinated (Gilligan & Fruttero, 2011; Ministry of
Social Development, 2007). However, some beneficiaries claim
that low-quality clinics, staff, and services prevent their access
to equitable healthcare (Ministry of Social Development,
2007). In terms of education, Bolsa Família clearly encourages
attendance and re-enrollment, and discourages dropping out
(Gilligan & Fruttero, 2011; Glewwe & Kassouf, 2012; Ministry
of Social Development, 2007). However, the program may
fall short of improving children’s performance in school, and
even when children consistently attend classes, the program
appears to have little impact on their cognitive skill development (Santarrosa, 2011; Soares, Ribas, & Osório, 2010). These
results are at least in part due to the low quality of curricula,
schools, and some teachers (Santarrosa, 2011; Soares, Ribas, &
Osório, 2010).
As these various studies suggest, Bolsa Família succeeds
at increasing enrollment rates and the number of people with
access to social services, but fails to address the quality of services (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
2011), which, especially for education, is very low across Brazil
(Aquino Menezes-Filho, Franco, & Waltenberg, 2008). This
matter is of concern, as even when conditional cash transfer
programs impose a mandatory use of health and education
services, complying with program conditionalities may not
build human capital if the quality of those services is not taken
into account (Calvo, 2011).
Two years after the implementation of the 2009 stimulus
package, anti-poverty spending increased even more with
the 2011 introduction of Brasil Sem Miséria, a multi-initiative
program that targets people living in extreme poverty (Ministry
of Social Development, 2012). This program scaled up Bolsa
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Família by taking into account both income-based and various
non-monetary dimensions of poverty that affect the extremely
poor. Operating on an annual budget of R$20 billion, Brasil
Sem Miséria offers expanded income assistance, enhanced
skill-building initiatives (e.g., job training programs, particularly for technical positions in the formal sector, and access to
micro-credit), and improved public services (e.g., distribution
of clean drinking water, and the addition of health center locations and improved services, particularly for children ages 0 to
5) (Ministry of Social Development, 2012; Nehring & McKay,
2013; Plan Brasil Sem Miseria, 2012).
Brasil Sem Miséria also seeks to extend efforts of social
inclusion to the extremely poor. The program employs language of inclusion, clearly stating that it is vulnerable citizens’
“right” to obtain benefits and secure a better quality of life
(Ministry of Social Development, 2012). Additionally, Brasil
Sem Miséria implemented the Busca Ativa (“Active Search”)
initiative, which sends teams of professionals, psychologists,
social workers, and counselors to locate potential beneficiaries
who have been excluded from benefit receipt for reasons such
as living in remote areas and lack of documentation (Ministry
of Social Development, 2012).
According to Brazil’s Ministry of Social Development
(2012), Brasil Sem Miséria achieved many successes after just
one year of implementation. The population of qualified cash
transfer beneficiaries was expanded to include women who
are pregnant or breastfeeding, adding 255,000 mothers to the
beneficiary roster. Across the country, 123,000 people were enrolled in technical job training courses. Of these students, 70%
were women and 44% were young adults between the ages of
18 to 28. Busca Ativa located 687,000 new families who were
eligible for social plans, and set a new goal of reaching 800,000
families by the end of 2013. Most impressively, Brasil Sem
Miséria has “lifted” 22 million people out of extreme poverty
since 2011 (Ministry of Social Development, 2013).
Despite these promising results, various concerns have
surfaced. First, Brasil Sem Miséria carries over problems with
exclusion due to income. To qualify for program benefits,
people must be at or below the extreme poverty line, which
may exclude some vulnerable persons from receiving benefits
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that they may need. Second, much like Bolsa Família, Brasil
Sem Miséria’s successes have been quantified in terms of enrollment. Granted Brasil Sem Miséria is in its infancy, thus it
may be too soon to determine factors such as program quality
and effectiveness. Going forward, such dimensions must be
examined. Third, although Brasil Sem Miséria addresses the
quality of health services, it does not tackle the quality of education. Brasil Sem Miséria does include education initiatives in
its agenda, such as Mais Educação (“More Education”), which
supports optional activities, such as students attending fulltime school days rather than the norm of part-time shifts. This
initiative, however, neglects to address contextual problems
within the education system that shape learning, such as poorquality curricula, teachers, and facilities.

Implications and Conclusions
Post-financial crisis stimulus spending in Brazil has had
an overall positive impact on the economy but mixed effects
on the well-being of the underprivileged. Emergency unemployment insurance essentially bypassed the poor. Minha Casa,
Minha Vida housing program created jobs and provided shelter
to over 1 million people, but imposed new burdens on some
recipients, like peripheral relocation. Bolsa Família extended
financial assistance to over 1 million new beneficiaries and increased access to education and health services. However, the
effect of increased access and enrollment is inconclusive, given
the low quality of services that beneficiaries tend to receive.
Some underprivileged persons residing just above the qualifying income threshold have been excluded from program benefits altogether. Brasil Sem Miséria evolved the understanding
of poverty to include various non-monetary factors, like clean
water access and job training, and made efforts to improve
health services. Brasil Sem Miséria, however, reaffirms access to
social assistance based on income levels, and has yet to tackle
the many complexities associated with improving the quality
of education services—a pressing matter if human capital is to
be built.
Brazil’s social program successes have typically been conceptualized in terms of quantitative increases—augmented
income levels, an increased number of people with housing,
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a rise in school and clinic attendance rates. The extension of
access to services is no doubt a massive accomplishment and
a critical starting point. However, the celebration of these indicators alone allows the low quality of services and the negative externalities that social programs may impose to be overlooked. These disregarded factors must be acknowledged,
as they impact the underprivileged population’s well-being,
human capital development, and access to future opportunities—variables that are central to future social and economic
progress.
Two implications can be drawn from this analysis. First,
despite Brazil’s pattern of healthy growth, future economic
development may be stunted if the quality of human capital
building mechanisms (primarily education) is not improved. A
nation’s long-term international competitiveness is in part determined by the quality of its labor force, which is largely contingent upon the quality of its schools (Puryear & Goodspeed,
2008). Furthermore, high-quality education “improves
workers’ skills, promotes growth, [and] reduces poverty”
(Puryear & Goodspeed, 2008, p. 45). Given these claims, the
state of the Brazilian education system is alarming. Across the
country, only 33% of fifth graders and 12% of ninth graders
perform at the minimum competency level in mathematics,
and 37% and 22% of the same age groups at the minimum
level of Portuguese (QEdu, 2013). Children often repeat grade
levels, and rather than attending a full day of classes, typically frequent one of two or three shifts, which are only a few
hours long (“Brazil’s Poor,” 2009). There is a massive dearth of
qualified teachers, and teacher truancy is a regular occurrence,
with absence rates averaging 30% per academic year (“Brazil’s
Poor,” 2009). Given that it may take years for changes in education quality to yield returns (Morley, 2001), social policies
that improve the quality of education are imperative today.
Going forward, future research must critically assess factors
that determine education quality, such as curricula, teacher
qualifications, and facilities. Advocacy leaders and members
of civil society must lobby for these changes to be implemented in underprivileged schools. Furthermore, future policy
agendas should focus on implementing policies that improve
not just attendance rates, but also the quality of learning.
The second implication that can be drawn is that if negative
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externalities of social programs are not addressed, they may
negate the benefits of social services distributed to some underprivileged persons. As illustrated by peripheral relocation
with Minha Casa, Minha Vida, disconnects between objectives
of economic growth and improved well-being may arise even
within progressive development programs. There is a need for
members of civil society to advocate for the state’s recognition
of the negative externalities that programs may impose, and to
lobby for correction of these burdens. There is also a need for
research to explore the positive and negative impacts of this
and other social programs, which will help identify program
gaps that may be overshadowed by impressive enrollment and
utilization rates. To date, few scholars have analyzed Minha
Casa, Minha Vida and Brasil Sem Miséria. This may be due to the
youth of these programs. Going forward, research exploring
these programs in greater depth is needed.
Overall, Brazil fared well in the aftermath of the 2007-2008
global financial crisis. Due to the 2009 stimulus package and
subsequent spending initiatives, economic growth was maintained, jobs were created, and poverty continued to decline.
Stimulus spending has had mixed effects on the well-being of
the underprivileged primarily because the quality of distributed services and goods has been overlooked. If established
socioeconomic successes are to be sustained, attention must
be turned towards improving the quality of human capital
building services for all members of society, including the
underprivileged.

References
Arestis, P., & Karakitsos, E. (2012). The U.S. dimension of the Euro
Zone debt crisis. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 35(1), 21-44.
Aquino Menezes-Filho, N., Franco, C., & Waltenberg, F. (2008). The
quality of education in Brazil. São Paulo: Inter-American Development
Bank. Retrieved from http://www.iadb.org/res/laresnetwork/
files/pr296finaldraft.pdf
Barbosa, N. (2012). Five [5] Brazilian economic policy and the 2008–
2009 crisis. The Global Economic Crisis in Latin America: Impacts and
Responses, 107, 85.
Brazil’s poor schools: Still a lot to learn. (2009, June 4). The Economist.
Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/13782570
Burridge, T. (2012, May 22). Spanish school and university protest
at education cuts. BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-europe-18156931

Stimulus Measures in Brazil

141

Calvo, C. (2011). Social work and conditional cash transfers in Latin
America. Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, 38(3), 53-72.
Cooper, A. F. (2010). The G20 as an improvised crisis committee and/
or a contested “steering committee” for the world. International
Affairs, 86(3), 741-757.
Davies, M., & McGregor, J. A. (2009). Social protection: Responding
to a global crisis. IDS Bulletin, 40(5), 68-77.
Davig, T., & Leeper, E. M. (2009). Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and
fiscal stimulus (NBER Working Paper 15133). Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved from http://
www.nber.org/papers/w15133
Duarte, A., & Benevides, C. (2013, January 7) Sem transporte para
Minha Casa Minha Vida. Jornal O Globo. Retrieved from http://
oglobo.globo.com/pais/sem-transporte-para-minha-casaminha-vida-7224679
Fiszbein, A., Ringold, D., & Srinivasan, S. (2011). Cash transfers,
children and the crisis: Protecting current and future investments.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2006).
Brazil: Major Lessons from Fome Zero (Zero Hunger). Santiago: Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Regional
Office for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Gilligan, D., & Fruttero, A. (2011, October 24). The impact of Bolsa Família
on education and health outcomes in Brazil. Second Generation of
CCTs Evaluations Conference. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Glewwe, P., & Kassouf, A. L. (2012). The impact of the Bolsa Escola/
Familia conditional cash transfer program on enrollment, drop
out rates, and grade promotion in Brazil. Journal of Development
Economics, 97(2), 505-517.
Hughes, N. (2011). Young people took to the streets and all of a
sudden all of the political parties got old: The 15M Movement in
Spain. Social Movement Studies, 10(4), 407-413.
International Labor Organization. (2010). Brazil’s response to the
crisis. International Labor Organization. Retreived from http://
www.dol.gov/ilab/media/events/G20_ministersmeeting/
G20-brazil-brief.pdf
International Labor Organization. (2011). Brazil: An innovative incomeled strategy. Geneva: ILO.
International Monetary Fund. (2012). Brazil’s banks need to serve
economy, navigate global risks. International Monetary Fund.
Retrieved
from
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
survey/so/2012/car073112a.htm
Kandil, M., & Morsy, H. (2010). Fiscal stimulus and credibility
in emerging countries (Working Paper 10-123.). International
Monetary Fund. Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10123.pdf
Koumparoulis, D. N., & Wong, K. C. (2012). The role of both IMF
and ECB in the current European economic crisis: A critical essay.
International Journal of Economics, Finance, & Management, 1(1), 3337.

142			

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

Lindert, K. (2006). Bolsa Familia: Cash transfers for the MJDR
program scaling-up poor. Managing for Development Results.
Retrieved from http://www.mfdr.org/sourcebook/6-1brazilbolsafamilia.pdf
Lindert, K., Linder, A., Hobbs, J., & de la Brière, B. (2007).
The nuts and bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program:
Implementing conditional cash transfers in a decentralized
context. World Bank. Retrieved from http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTLACREGTOPLABSOCPRO/Resources/
BRBolsaFamiliaDiscussionPaper.pdf
MacSwan, A. (2012, November 15). Impoverished Iberians, booming
Latin America eye new relations. Reuters. Retrieved from http://
www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/15/iberoamerica-summitidUSL5E8ME53Z20121115
Maresch, P. (2011, June 21). Minha Casa, Minha Vida: Phase two. The
Rio Times. Retrieved from http://riotimesonline.com/brazilnews/rio-politics/minha-casa-minha-vida-phase-two/
McKee, M., Karanikolos, M., Belcher, P., & Stuckler, D. (2012).
Austerity: A failed experiment on the people of Europe. Clinical
Medicine, 12(4), 346-350.
Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade. (2013,
December 7). Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida já entregou 1
milhão de moradias. Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e
Comércio Exterior. Retrieved from http://www.brasilmaior.mdic.
gov.br/noticia/index/institucional/id/1903
Ministry of Finance. (2011). Brazilian Economic Outlook, 12th Edition.
Ministério das Finanças. Retrieved from http://www.fazenda.gov.
br/portugues/docs/perspectiva-economia-brasileira/edicoes/
ENG-12Ed_PT_Mai_Jul--20-09-11--WEB.pdf
Ministry of Social Development. (2007). Primeiros resultados da
snálise da linha de base de avaliação de impacto do programa
Bolsa Família. Secretaria de Avaliação e Gestão da Informação.
Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social. Brasília.
Ministry of Social Development. (2012). Revista um ano de resultados
do plano Brasil Sem Miséria. Ministry of Social Development.
Retrieved from http://www.brasilsemmiseria.gov.br/MDS/
MDS2/brasilsemmiseria/brasilsemmiseria/arquivos/
RevistaBrasilSemMiseria_Web.pdf
Ministry of Social Development. (2013, February 19). Brasil Sem
Miséria retira 22 milhões de pessoas da extrema pobreza.
Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social. Retrieved from http://
www.mds.gov.br/saladeimprensa/noticias/2013/02/brasilsem-miseria-retira-22-milhoes-de-pessoas-da-extrema-pobreza
Morley, S. A. (2001). Distribution and growth in Latin America in an era
of structural reform: The impact of globalisation. Paris: Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Nehring, R., & McKay, B. (2013). Scaling up local initiatives: Brazil’s
food acquisition program (Working Paper No. 106). Brasilia:
International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, United Nations
Development Program.

Stimulus Measures in Brazil

143

O Futuro Começa Agora. (2012). Principal destino dos recursos do
Bolsa Família, segunda nas benefiários. O Futuro Começa Agora
(OFCA).
Ocampo, J. E. (2012). How well has Latin America fared during the
global financial crisis? The Global Economic Crisis in Latin America:
Impacts and Responses, 107, 25.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
(2011). The labor market effects of social protection systems in
emerging economies. Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/
EMO%202011%20Chap%202%20ENG.pdf
Paiva, P. (2009) Impact of economic crisis on Brazilian economy.
Revista de economia, 23, 227-244.
Plan Brasil Sem Miseria. (2012, February 14). Ceará poderá
complementar o Bolsa Família para famílias extremamente
pobres, diz deputado. Brasil Sem Miseria. Retrieved from
http://www.brasilsemmiseria.gov.br/noticias/noticias-geral/
ceara-podera-complementar-o-bolsa-familia-para-familiasextremamente-pobres-diz-deputado
Puryear, J., & Goodspeed, T. O. (2008) Building human capital: Is
Latin American education competitive? In J. Haar & J. Price
(Eds.), Can Latin America compete?: Confronting the challenges of
globalization (pp. 45-62). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
QEdu. (2013). Respostas dos professores ao questionário da Prova
Brasil 2011. QEdu. Retrieved from http://www.qedu.org.br/
brasil/pessoas/professor
Rocha, C. (2009). Developments in national policies for food and
nutrition security in Brazil. Development Policy Review, 27(1), 5166.
Romer, C., & Bernstein, J. (2009) The job impact of the American
recovery and investment plan. White House Council of Economic
Advisers. Retrieved from http://www.illinoisworknet.com/
NR/rdonlyres/6A8FF039-BEA1-47DC-A509-A781D1215B65/0/
2BidenReportARRAJobImpact.pdf
Salmon, K. (2010). Boom to bust: Reconstructing the Spanish economy.
International Journal of Iberian Studies, 23(2), 83-91.
Santarrosa, R. (2011). Impacto das transferências condicionadas de renda
sobre a proficiência dos alunos do ensino fundamental no Brasil
(Unpublished master’s dissertation). São Paulo, Fundação
Getúlio Vargas – Escolas de Economia de São Paulo.
Santin, W. (2012, October 21). Programa Minha Casa, Minha Vida
eruge ‘minicidade’ isolada. Folha de São Paulo. Retrieved from
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/1172645-programaminha-casa-minha-vida-ergue-minicidade-isolada.shtml
Santos, P. L. M., Paes-Sousa, R., Miazagi, E., Silva, T. F., & Medeiros
da Fonseca, A. M. (2011, October 19-21). The Brazilian experience
with conditional cash transfers: A successful way to reduce inequity
and to improve health. Rio de Janeiro: World Health Organization
World Conference on Social Determinants of Health.

144			

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

Schizer, D. M. (2012). Fiscal policy in an era of austerity. Harvard
Journal of Law & Public Policy, 35, 453 (missing pp).
Schoenbaum, T. J. (2012). The age of austerity: The global financial crisis
and the return to economic growth. Northampton, MA: Edward
Elgar Publishing.
Serrano, F., & Summa, R. (2011). Macroeconomic policy, growth,
and income distribution in the Brazilian economy in the 2000s.
Washington, DC: Center for Economic Policy and Research.
Soares, S. (2012). Bolsa Família: Its design, its impact, and possibilities
for the future (Working Paper No. 89). Institute for Applied
Economics Research. (incomplete ref)
Soares, F. V., Ribas, R. P., & Osório, R. G. (2010). Evaluating the impact
of Brazil’s Bolsa Família: Cash transfer programs in comparative
perspective. Latin American Research Review, 45(2), 173-190.
Soares, S., Ribas, R. P., & Soares, F. V. (2010). Targeting and coverage
of the Bolsa Família programme: Why knowing what you
measure is important in choosing the numbers (Working Paper
71). International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, United Nations
Development Program. Retrieved from http://www.ipc-undp.
org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper71.pdf
Soares, S., & Sátyro, N. (2010). O programa Bolsa Familia: Desenho
institucional, impactos, posibilidades futuras (Ipea Discussion Paper,
No. 1424). Brasilia: IPEA.
Stone, C., & Cox, K. (2008). Economic policy in a weakening economy.
Economic Policy. Retrieved from http://media.mcclatchydc.
com/smedia/2008/01/09/15/Hall-1-8-08bud.source.prod_
affiliate.91.pdf
Tcherneva, P. R. (2012). The role of fiscal policy lessons from
stabilization efforts in the United States during the great
recession. International Journal of Political Economy, 41(2), 5-25.
United Nations. (2013). Population below national poverty line, total,
percentage. UN Data. Retrieved from http://data.un.org/Data.
aspx?d=MDG&f=seriesRowID%3A581
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
(2012, November 2). Austerity measures may violate human rights.
Retrieved from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/
Pages/AusterityMeasures.aspx
Valença, M. M., & Bonates, M. F. (2009). The trajectory of social
housing policy in Brazil: From the National Housing Bank to the
Ministries of the Cities. Habitat International. (incomplete)
Williamson, J. (2009). The impact of the global financial crisis on
Brazil. Economics, Management, & Financial Markets, 4(1), 172-177.
Winter, B., & Pererira, V. (2012, November 30). Brazil economy
surprisingly weak, adds to global fears. Reuters. Retrieved
from http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/30/us-brazileconomy-gdp-idUSBRE8AT0KM20121130

Stimulus Measures in Brazil

145

With youth unemployment at 55 percent, Spanish students take to
the streets. (2013, August 2). Forbes. Retrieved from http://www.
forbes.com/sites/danalexander/2013/02/08/with-youthunemployment-at-55-percent-spanish-students-take-to-thestreets/
World Bank. (1995). Brazil: A poverty assessment. Washington, DC:
World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean Department.
World Bank. (2012, March 22). India, Brazil and South Africa address
the challenge of slums. World Bank. Retrieved from http://wbi.
worldbank.org/wbi/stories/india-brazil-and-south-africa-ibsaaddressing-challenge-slums
Wren-Lewis, S. (2011). The case against austerity today. London:
Institute for Public Policy Research.
Endnotes:
1. The poverty rate is defined as the percentage of the population
earning a per capita monthly income at or below the national
poverty line (United Nations, 2013). In 2004, the poverty line
registered at R$100 (US$50) and was adjusted various times,
registering at R$140 (US$70) in 2011 (Soares, 2012).
2. Extreme poverty is defined as living at or below a per capita
family income level, which in 2011 was R$70 (US$35) per month
(Soares, 2012).

Queensland's Budget Austerity and
Its Impact on Social Welfare:
Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?
Greg Marston
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While considerable attention has been paid to the austerity experiments in Europe, much less attention has been paid to austerity
case studies from other parts of the world. This paper examines
the case of Queensland, Australia, where the government has pursued austerity measures, while making dire warnings that unless
public debt was slashed and the public service sector downsized,
Queensland risked becoming the Spain of Australia. The comparison is incomprehensible, given the very different economic situation in Queensland compared with Spain. This comparison constructed a sense of crisis that helped to mask standard neoliberal
economic reform. While pursuing neoliberal economic policies,
the Queensland Government has also been introducing draconian
laws that limit civil liberties and political freedoms for ordinary
citizens. This mix of authoritarianism and austerity has met considerable resistance, and this dynamic is discussed in the paper,
along with the predictable and unequal impact that austerity
measures have had on the general population and social services.
Key words: Australia, Queensland, austerity, public service
sector, economic policies, neoliberal

In July 2012 the Premier of Queensland, Campbell Newman,
declared that “Queensland risked becoming the Spain of
Australia” ("Newman Makes," 2012, para. 1). The context
for this statement was the lead up to a Council of Australian
Governments (COAG) meeting of all State and Territory
Premiers and the Prime Minister of Australia to discuss a whole
of government commitment to a new Commonwealth–State
funded social insurance scheme for people living with a disability. The Queensland Premier made the comment as a justification for why Queensland would not be putting any money
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on the table towards a trial of the new policy. He claimed he
had inherited too much public debt from the previous Labor
government. In another media interview the same month he
said, “Queensland has been bankrupted—is on the way to
being bankrupted—by poor and reckless financial management" ("Queensland on Verge," 2012, para. 5). Crying poor has
long been the rallying cry of state premiers when negotiating
with the national government over funding for health, education and welfare. However, comparing Queensland to Spain
came as a surprise to even seasoned political commentators,
given the absurd nature of the argument. In mid-2012 when
the comparison was made, for example, Spain’s official unemployment rate was 24.5% compared with Queensland’s 5.5%;
the bank bailout in Spain was $125 billion alone, and economic
growth was - 0.3%, while in Queensland growth was running
at 1.4% in 2012.
We could read the sensational comments by the Premier as
a case of political theater, using Spain as a symbol of fear to construct an apparent crisis and reminding Queenslanders about
the social and economic upheaval that can happen if governments are not prepared to reign in expenditure through “tough
measures,” such as job cuts and cuts to the welfare state. But
perhaps we should read it analytically as a sign of the hegemony of austerity, a term that can be deployed as a miracle economic cure regardless of whether we are talking about Spain
or Australia, the past or the present, and regardless of all the
evidence which shows that in the vast majority of cases austerity simply doesn’t work (Blyth, 2013). Austerity might make
for good politics, particularly for conservative governments
seeking to shore up electoral support for pro-market reform,
but it doesn’t make for good policy, as the growing evidence
from Europe’s failed austerity experiments demonstrates
(Blyth, 2013; Clarke & Newman, 2012; Krugman, 2012). At the
heart of austerity is a belief that strategies of fiscal constraint
can, counter-intuitively, produce expansionary effects in national economies, increase private consumption and investment and produce growth in gross domestic product (Clarke
& Newman, 2012).
In many cases, the effects of fiscal consolidation are contraction, not expansion. While there has been much discussion
in the media and academic literature about the European cases
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of austerity, particularly the Mediterranean countries of Spain,
Italy and Greece, much less is known about how the discourse
and politics of austerity has played out in the Australian
context. Australia makes an interesting case study of the contrast between a Keynesian-inspired response to the recent
global financial crisis and its effects, which was applauded
by many international economists at the time, and a case of
neo-liberal austerity and authoritarianism as practiced by the
state of Queensland over the last two years. Such a contrasting
case study is possible to examine because of Australia’s federal
political system where there is a national level of government
and eight state and territory governments and where it is not
uncommon to have a government of one political persuasion
in power at the national level and another party of a different
political persuasion at the state and territory level.
The first part of this paper will sketch some of these political differences and contrasting policy responses by way of
providing context, before taking a more detailed examination
of Queensland’s austerity measures and their impact on social
welfare and the public sector. Here the discussion will focus
on how the problem was framed, the policy measures that followed and the link between restrictions on civil and political
rights and the erosion of social protection and social services.
The third and final part of the paper will briefly reflect on what
sort of alternative politics might be possible in light of the austerity critique.

Australia and the Aftermath of
the Global Financial Crisis
Australia was in a strong economic position at the time of
the GFC; it had one the highest rates of economic growth in
the developed world, largely based on a mining boom fueled
by China’s growth and its demand for Australia’s commodity
exports. Australia had a relatively low rate of unemployment,
at around 5%, and a favorable exchange rate. The Australian
financial system was also markedly more resilient, with a
much lower proportion of sub-prime mortgage exposure compared to the U.S. Moreover, during the crisis the Australian
banks continued to be profitable and did not require any
capital injections from the national government. The health
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of the Australian banking system also facilitated the effectiveness of the monetary and fiscal response to the fiscal crisis,
particularly by allowing much of the large easing in monetary
policy to be passed through to interest rates on loans to households and businesses, in stark contrast to the outcome in other
developed economies (ABS, 2013). Australia’s resilience was
also reflective of less documented institutional features, such
as strong corporate governance and oversight, transparent
legal structures and banking history (Ferran, Moloney, Hill, &
Coffee, 2012). Government guarantees to commercial banks to
safeguard against a possible banking collapse were also critical
in maintaining confidence in the market and among citizens
whose savings were being held by the banks. These institutional features and economic position were important, but so
were the social policy initiatives pursued during the financial
crisis, not just in terms of scale, but also in terms of type.
The government’s fiscal stimulus package, alongside the
quick response by the Reserve Bank to cut the official interest
rate, was a decisive factor. In 2009 the national government,
led by the then Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, approved
$42 billion worth of spending. This was only the first phase.
The various phases of fiscal stimulus added up to about $95
billion over two years. These comprise the $10.4 billion in
cash payments that were announced in October 2008; $15
billion in extra funding for the states (November 2008); a $4.8
billion infrastructure plan (December 2008); the $42.5 billion
package (February 2009); and another $22 billion in infrastructure spending (in the May 2009 budget). The Treasury told
the Senate economics committee in September 2009 that the
stimulus had added one percentage point to GDP growth in
2008-2009 and would add 1.6 points in 2009-2010. “This translates into a level of GDP that is 2.75 per cent higher in 2009-10
than without the stimulus,” it said in a submission. More to
the point for thousands of workers, the Treasury added this:
“The peak unemployment rate was estimated to be 1.5 per cent
lower as a result of the fiscal stimulus” (Federal Treasury, cited
in Crowe, 2013, p. 1).
There has since been debate about whether the national
government in Australia kept the stimulus going for longer
than was necessary, which then added to the budget deficit.
Whether this is the case is difficult to know. Regardless of the
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narrative that is used to explain Australia’s resilience, what is
indisputable is that Australia fared better than most advanced
economies during and in the years since the crisis began in
2008. This observation has not been lost on some of the world’s
notable economists, particularly those that are not opposed
to demand-side economic management and an interventionist state. Nobel Prize laureate and Professor at New York’s
Columbia University Joseph Stiglitz (2010, p. 1) said in a 2010
visit to Australia that, “You were lucky to have, probably, the
best designed stimulus package of any of the countries, advanced industrial countries, both in size and in design, timing
and how it was spent.”
The evidence shows that most of the stimulus money
was spent, rather than saved or used to pay down household
debt (Leigh, 2009). Payments, which were paid through the
tax system, were not taxable, and were ignored for the purposes of calculating other income support payments. It was
also possible for households to receive multiple payments. For
example, a husband and wife who each earned $40,000 and
had two school-aged children would each have received a Tax
Bonus of $900, plus $1900 in a Back to School Bonus, resulting
in an overall non-taxable bonus of $3700 for the household,
or about 4 percent of that household’s annual market income
(Leigh, 2009). It wasn’t all a success story, however. Other parts
of the stimulus package were bungled through poor implementation, such as the Homeowners Insulation Scheme, which
involved subsidizing households to have insulation installed.
A number of the suppliers were involved in fraudulent claims
for work that was never completed and other contractors were
not complying with workplace health and safety regulations,
resulting in house fires and a number of deaths of workers involved in installing the insulation in houses.
Despite these tragedies and implementation problems,
the Australian Government’s response to the crisis was swift
and decisive. For the most part, the state and territory governments around Australia followed suit, borrowing money to
spend on infrastructure projects in an effort to pump prime the
economy and increase demand to avoid a recession. Certainly
this was the path of the Queensland Labor government that
was in power in Queensland from 2001 to early 2012. However,
in April 2012 the Labor Government lost power in the state
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election and was replaced by the conservative Liberal National
Party (LNP) Coalition, led by Premier Campbell Newman. It is
this change of government and the party's version of austerity
that is discussed in the next section.

Queenland's Austerity and Impact on Social Welfare
While the national government implemented a large stimulus package when faced with a global economic crisis, the
LNP Queensland Government that came to power in 2012 had
a different response to what it perceived to be a major debt
crisis. The construction of the public policy problem is important to understand, as the earlier discussed comparison with
Spain was part of a plan to establish a sense of crisis. The other
components of the problem construction were fairly standard
narratives for a conservative government—blaming the previous Labor government for spending beyond its means, and
blaming the public service for being driven by self-interest,
rather than serving the public.
How much of this narrative is supported by the evidence is
another matter. Certainly, the previous state Labor government
borrowed, but they did so at a time when Queensland was recovering from the global financial crisis and natural disasters,
such as floods that had ravaged parts of the state. The bulk of
the borrowings were invested in infrastructure that developed
the state’s services and economic capacity: roads, bridges,
eight new hospitals, more than 200 kindergartens, 90,000 new
jobs and economic growth approaching 5% (Remeikis, 2013).
As Chris Richardson from Deloitte Access Economics argues,
“it is both financially responsible and economically prudent to
borrow to build infrastructure, and pay it off over the life of
the asset” (Richardson, cited in Riordan, 2013). These nuanced
distinctions were lost in the simplistic political messages and
policy measures of the newly elected LNP government.
Within months of coming to office, the Queensland
Government set up a Commission of Audit to determine the
state’s finances and make recommendations for what could
be done to reduce debt. At the time there was criticism about
the choice of the former Australian Treasurer, Peter Costello,
to lead the Audit Commission’s review, given that he was
the Treasurer in the Coalition Government that held office
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nationally from 1996-2007. There was even more criticism
when the executive summary of the report was released in
September 2012 over its methodology for estimating state debt,
which was inflated. As Professor of Economics John Quiggin
(2013) explains:
The Costello report switched attention from net worth
to gross debt. While this makes little economic sense in
ordinary terms (if you were buying a company, would
you care more about its net value, or its debt level), it
might be important if the ratio of debt to net worth had
risen a lot. Actually, gross debt was $24 billion in 1996,
and is $64 billion now. The ratio of gross debt to net
worth has actually fallen. (p. 1)
The Audit Commission report also failed to take into
account the value of state assets. In short, the Audit Commission
report painted a gloomy fiscal future for Queensland. The
Audit Commission report claimed that gross debt would reach
$100 billion by 2018-2019 unless urgent action was taken to
pay it down. It is against this backdrop of an inflated crisis
that the government justified its savings measures, which included cutting 14,000 public service jobs (estimated to save
the government $3.7 billion over four years). At the time, the
government claimed nobody would be sacked, the numbers
would be reduced through redundancies and not renewing
contracts. The government also emphasized that no front-line
workers would lose their jobs, a claim which was questioned
by the unions. The Premier, when interviewed at the end of
his government’s first 100 days in office, said: “What we need
to do is find new, cutting-edge ways to deliver services and
to cut down on waste and inefficiency, in particular in the
back office” (Hurst, 2012, p. 1). The state government was also
maintaining pressure on the unions by limiting the pay offer
to Queensland public servants at less than 2.5%, claiming anything higher would be unaffordable. It was ironic, then, when
in the midst of this austerity talk, the government announced
that it would be increasing state politician salaries by 9% over
two years during 2012-2013. In its defense, the Government
claimed the 9% was much less than an earlier cabinet decision
which would have seen state politicians receive a 42% pay rise
(Remeikis, 2013).
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The Queensland Government also looked to make savings
outside of their own workforce and they targeted community welfare organizations, many of which are dependent on
either Commonwealth or State grants for their operational expenses. It is difficult to get an estimate on how many organizations lost their funding or have had their funding reduced,
but the cuts were extensive. It is important to remember that
Queensland is a state that has historically been underfunded
in terms of social welfare, which reflects the legacy from the
1970s and 1980s, when the conservative government, led by
the then Premier Joh Bjelke Petersen, underinvested in education, health and welfare. Given this, there wasn’t a lot of fat
to cut when the Newman government decided to withdraw
funding for tenancy rights services, health services for gay and
lesbian people, prisoner’s legal services, youth arts programs,
women’s legal services, and diversionary court programs that
were working to break the cycle of recidivism. A representative
from the Community Legal Service argued that “Certainly, the
government should consider whether it really wants to cause
such adverse impacts to the ability of ordinary Queenslanders
to have reasonable access to justice and, through that, equality
before the law” (Keim, Marsh, & Moran, 2012, p. 1).
The Queensland Council of Social Services (QCOSS) estimated that in total there was a reduction in the amount spent
on social welfare, housing and other community services in
the 2012-13 state budget from 12.96% of total expenditure in
2011-12 to 10.72% in 2012-13. The Department of Communities
reduced funding to non-government community organizations
receiving grants and subsidies by approximately $65 million in
2012-13 (QCOSS, 2012). While these short-term savings may
look like they will save the government money, the long-term
cost may outweigh any savings. As the accountancy and consulting firm Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) pointed out, care
is required in making budget cuts, as the short-term financial
benefit to government of these cuts will be far outweighed by
the longer-term economic impact of a decline in essential community services. For example, the loss of preventative health
programs such as public health nutrition, healthy living and
chronic disease prevention programs will add further pressure to an already overburdened health system. And while the
Government expects to save $287.7 million from the removal
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of the Skilling Queenslanders for Work (SQW) program, this
needs to be balanced against the costs incurred through lost
productivity and the need to invest in tertiary services due
to entrenched and long-term unemployment (PWC, cited in
QCOSS, 2012). All of these cuts came at a time when demand
for social services, health and housing, has never been higher
in Queensland. In terms of impact on social welfare clients,
the Queensland Council of Social Service estimated that some
73,000 clients across eight different programs in Queensland
would no longer receive support (QCOSS, 2012). Cuts in
welfare spending are not borne equally; they impinge directly on the poor, the young, the sick and the disabled (Levitas,
2012). Austerity measures in Queensland are likely to produce
new landscapes of inequality. Research shows that cuts to
public service jobs and social services disproportionally impact
women because public sector employment is predominantly
female, and women, on average, are more reliant on public services than men (Theodoropoulou & Watt, 2011).
In addition to cutting services, democracy was also being
thinned. For community groups that managed to maintain
their funding, the Government installed so-called "gagging
clauses" into their funding agreements, which state that:
Where the organization receives 50 per cent or more
of its funding from Queensland Health and other
Queensland government agencies, the organization
must not advocate for state or federal legislative change.
The organization must also not include links on their
website to other organizations’ websites that advocate
for state or federal legislative change. (Queensland
Law Society, 2012, p. 1)
The Queensland Government’s argument is that not-forprofits should be delivering frontline services and not participating in the public domain for government policy changes.
The use of gagging clauses follows a similar move by the conservative national government, led by Prime Minister John
Howard from 1996-2007. The Prime Minister and his government also believed that the role of non-profit welfare groups
in addressing poverty was getting them to return to a 1800s
charity model of soup kitchens and poor relief, rather than

156			

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

systemic advocacy and policy activism (Wright, Marston, &
McDonald, 2011). The gagging clauses were removed by the
incoming Labor government in 2007. The use of gagging
clauses in Queensland has been highly criticized as an attack
on basic political freedoms and as undermining the necessary
checks and balances that underpin effective policy processes. As the Deputy President of the Queensland Law Society,
Annette Bradfield (2012), wrote at the time in The Australian
newspaper, “By making the restriction of free speech a condition of funding, the government is robbing Queenslanders,
and itself, of the ability to use information from frontline providers to consider sensible proposals for legislative reform and
identify service efficiencies” (p. 1).
Were these cuts to services and public service jobs necessary? Governments always have choices about how they construct problems, identify possible solutions and justify their
actions to the electorate. The government had chosen to put a
negative spin on debt to justify savage cuts to public services
jobs and social services. The narrative of debt and budget cuts
to reduce a budget deficit had become the mantra of the new
Queensland government ever since it was elected in April,
2012. Clearly, running budget deficits indefinitely is not in
the interests of Queenslanders. But the LNP’s cuts to public
service spending are not necessarily in the state’s best interests
either. A shortfall in revenue does not automatically imply the
need for austerity. The shortfall could be addressed by raising
taxes rather than cutting spending, or by using a mixture of
both. But the ideological stance of the Premier and his Liberal
National Party government is, of course, biased towards
smaller government and lower taxes, so raising taxes (in areas
other than household taxes) was never seriously considered
(Eltham, 2012).
The austerity cuts have not worked to reduce debt or build
growth. Since coming to government in April 2012, state debt
is up, economic growth is down, unemployment is up, and the
state’s credit rating has not improved (Eltham, 2012). In July
2013, the unemployment rate in Queensland was 6.4%, which
was the second worst unemployment rate in the country
behind Tasmania (ABS, 2013). When austerity measures drain
confidence, economic activity declines, and the state’s revenue
dries up. This is why Queensland’s debt situation is getting
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worse, not better. However, to believe the narrative of the
Premier and his front bench colleagues, it is all the fault of the
previous Labor government. Rather than looking to the past
for blame, he may be better advised to look at Europe and take
note of the simple observation that Mike Smith, CEO of the
ANZ bank, made recently on the ABC’s Inside Business about
austerity in Europe: “All this austerity doesn’t work. You’ve
got to create some stimulus as well” ("Mike Smith," 2013).
While the government has said it must cut costs to reduce
public debt, it has shown that some activities are priorities and
others are not. There are multiple examples of this over the last
two and half years. One of the first acts of the new Government
in Queensland was to scrap the Premier’s Literary Awards,
worth $200,000. At the same time, the government went ahead
with a promised grant of $200,000 to help fund the next series
of Big Brother reality TV. And, despite the crisis rhetoric in
2012, the government managed to find $110 million to upgrade
the racing industry statewide, including more than $30 million
for the Gold Coast turf club. Clearly not everyone has to pay in
an age of austerity. More recently, in late 2013, the government
has managed to find $30 million to implement its "tough new
anti-biker laws," which were introduced amidst a moral panic
about "out of control bike gangs operating in Queensland"
("New Laws," 2013). By introducing the legislation, the government has curtailed the power of the courts to make sentencing decisions, instead vesting powers in the executive arm of
government, a move criticized by many in the community and
judiciary for its failure to respect the doctrine of the separation
of powers (Agius, 2013). Effectively, the passage of this legislation marries austerity with conservative authoritarianism.
A divisive and authoritarian style of political leadership
in the context of austerity can be a dangerous mix. Silencing
criticism through “gagging clauses,” reducing the right to
justice for ordinary citizens, and reducing the discretion of
the courts in sentencing goes against the spirit of democratic
freedom, the separation of powers doctrine and parliamentary
accountability in Queensland. This is where the particularities
of the Queensland case come to the fore. Many Queensland
citizens have lived through an authoritarian governing style
under the conservative government, led by Premier Joh
Bjelke Petersen, during the 1970s and 1980s. The dictatorial

158			

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

style of governance and corruption that characterized that
government eventually led to its downfall when a judicial
inquiry was set up by Tony Fitzgerald. So while the current
Premier of Queensland Campbell Newman seeks to tap into a
global narrative about the virtue of austerity, his authoritarian
push for achieving his ends may be derailed by another narrative about Queensland with a different moral tale—ignore
the political lessons of the past at your own peril. As Tony
Fitzgerald said in his criticism of the politics and policies of the
Newman Government, “For what it’s worth, my impression is
that most Queenslanders don’t want to revisit the dark days of
political caprice and corruption” (2013, para. 2).

From Local to Global: Reflections on
Austerity and Social Welfare
Queensland is not alone in marrying austerity politics
with state authoritarianism. The violent crackdown on street
protesters in the UK, Greece, and Spain, reveals the lengths
to which governments will go to enforce their austerity policies. A new report published by the International Network of
Civil Liberties Organizations has chronicled the global trend
by “democratic” states towards an increased tendency to criminalize dissent and utilize excessive legal and physical force
against lawful demonstrations against political authority. The
research identifies a convergence among countries such as
the United States, Israel, Canada, Argentina, Egypt, Hungary,
Kenya, South Africa and Britain towards the increasing militarization of policing, justified in the name of fighting terrorism, but predominantly employed against mass domestic protests (Kennedy, 2013). Other research has examined the link
between austerity and authoritarianism in Europe and found
that while autocracies and democracies show broadly similar
responses to budget cuts, countries with more constraints on
the executive arm of government are less likely to see social
unrest after austerity measures (Ponticelli & Voth, 2011). The
state can obviously choose to respond to protests against neoliberal austerity in a variety of ways.
In this context, it is worth pointing out that Brisbane, the
capital of Queensland, will be hosting the G20 summit in 2014.
Civil liberty and human rights groups have already raised
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concerns about the introduction of the G20 (Safety and Security)
Act, which passed the Queensland Parliament in November
2013. The law allows the police commissioner to list people
prohibited from entering secure zones in Brisbane and Cairns
during the November 2014 summit. Police will also be allowed
to detain unauthorized people found inside secure areas. The
Police Minister, Jack Dempsey, says legitimate protests will be
allowed, but they will act on intelligence from sources including foreign and domestic security services. Protest groups at
previous G20 summits included a mix of non-profits, church
groups, trade unions, and peace groups. These groups protested against excessive corporate profit, unfair trade deals and
militarism.
According to the sociologist Loic Wacquant (2011) these
tough law and order responses to social protest against neoliberal austerity or economic globalization reflect a growing
convergence of the logic of prisonfare and workfare in
Anglophone welfare states:
The downsizing of public aid, complemented by the
shift from the right to welfare to obligation of workfare
(that is, forced participation in subpar employment as
a condition of support), and the upsizing of the prison
are the two sides of the same coin. Together, workfare
and prisonfare effect the double regulation of poverty
in the age of deepening economic inequality and
diffusing social insecurity. (p. 34)
Racialized backlashes are also coming to the fore in countries that have implemented tough austerity measures. Violence
against immigrants as a response to domestic economic insecurity is on the rise in a number of European countries, fueled
by the propaganda of extreme right wing political parties. The
labor market economist Guy Standing (2011) discusses this
phenomenon in his book The Precariat, where he draws the distinction between a progressive politics of hope in responding
to economic insecurity (in which the state implements universal policies to provide a basic measure of economic security)
and a politics of inferno, in which immigrants are demonized
and constructed as scapegoats.
Given the social, political and economic consequences of
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austerity, it is difficult to fathom why governments persist
with its implementation. It is not simply a case of no other alternatives, as Mark Blyth (2013) shows in his exhaustive analysis of the origins of austerity. He suggests the answer to this
question lies in the power of economic ideas, particularly the
variants of liberalism. He is referring to the sensibility within
liberalism that sees the state as something to be minimized,
avoided, curtailed, and certainly not to be trusted. This view
of the state, however, misses Polanyi’s (1944) enduring analytical point that there is nothing natural about markets; states
make markets as much as markets make states through multiple forms of regulation. Liberal economic thought remains
oblivious to these facts, and as a result, contemporary neoliberals who argue for austerity come at the issue with an antistatist neuralgia that produces “cut the state” as the default
answer, regardless of the question asked or its appropriateness
(Blyth, 2013, p. 99). And unlike forms of austerity in the past,
such as that in post-war Europe which included a powerful
nation-building narrative, it is not clear what the benefits of
sacrifice of contemporary austerity are, particularly as the financial pain is not been being borne equally. Deepening social
inequalities have induced both discomfort and discontent,
making the popular austerity claim that “we are all in this together” simply implausible (Clarke & Newman, 2012, p. 314).
Nonetheless, it seems we will be faced with repeating the
economic mistakes of the past until the parties implementing
austerity measures are voted out, or the pressure from collective opposition is sufficient enough challenge to this particular form of path dependency. There are many individuals
and groups in the community who are not satisfied with the
aim of austerity measures being a case of restoring "business
as usual." For these groups, business as usual is no longer socially or ecologically viable. Perhaps one of the lessons from
the austerity case of Queensland, as well as in Europe, is to
use other political theories to analyze challenge and resistance
than those offered by institutional approaches.
A great deal of resistance against austerity happens on
the streets and in other public spheres. In the Queensland
case, trade unions have continued to provide an indispensable means of defending the basic conditions of workers
in the face of public sector job cuts. More recently, new
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coalitions of civil liberty groups and lawyers are emerging to
challenge the erosion of procedural rights, access to justice, and
the abuse of executive power associated with authoritarian
austerity. Elsewhere, in countries like the UK, other forms of
collective organization are emerging, such as the Social Work
Action Network (SWAN), to bring together front-line workers,
students, academics and service users to discuss, debate and
challenge marketization in social work and the oppression of
migrants and asylum seekers (Ferguson & Lavalatte, 2013, p.
107).
These social movements that seek to revive the promise of
fairness and solidarity are providing important counterpoints
to the faith-based politics and practical failures associated
with austerity. Whether these forms of resistance can be effective in convincing governments to change direction remains
an open question. A pessimistic reading of the future would
suggest that we can look forward to a continuation of the dangerous mix of more austerity and more authoritarianism for
some time yet (Clarke & Newman, 2012). A more optimistic
reading might suggest that the appeal of austerity and reduced
consumption lies in the fact that they carry, at some level, the
desire for a different, more solidaristic and convivial way of
life—and it is this that we need to imagine, improvise and
create (Levitas, 2012, p. 339). Bringing these different possibilities back to the local case of Queensland, we might conclude
that the dangerous mix of unequal austerity and authoritarian
rule serves to remind Queensland citizens what they fought to
overcome in the recent past, and it is this political memory that
may help to mobilize effective resistance in the present. Many
of the placards and flyers used in street protests in Queensland
are making direct links between the new Premier and the
notorious conservative state leader from the past, Joh BjelkePetersen. For example, one of the recent postcards distributed
at a rally outside parliament read “You’ve got to be Joh-king.”

Conclusion
The comparison between the federal and the state government in the beginning of the article highlights that political ideology matters when it comes to responding to crises.
For the national Labor government it had a wider range of
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ideas laying around to dust off and apply given its intellectual
heritage through the post-war nation building years; hence,
the revitalized Keynesian-inspired fiscal stimulus response.
Whereas the Liberal National Party in Queensland was constrained by its own past, ideas that were formed as a direct reaction against post-war spending. Liberal-conservatives have
a view of the state which can be summed up as “can’t live with
it, can’t live without it, don’t want to pay for it” (Blyth, 2013,
p. 14). But the desire to apply austerity is not just ideological.
There are good reasons for wanting to clear the balance sheets
of sovereign states and ensuring the banking sector doesn’t
collapse. However, bailing-out can lead to further debt, debt
leads to deeper crisis, and crisis leads to tough austerity. This
sequence can be avoided as there are moments of choice, which
the Australian case illustrates. There are also cases within
Europe that illustrate the effect of different choices, such as the
comparison between Ireland and Iceland, where Iceland let
the banks fail and has done well in its recovery phase, while
Ireland bailed out the banks and condemned itself to a generation of misery because of it (Blyth, 2013, p. 231).
In the case of Queensland the answer to the question
framed in the title of the paper is a simple “yes,” the cure is
worse than the disease. The Queensland government, elected
in April 2012, has exaggerated the state debt problem, made
drastic budget cuts, constrained the voice of community-based
advocacy organizations and weakened both civil liberties and
the power of the judiciary to act independently. Both democracy and the welfare state are weaker as a result. Predictably,
the economy hasn’t responded as promised. Unemployment
remains historically high, investment is down, and debt has
increased in Queensland. The protests against these reforms
are continuing. Queensland trade unions continue to organize
rallies and challenge what they perceive as restrictive industrial relations laws and staffing cuts. The legal fraternity and
civil liberties groups are banding together to fight draconian
laws that restrict political freedoms and fundamental civil
rights. Parts of the community welfare sector have been vocal
in their opposition to service cuts and they have had some
limited success in getting the Federal Government to fund, for
a limited time, some of the tenancy services withdrawn by the
Queensland Government. In the context of the Queensland
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case study of austerity, it is important to note that the
advancement of social and economic rights depends on political freedoms and strong parliamentary democracy and
transparency in decision making. These issues have particular
resonance in Queensland, given its recent political history of
corruption and secrecy. In this respect, there are others costs to
austerity that are not so easily calculated, such as the crisis of
a loss of trust in governments that can result from a carefully
constructed crisis, a pre-determined policy response and deepening social inequalities.
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Book Reviews
Giuliano Bonoli, The Origins of Active Social Policy: Labour
Market and Childcare Policies in a Comparative Perspective.
Oxford University Press (2013). $ 99.00 (hardcover).
Accounts of the historical evolution of state welfare in the
Western countries since the end of the Second World War have
relied extensively on quasi-paradigmatic conceptual frameworks that seek to encapsulate the complex social, political,
economic, demographic and other changes accompanying
welfare state development. Typological representations that
classify different countries as well as stadial interpretations
that identify key historical phases in social policy evolution
have been widely used. These interpretations suggest that the
immediate post-war period was a protective stage in which
governments prioritized income maintenance and social protection, while the period following the oil shocks of the 1970s
and the election of radical right governments is viewed as one
of crisis. Recently, a new phase in social policy, one that emphasizes labor market participation and enhanced state intervention in child care, education, skills training and other investments that promote work, has been identified.
Bonoli discusses this new phase and the growing interest
in what European social policy scholars have variously called
active social policy, social investment, flexicurity, new social
risks and the Third Way. Agreeing with other writers, he believes that the emergence of active social policy marks a major
shift in social welfare in Western nations and particularly in
Europe, where the new approach has been implemented by
several governments with the support of the European Union
and OECD. The book begins by defining the concept of active
social policy with reference to the other terms that have been
used to connote more or less the same phenomenon, and this
is followed by an operationalized account of the adoption of
this approach in different countries, which reveals that most
European governments now spend more on active social
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policy than in the 1980s. The author then offers an historical
overview of the expansion of active social policy and, in a sophisticated analysis, examines various conceptual interpretations of active social policy, including those that question
the idea that European social policy has indeed moved away
from social protection towards social productivism. Two chapters compare labor market and child care policies in several
European countries in some depth, and in the final chapter, the
author grapples with some of the complexities associated with
an analysis of the changes that have taken place. In particular, the author discusses several “puzzles” which complicate
his analysis. These include: the apparent paradox of increased
spending on active social policy versus retrenchment in the
face of recent recessionary challenges; the extent to which
deterministic explanations capture complex realities; and the
problem of differences among European welfare states, some
of which have not embraced active social policy with the same
enthusiasm.
In addition to offering a readable and engaging account, the
author provides useful information on labor market and child
care policies in Europe. The two chapters describing these policies and programs will be a useful resource to scholars working
in these fields. Similarly, the documentation of recent social
policy developments in Europe makes an important contribution to comparative analysis and will be of interest to readers
around the world. But it is chiefly with regard to theoretical
interpretation that the author’s contribution will excite, largely
because he himself recognizes the complexity of the topic.
Grappling with several complex issues, including the puzzles
mentioned earlier, he examines competing views on recent
developments, struggles with exceptions to the trend towards
activation, and recognizes the challenges of reducing multifaceted and convoluted historical forces to simple propositions.
His account of different analytical interpretations of whether
active social policy is essentially a reformulation of market
liberalism, a radically new normative approach, or little more
than a restatement of older social democratic commitments, is
fascinating. Other equally complex but interesting issues are
raised throughout the book, which deserves to be widely read.
It makes a major contribution to understanding the nuances of
social policy in European countries and hopefully it will foster
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, Vol. 41, Issue 2, 2014
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other accounts that transcend the tendency in social policy to
regurgitate simplistic models. Although limited to Europe, its
analytical sophistication should be emulated in social policy
analysis in other parts of the world as well.
James Midgley, School of Social Welfare,
University of California, Berkeley
Sherry Cable, Sustainable Failures: Environmental Policy and
Democracy in a Petro-Dependent World. Temple University
Press (2012). $29.95 (paperback).
When one examines the ever-deepening state of our global
ecological crisis, environmental policies aimed at stemming
ecological degradation and growing climate instability have
self-evidently failed. Hence, our ability to successfully interrogate why is of critical import if we are to extricate ourselves and heal, in Marx’s words, “the metabolic rift” between
human society and the biosphere. Sociologist Sherry Cable,
in her new book, Sustainable Failures, attempts to address this
important question of why, despite a host of environmentally-oriented legislation stretching back many decades, neither
United States domestic, nor inter-governmental international
environmental policy, has been able to move society onto a
more environmentally benign pathway.
Domestic and international policy does not conform, as
Cable outlines, to leftist ecologist Barry Commoner’s Four
Laws of Ecology, upon which Nature operates in a sustainable
manner. Cable seeks to delineate, via extensive exposition of
legal examples, why environmental policies focus far more
on mitigation of pollution after the fact than on prevention.
Her training in sociology propels her to bring to bear an historical, cultural and socio-economic analysis that synthesizes
literature from a diverse array of fields, including select case
studies, in order to craft an answer.
In a book divided into four sections, Cable begins with
a brief and thereby necessarily schematic overview of two
million years of human social development, with the emergence of hunter-gather societies, through to today’s world
of “petro-dependency,” which she argues commences in
earnest in 1945. Part Two convincingly elucidates the failure
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of “petro-dependency,” which she argues commences in
earnest in 1945. Part Two convincingly elucidates the failure
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of U.S. domestic environmental policies to curb ever-accelerating environmental degradation, while Part Three accurately
describes the environmental failures of international environmental policies, most recently through the United Nation’s
Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and
the multi-decade process of international negotiations via the
mechanism of the Conference of the Parties (COP). The real
question, however, remains: why?
All of these failures are ultimately ascribed to living in a
“petro-dependent world.” A world which began, post-1945,
with the intensification of mechanization in agriculture based
on energy and other inputs furnished by petroleum, and the
production of novel, increasingly toxic, long-lived synthetic
products derived from oil. In turn, this decisive shift to petroleum dependency begat an increase in population and economic expansion, neither of which were cognizant of environmental limits to growth and the ecological principles outlined
in Connor’s The Closing Circle.
As Cable makes clear, her analysis, in contrast to many
other sociological writers in this area, eschews a clear and
distinctive break in modes of production between industrial
and pre-industrial societies. Rather, industrialization for Cable
merely represents an acceleration of the accumulation and
transformation of nature in the interests of human social development that began with the transition from hunter-gatherer
societies to civilization based on agriculture. Cable justifies her
unorthodox approach on the basis that she is interested in humanity’s use of the biosphere in relation to how we acquire the
resources and energy needed to stay alive, and how they are
obtained, whether that be from machines or animal/human
labor, and energy from wood, coal or oil.
Unfortunately, Cable’s chosen methodology obscures more
than it reveals. While certain chapters of her book, particularly her analysis and the attention she pays to environmental
racism, are important and refreshing, her overall analysis fails
to indicate the systemic root of the problem, which remains
hidden within the structural dynamics of capitalism.
Petro-dependency, in and of itself, is not a social force and
there is a clear social, economic and political break between
pre-capitalist and capitalist-oriented societies which cannot
be overlooked when seeking answers to the ideological and
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economic underpinnings of society, and the resultant attitude
and impact with regard to nature. Without indicating from
whence the driving force of economic expansion and the reactive nature of environmental policies and their often abused or
routinely ignored regulations emerge, the nature of the state,
and democracy under capitalism, there is no underlying social
rationale for an ultimately irrational socio-political system
hell-bent on short term objectives and growth, impelled by
profit maximization. Her analysis begs the question: would
capitalism be sustainable if it could change to non-fossil fueled
sources of energy?
Furthermore, like so many other environmentally-themed
books describing the global ecological crisis, Cable, as she declares in the preface, has learnt precious little about “how to
get out of it.” Hence, the final part of Sustainable Failures, "And
So…," is all of ten pages. Within those ten pages, however, she
makes concrete and clear her proclivity for a human declensionist argument from the origin of our species until today. A
graphic of an ever-thickening spiral, titled “Downward Spiral
to Premature Human Extinction,” shows the social evolution
of humankind as a continuous process of increasing environmental abuse, ending with our “suicidal path of petro-dependency” (p. 197).
Cable’s briefly posited solutions, due to her mistaken
analysis of the root of the problem and disregard of the social
system of capitalism, end with utopian calls for a society based
on localism and bioregionalism that mixes contradictory goals
such as local sustainability via chartered corporations, national service in agricultural knowledge, “just” discrepancies in
wealth and the bolstering of the institution of the family. All
of these are to be based on something she describes as a “perpetual energy source” (p. 198) of locally grown and distributed
food, human labor power and the reduction of toxic inputs,
processes and products. Along with her outdated focus on the
immanence of “peak oil” and, to her mind, the dire problem
over-population, her mode of analysis and alternatives end up
failing to adequately tackle her original purpose.
Chris Williams, Department of Chemical and Physical Science,
Pace University
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David Mechanic, Donna D. McAlpine, and David A. Rochefort,
Mental Health and Social Policy: Beyond Managed Care (6th
ed.). Pearson (2014). $120.47 (paperback).
David Mechanic’s Mental Health and Social Policy has become
a classic text in this field since its first introduction in 1969. The
most recent release, its sixth edition, has solidified its currency
and usefulness, reflecting the addition of two distinguished
co-authors, Donna D. McAlpine and David A. Rochefort, and
includes several new chapters and rewrites of others. Whereas
its opening chapter now succinctly discusses the social context
of mental health, the new concluding chapter on policy analysis reviews five approaches to the analysis of mental health
policies, including the use of report cards and similar benchmarks. Most chapters have been substantially updated since
the 2009 fifth edition, and the book includes coverage of the
struggle to develop community support systems in chapter 10.
It updates its former focus on managed care, discussing both
changes anticipated through the Affordable Care Act, including the current push to integrate behavioral and medical care
through such devices as health homes and accountable care
organizations. The authors very appropriately raise questions
about the implications of such integration for the seriously
mentally ill.
There is no shortage of strengths that can be cited for this
text. The least that can be said is that it is well-written, engaging, and to the point. But it will not be an easy text for many
students, partly because of the wealth of information that is
packed in, but mainly because of one of the most important
features of this book. Mechanic and his colleagues are careful
to integrate and cite empirical research pertinent to the various
problems and policies discussed, consistent with the push for
evidence-based practices. An early and particularly important
chapter in the book contains a review of research from psychiatric epidemiology, a critical but often neglected foundation
for the development of coherent mental health policies.
The book is not ideological and presents a fairly balanced
view on most topics covered, for example, the debates on psychiatric outpatient commitment. It succeeds in avoiding the
rhetoric of political correctness. It manages to do this even
while confronting such contentious issues as the changes in the
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latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, 5th Edition, and the continuing expansion in the use
of psychotropic medications.
Given the extensive history and breadth of the mental
health field, any single text will inevitably have limitations,
depending on the needs and interests of particular readers. A
key limitation involves the minimal inclusion of an international comparative perspective, both in respect to the material
on psychiatric epidemiology and mental health policies and
services. In addition, more in-depth coverage is needed for
debates on cultural competency and the needed adaptations
of mental health policies and services for a wider range of cultural and ethnic groups.
The book could also benefit from improved coverage in
three other areas. One is historical, and involves the role of the
tightening of psychiatric commitment criteria to include dangerousness, as well as procedural changes; there is considerable evidence that both have been key driving forces behind
the deinstitutionalization of mental health inpatient facilities
over the past sixty years. Unfortunately, deinstitutionalization
and changes in mental health law are covered in two separate chapters, and as such, the connections are not explored as
much as might be desired. The second area involves the continuing struggle to develop coherent community systems of
care, a dream that has been pursued through a variety of initiatives since the 1960s but has typically floundered. Given the
many truncated experiments with systemic changes, it should
come as no surprise that the interest of many has shifted to
the very important movement involving the implementation
of evidence-based practices, with increasing skepticism about
the role of systemic change as a precondition for successful use
of such practice-level changes. Chapter 10 introduces some of
these initiatives, but might be better integrated into both the
history of deinstitutionalization, as well as the discussion of
innovations in mental health care. Finally, the book would also
benefit from a more in-depth discussion of the role of the recovery movement.
Despite the noted limitations, this book is highly recommended, not only for students in the various human services
preparing for careers in mental health, but for all mental health
professionals, and particularly for mental health advocates. It
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reviews a wealth of research on the many problems in contemporary mental health systems, as well as a wide variety of
promising innovations.
Christopher G. Hudson, School of Social Work,
Salem State University
Janet Zollinger Giele, Family Policy and the American Safety Net.
Sage (2013). $26 (paperback).
In Family Policy and the American Safety Net, Janet Zollinger
Giele brings a sociologist’s perspective to understanding
family policy. While most introductory books are written by
and for family practitioners, Giele’s book provides a sociological analysis of family policy. What makes Giele’s book unique
is that, as a sociologist, she applies a structural functionalist
perspective to understand the social contexts within which
family policies emerge. Giele views family policy as an adaptive societal response to social change in the family and society.
The application of a structural functionalist perspective is both
a strength and weakness of Giele’s work.
Giele argues that to understand family policy, one must
understand the functions of the family, which she identifies
as care-giving, economic provision, residence, and the transmission of cultural identity and citizenship. Giele finds that
changes in the roles of women and the structure of the economy
have made it difficult for families to meet these functions, thus
family policy is a necessary societal response. The book begins
with chapters on the emergence of family policy and changes in
family structure and gender roles. She then organizes chapters
around each of the four functions by explaining the challenges
of contemporary families and corresponding policies. In the
last chapter, Giele provides a discussion of the process through
which family policies emerge. A great strength of Giele’s work
is that she expands family policy beyond the usual discussions of care-giving and income support to include housing
and laws related to immigration and citizenship. Giele’s use
of functionalist theory is quite effective as a rhetorical strategy
for arguing for a stronger role for family policy in the United
States.
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However, Giele’s work has a weakness typical of the functionalist perspective. Giele argues that social welfare states
have developed similar family policies because they are responding to modernization. But by attempting an analysis
at the system level, she draws attention away from human
agency. Viewing family policy as a response to system-needs
raises questions as to why the United States has much weaker
family policies than other industrialized nations or why there
has been such a strong political movement to scale back family
support policies, despite high maternal employment and high
unemployment and poverty rates in the United States. To be
fair, in the last chapter, Giele does present a theory that outlines the various groups involved in devising family policy.
But tying this process to system-needs denies the contentious
politics around family policy in the United States.
Unfortunately, the most original part of Giele’s work, her
chapter on heritage, identity, and citizenship, is also her least
successful. The chapter relies on Talcott Parsons’ study of the
assimilation of Catholics and Jews to understand the process
by which African Americans and immigrants might be integrated into American society. Because Giele relies on a model
of assimilation, she focuses on identity. With largely anecdotal
evidence, she argues that in the past, African Americans internalized a stigmatized “Negro” identity as a means of adapting
to and accepting their lower status in society. However, Giele
overlooks years of struggle and resistance by many African
Americans, even in the worst days of terror and segregation.
Giele emphasizes the importance of maintaining an “immigrant orientation” to facilitate upward mobility but neglects a
discussion of inequalities in opportunity. As a result, she fails
to address much of the literature on racial stratification.
Overall, there is much promise in Giele’s work, especially for those interested in a work that combines demographic
knowledge with a structural-functionalist perspective. Giele’s
work is useful because it provides rhetorical tools to argue in
favor of policies to support families and for its expansion of
family policy to include issues such as housing and immigration. However, it is difficult to recommend the chapter on cultural identity to a broader audience because of its neglect of
the larger literature on racial stratification.
Mary Ann Kanieski, Department of Sociology,
Saint Mary’s College
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Kenneth W. Mack & Charles Guy-Uriel (Eds.), The New Black:
What Has Changed – and What Has Not – with Race in America.
The New Press (2013). $21.95 (paperback).
The New Black is a collection of 11 thought-provoking essays
and an introduction, which juxtapose the accomplishments of
the civil rights movement with the unraveling of legal and
policy remedies. The essays examine the deep divide in the
American soul and psyche as the nation confronts its oldest
social problem in a new century. The term “New Black” is used
throughout the collection as a symbol of contemporary U.S.
race relations.
The New Black is useful for anyone who wants to learn
about the context of continuing racial/economic discrimination, and the continual exclusion of “Blacks” from a range of
spheres, including housing and education. The New Black describes how systemic racism and oppression is recalibrated,
while underscoring the need to challenge individual and collective discrimination with new strategies.
In “Political Race and the New Black” (chapter 1), Guinier
and Torres respond to a question posed by a gay Cuban at a
Critical Race conference: “What is the work we want race to
do … other than to serve as a site of grievance?” (2013, p. 18).
They propose an analytic shift from traditional civil rights for
African Americans to “political race” by identifying potential
political coalitions of those disadvantaged by current structural dynamics. Thus, “political race” is a metaphor for the
collective mobilization of people around race, class, gender,
and geography. Accordingly, “race becomes a political space
for organized resistance around a more transformative vision
of the good society ... political race is a metaphor that captures
the ideas of race as a site of emotional connection and political
engagement” (p. 20). This chapter compels readers to action,
since the concept of political race links coalitions of economically and socially disenfranchised groups and deepens knowledge about how differences are co-opted to support systems of
intersectional oppression.
In “Déjà vu All Over Again” (Chapter 2), Lee analyzes
Barack Obama’s ascendancy to the presidency as a window
into racial politics and discourse in the new millennium. Lee
focuses on how media prejudice shaped calculations about
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American voting behavior and perceptions about the election,
despite successful strategic coalitions formed to elect the first
African American President that did not fit with their narrative. In particular, Lee contends that the media’s focus on independent voters ignored the varied racial and ethnic voters
who contributed to President Obama’s victory. Challenging
the assumption that independents were primarily Whites
who transcended their racial groups’ interest by voting for
President Obama, Lee describes increasing number of Latinos,
Asians, and immigrants who do not identify with either the
Republican or Democratic Party.
In chapter 8, Bell discusses the “tolerance–violence
paradox." “The Puzzles of Racial Extremism in a “Postracial”
World” calls attention to the fact that, while many eras in
American history have moments of racial progress occurring
in the midst of violence, in this particular moment, violent
expression of racism (including racism directed at President
Obama, the increase in extremist and other bias-motivated and
anti-integration violence directed at ordinary people) alongside racial progress seem to defy logic. One explanation for
contemporary racial extremism in this post civil rights era
might be attributed to averse racism theory:
Conflicting views, such as those suggesting equal
treatment for all regardless of race and racial bias may
coexist within a particular individual. Because such
views are contradictory, averse racists subconsciously
suppress their negative views and will not discriminate
unless they can ascribe nonracial reasons. (p. 141)
Although I found the book captivating and engaging, at
times I struggled to understand the book’s main thesis. Race
has been a critical factor in the economic, social and political
structures of American society from its pre-colonial beginnings
to the present, and The New Black successfully documents the
contemporary exemplars of racism. While racism stresses differences among individuals or groups, it is not differences
themselves that lead to subordination and systemic oppression, but the interpretation of differences in policy and law
enforcement. However, because many authors are lawyers,
the level of critical analysis is dense and left me pondering the
central goal of the book: How would my new awareness of
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, Vol. 41, Issue 2, 2014

178			

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

paradox and contradictions reshape my future commitment
and actions?
Fortunately, institutions, like individuals, can evolve to
become anti-racist. The transformation begins with developing
a comprehensive understanding of how racism and oppression operate within an organization’s own walls. While The
New Black fails to explicitly identify actions needed to dismantle racism, the analysis laid out in the book should facilitate
a commitment to and concrete plans for dismantling racism
within the reader’s reach and, ultimately, in larger society.
Johnnie Hamilton-Mason, Graduate School of Social Work,
Simmons College
Jeffrey Ian Ross (Ed.), The Globalization of Supermax Prisons.
Rutgers University Press (2013). $28.95 (paperback), $72.00
(hardcover).
This book is a fascinating comparative examination of
the worldwide proliferation of supermax prisons. It appraises the historical, political, and cultural justifications in each
country, including the role of terrorism and increases in crime.
Each chapter compares the make-up of that country’s supermax population, entrance criteria, conditions of confinement,
policies and actual practices, and amenability to public scrutiny. There are myriad journal articles and several books that
examine supermax prisons in America or other countries.
However, this book fills a scholarly void as a cross-national
analysis of the implementation of these controversial facilities
and an exploration of policy diffusion and the impact of globalization on correctional policy.
The book begins with Loïc Wacquant’s introductory
summary of the historical events and consequences of the punitive turn in the American criminal justice system between
1960 and 2000. Ross discusses the importance of examining
supermax prisons from a global perspective, studying the patterns of development, implementation, and the extent of crosspollination. He then summarizes the history of American supermax prisons, their general conditions of confinement and
entrance criteria, and the critiques of them. Finally, he ends the
book along with Rothe’s two chapters on the supermax-like
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facilities at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, both replete
with the rich history of America’s war on terror.
Moving out of the U.S., Ross uses secondary data to piece
together Canada’s continuously changing policies and facilities for housing dangerous prisoners, ending with one supermax for that country. By contrast, O’Day and O’Connor discuss
the multitude of maximum security prisons that Mexico uses
to incapacitate its most dangerous and escape-prone prisoners. Though these prisons’ exteriors appear to be formidable
and escape-proof, the rampant corruption in Mexico results
in prisons being controlled by their inhabitants, providing a
sharp contrast to other countries’ incarceration regimes. Filho
outlines Brazil’s path for addressing prison riots, violence,
and gangs that resulted in the creation of a Differentiated
Disciplinary Regime for states to implement and the development of a national prison system to incapacitate Brazil’s most
dangerous criminals.
Switching to Europe, Crews describes Great Britain’s
lengthy history of addressing both its “security” and “control”
issues through many iterations of supermax facilities resembling those in America. However, Great Britain is committed
to keeping its supermax population low, addressing the needs
of mentally ill inmates, and ensuring transparency through
outside review. Resodihardjo explains how the dramatic increase in crime in the Netherlands between 1990 and 1994
resulted in building special security units that failed to deter
escapes, and ultimately the creation of one supermax prison
for a small number of prisoners that successfully deterred
escapes, yet offered prisoners more interaction, activities, and
oversight.
Buntman and Muntingh detail the creation of two South
African supermaxes modeled on U.S. policies and regimes
that appear to be more enlightened compared to their U.S.
counterparts, but whose implementation has been marred
by the neglect of law, prisoner abuse, and corruption. Brown
and Carlton situate Australia’s supermaxes as trajectories of
its historical roots—operating secondary punishment facilities within its penal colonies or institutions. They delineated three phases of these high-security units in two of their
states, explaining the transformation from brutal antiquated
facilities to equally harsh but more technologically-oriented
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facilities enhanced by inspections and accountability mechanisms. Newbold describes Paremoremo, a maximum security
prison opened in New Zealand in 1969 that initially paralleled
the path of FCI-Marion but that experienced physical and operational decline due to New Zealand’s increasing violence
and drug crime.
The book’s biggest weakness is the inclusion of the chapters on the conditions of confinement at Guantanamo and Abu
Ghraib. While these are fascinating historical accounts of neoconservative practices, including supermax and questionable
interrogation techniques, these chapters feel misaligned in this
book. Since the U.S. chapter generalizes about supermax practice for the entire country, another chapter or two highlighting
specific state supermax prisons would have made for a nice
contrast with the detail given about other countries’ supermax
regimes. However, Ross successfully delivers on his comparative analysis of supermax in nine countries and offers a measured discussion of diffusion and globalization. One is struck
by many of the global patterns found: the disproportionate
incarceration of minorities; the enormous differences that individual leaders make in successful implementation; and how
public scrutiny usually results in improved and more humane
conditions of confinement. The Globalization of Supermax Prisons
is a must-read for any student, practitioner, or scholar of punishment and correctional practices.
Ann Marie Rocheleau, Department of Sociology & Criminology,
Stonehill College

Nina Munk, The Idealist: Jeffrey Sachs and the Quest to End
Poverty. Doubleday (2013). $15.95 (paperback).
Jeffrey Sachs wants to save the world. More precisely,
his goal is to eliminate extreme poverty worldwide in a few
decades. Is this a preposterous, Promethean dream? No. It is
conceivable, and perhaps feasible: the percentage of the global
population living on less than $1.25 per day has fallen by
more than half during the past 25 years, actually meeting the
Millennium Development Goal set in 2000. However, much of
the recent global progress on poverty reduction is accounted
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for by rapid economic growth in Asia. The principal challenge
remaining is in Sub-Saharan Africa, which has seen only a
modest reduction in the proportion of the very poor—to just
under one in two.
The Idealist is the story of Jeffrey Sachs’ single-minded
drive to rescue Africa from poverty. Who is this man? Sachs is a
high-profile economist based at Columbia University. Initially
a wunderkind macroeconomist at Harvard, he notoriously
advised Russia and Bolivia in the 1980s to address their economic problems with a form of “shock therapy.” In the 1990s,
after discovering Africa beset by AIDS, malaria, and persistent
poverty, Sachs resolved to do something about it.
He became special advisor to UN Secretaries General
Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-Moon, helped create the Millennium
Development Goals, published the widely-read The End of
Poverty, campaigned with celebrities, and lobbied world
leaders for a doubling of foreign aid to Africa. For Sachs, the
existence of desperate poverty is an outrage that must be addressed immediately with all the resources that the world can
muster. He and U2 singer Bono became the world’s leading
evangelists for the idea that that extreme poverty is a shameful
failure of moral imagination and, with sufficient global political will and donor assistance, it can be eliminated in a matter
of decades.
The Idealist is a riveting account of the centerpiece of Sachs’
vision and extraordinary fundraising, the Millennium Village
Projects. The MVPs are series of unusually well-funded integrated rural development projects in Africa encompassing coordinated improvements in agriculture, small-scale industry,
education, health care, housing, and water and sanitation. If
these succeeded in raising living standards, Sachs reasoned,
he could demonstrate to donors that the only thing keeping
Africans in poverty was lack of adequate funding. Hence, the
MVP approach could then be scaled up massively with the
$200 billion—just a quarter of the 2013 Pentagon budget—
needed to eliminate extreme poverty.
Nina Munk, a contributing editor at Vanity Fair, wrote a
profile of Sachs in 2007 that ultimately led to this book. What is
especially admirable is that she spent time in two of the MVPs:
Dertu, a semi-arid community in northeast Uganda near
the Somali border; and Ruhiira, a village in the highlands of
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southwest Uganda. She talked extensively with project managers and others living in these villages. Her reporting allows
her to compare Sachs’ grand design against the realities on the
ground. The setbacks were legion: the rains fail, economic opportunities are lacking, fertilizer prices soar, and both expectations and resentments rise. The MVP headquarters in New
York insisted that farmers plant drought-resistant maize, but
the villagers just don’t like the taste, and so on.
The lives of those in The Millennium Villages have indeed
improved, according to various metrics, but progress has also
been made elsewhere in Africa. How much is attributable to
the MVPs? Unfortunately, we can’t know because Sachs was
uninterested in supporting rigorous, independent evaluations
such as randomized control trials. Experienced development
experts, explains Munk, are almost universally skeptical of
what they consider the unsustainable nature of the MVPs,
and they are personally offended by the man’s megalomania
and dismissal of their concerns. The rub is this: whereas Sachs
advocates big ideas and comprehensive solutions to African
poverty, development economists such as Esther Duflo advocate modest, empirically-grounded strategies. In addition,
recent Asian experience demonstrates that rapid economic
growth is the best way to reduce extreme poverty. Foreign aid,
as far as we know, cannot foster economic growth, but it can
help improve lives.
It is a case of hubris versus humility, but perhaps social
change needs both. Despite Jeffrey Sachs’ grandiosity, missteps, and rough edges, there is much to be learned from the
story of a brilliant, passionate visionary obsessed with ending
extreme poverty in our time. In this fine book, Nina Munk has
brought the man and his mission to life, giving us much food
for thought.
Edward U. Murphy, Global Studies and International Affairs,
Northeastern University
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Policy Press (2014). $15.00 (paperback).
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southwest Uganda. She talked extensively with project managers and others living in these villages. Her reporting allows
her to compare Sachs’ grand design against the realities on the
ground. The setbacks were legion: the rains fail, economic opportunities are lacking, fertilizer prices soar, and both expectations and resentments rise. The MVP headquarters in New
York insisted that farmers plant drought-resistant maize, but
the villagers just don’t like the taste, and so on.
The lives of those in The Millennium Villages have indeed
improved, according to various metrics, but progress has also
been made elsewhere in Africa. How much is attributable to
the MVPs? Unfortunately, we can’t know because Sachs was
uninterested in supporting rigorous, independent evaluations
such as randomized control trials. Experienced development
experts, explains Munk, are almost universally skeptical of
what they consider the unsustainable nature of the MVPs,
and they are personally offended by the man’s megalomania
and dismissal of their concerns. The rub is this: whereas Sachs
advocates big ideas and comprehensive solutions to African
poverty, development economists such as Esther Duflo advocate modest, empirically-grounded strategies. In addition,
recent Asian experience demonstrates that rapid economic
growth is the best way to reduce extreme poverty. Foreign aid,
as far as we know, cannot foster economic growth, but it can
help improve lives.
It is a case of hubris versus humility, but perhaps social
change needs both. Despite Jeffrey Sachs’ grandiosity, missteps, and rough edges, there is much to be learned from the
story of a brilliant, passionate visionary obsessed with ending
extreme poverty in our time. In this fine book, Nina Munk has
brought the man and his mission to life, giving us much food
for thought.
Edward U. Murphy, Global Studies and International Affairs,
Northeastern University
Sarah Banks (Ed.), Ethics. (Critical and Radical Debates in
Social Work, I. Ferguson & M. Lavalette, series editors).
Policy Press (2014). $15.00 (paperback).
Ethics, edited by Sarah Banks (who also contributes the
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lead essay), is a brief volume with a substantial aim: to reframe an international discussion of social work ethics. This
96 page volume (83 without the references) is part of a series
edited by Ferguson and Lavalette that aims to reignite an activist/radical approach to social work that “located the problems experienced by those who sought social work support in
the material conditions of their lives and attempted to develop
practice responses which challenged these conditions and
their effects“ (Series editors’ introduction, p. xi). Like other
series volumes on topics ranging from Poverty and Inequality,
Mental Health, and Children and Families, Ethics is structured
by a lead essay, 8 response essays of about 5 pages each, and
concluding remarks from the lead author. This very satisfying
approach forces respondents to get right to the point of their
critique, allows the readers to digest a debate in one sitting,
and skillfully frames a topic of profound importance to the
social work profession—namely the scope of its ethics in the
era of managerialism and austerity.
Banks' lead essay, “Reclaiming Social Work Ethics:
Challenging the New Public Management,” describes a resurgent interest in ethics (what some have characterized as an
ethics “boom”) in terms of two competing agendas. On the one
hand, contemporary social work ethics have been employed
to criticize the “worst excesses” of New Public Management
(NPM); on the other hand, ethics (and more particularly ethical
codes) have been part of the NPM project. For example, social
workers have argued for the need to reclaim professional authority (against for example, standardized practices) from
the position that professional expertise and ethical practice
demands that social workers challenge and resist “inhumane,
degrading and unjust practice and policies” (p. 13). At the
same time, increasingly lengthy ethical codes have been used
to discipline social workers and create ethical guidelines that
speak to the demand for public accountability.
Banks thinks that social work ethics have been coopted by
managerialism, and that the problem is rooted in traditional
ethics’ focus on the professional autonomy of the social worker
and the individual relationship between the service user and
the social worker. Thus, Banks argues for a “situated ethics of
social justice” that encompasses what others have termed an
“ethics of care,” and lays out a set of preliminary values (radical
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social justice, empathic solidarity, relational autonomy, collective responsibility for resistance, moral courage, and working
in/with complexity and contradictions) aimed at strengthening ethics against cooption and reclaiming them.
The 8 short response essays are written by authors from
a variety of countries (United States, United Kingdom, South
Africa, Japan and Canada) with a variety of viewpoints. Each
response extends and/or critiques different aspects of Banks'
argument and proposal. Beckett’s chapter ("Managerialism:
Challenging the New Orthodoxy"), for example, takes issue
with Banks' presentation of managerialism as a “straw man
to attack” that lays too much blame on the current trends
towards efficiency and accountability (“what is wrong with
trying to make the best use of limited resources?”). This critique will resonate with many readers, including students and
practitioners that have a more moderate perspective, and it is
a real strength of the book that it allows the reader to follow
a debate and develop her or his own critique. Of additional
interest is the fact that authors from multiple countries weave
in discussion of the development of their countries’ ethical
codes and degree of privatization. Thus, this book provides a
comparative, cross-national perspective on the topic of social
work ethics without requiring that the reader be an expert in
the countries represented.
This book would be a great addition to social work education, in particular courses in ethics, policy, or international
social work. Its low cost and brief yet in-depth presentation
seem ideal for generating discussion and making curriculum
more contemporary. Of note for U.S. students and curriculum
is the discussion of NPM, a topic that generally has not been
named or discussed much. This volume frames the discussion
NPM from an ethical perspective and could serve as a useful
introduction to analysis of the impact of privatization on social
work practice for U.S. social work students.
Jennifer R. Zelnick, Touro College
Graduate School of Social Work
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